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I.
The work of Professor Martin Shapiro is distinguished by lucidity, an
analytical turn of mind, formidable sophistication, and a thoroughly read-
able style. A political scientist by training, Shapiro is very much at home
with the tools and techniques of the lawyer. His flair for case analysis is
much in evidence in Law and Politics in the Supreme Court In the chap-
ters on tax and labor policy, for example, his view of the Court as a po-
litical agency furthering its interests through interaction with other agen-
cies such as the Internal Revenue Service and the National Labor Relations
Board is developed through close readings of decisions2 and comparisons
among groups of cases.' Indeed, Shapiro's analysis of the reapportionment
controversy demonstrates a regard for lawyers' sensibilities seemingly above
and beyond the call of duty-considerably more than half the chapter is
devoted to a closely reasoned parsing of the "political question" cases."
Shapiro's regard for "lawyer's law," however, is only apparently ex-
cessive. His focus on the interaction among governmental agencies in-
evitably involves consideration of cases in which the Court paces the bound-
aries of its own jurisdiction. And as Professor Bickel's work in The Least
Dangerous Branch' testifies, this judicial mapping of spheres of competence
is preeminently "lawyer's law," with compass directions provided in the
arcane terminology of "case and controversy," "standing," and "ripeness."
Yet it is precisely here that Shapiro breaks decisively with conventional
legal approaches.
Shapiro denominates his view "political jurisprudence."' Postulating
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that Court opinions represent political decisions embodying the policy
preferences of the Justices, he perceives the doctrines surveyed by Bickel as
political accommodations between the judiciary and rival centers of political
power. Devotees of polemical literature concerning the Court will recognize
this delineation.
The starting point for the recent debate has been Judge Hand's eloquent
Holmes Lectures. In those lectures, Hand confessed his inability satisfac-
torily to justify a doctrine of judicial review that enables a Court not re-
sponsible to the electorate to nullify acts of political agencies deriving their
powers directly from that electorate7 Professor Wechsler's essay on neutral
principles, by rooting the power of judicial review in the text of the Con-
stitution itself,8 attempts to lay the ghost of judicial usurpation raised by
Hand.
Shapiro, so to speak, stands Hand on his head. He accepts as given-
as the normal state of affairs-the very attempt by the Court to substitute
its policy preferences for those of the political agencies that Hand found
so difficult to justify even in exceptional circumstances Shapiro's char-
acteristically trenchant assessment of the Court's need for neutral principles
defines the gulf that separates his starting point from those of Hand and
Wechsler.
To put it bluntly, the real problem is how the Supreme Court can pursue its
policy goals without violating those popular and professional expectations of "neu-
trality," which are an important factor in our legal tradition and a principal source
of the Supreme Court's prestige. It is in these terms, not in terms of the philosophic,
jurisprudential, or historical correctness of the concept of neutral principles, that
the debate should now proceed."0
Demonstration of the superiority of one or another theory about the
role of the Court hinges upon the understanding such a theory affords of
the results embodied in particular decisions. Shapiro's most recent book'
advocates more vigorous implementation of first amendment guarantees
than would be deemed proper by Hand, Wechsler, or Justice Frankfurter-
a group whose reiterated concern that the Court might be overstepping the
legitimate boundaries of its authority leads Shapiro to designate them the
"modest." 2 That Shapiro regards this difference in attitude toward the
first amendment as dependent upon differences between his theory of
judicial review and that espoused by the "modest" is clear. The introduc-
7. See L. HAN, Tim BiLL OF RIGHTS -30 (1958).
8. See H. WEcHsLER, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, in PRINCIPLES, POLITIcs,
AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 3, 4-15 (196x).
9. See L. HAND, supra note 7, at 1-3o, 56-77.
iO. M. SHAPmo, supra note I, at 31.
ii. M. SHAPmo, FxtEEDo op SPEEcH: Tim SUPRmEM COuRT AND JUDicm Rvmw (1966).
12. Seeid. at xo8-ix.
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tory section of his book concludes: "Having cleared away the hesitancies
of judicial modesty, it is possible to proceed to the problem of what level
of protection the Supreme Court ought to give freedom of speech.""3
The first amendment, however, does not provide a satisfactory area in
which to demonstrate Shapiro's thesis more successful than the "modest"
view. True, much of the opposition to the Hand and Wechsler positions
came from those who approved results reached by the Court in decisions
that both Hand and Wechsler found illegitimate. And Shapiro does arrive
at first amendment conclusions considerably divergent from those reached
by the judge and the professor. But we are not justified in regarding one
view of the judicial role as more valuable than another simply because it,
more frequently than the other, produces substantive results with which
we agree. We might well prefer such a theory, but we could regard it as
demonstrably better than alternative views only on the basis of the criterion
by which all theories are judged: the ability satisfactorily to account for a
range of phenomena. Thus, when we say that the value of a theory con-
cerning the Court rests on its application to particular decisions, what we
mean is that successful theories satisfactorily account for results that alterna-
tive hypotheses fail to explicate.
Given this criterion, what does Shapiro's view of the Court's function
explicate-in first amendment cases-that is not also accounted for by
the views of the "modest"? Shapiro argues that the Court's clientele con-
sists of those groups and potential groups in our society that are not rep-
resented by other political agencies;' 4 that the Court, like other political
agencies, ought to act so as to create and support that clientele;15 that groups
seeking to protect speech are normally not represented by agencies other
than the Court; and, hence, that the Court ought to grant protection of
their interests a high priority." Shapiro's view thus accounts for the phe-
nomenon of the Court's affording a special status to first amendment
guarantees.
But the fact is that both Hand and Wechsler also account for this phe-
nomenon. Wechsler accepts the "preferred position" conception of first
amendment rights "insofar as it recognizes that some ordering of social
values is essential; that all cannot be given equal weight, if the Bill of
Rights is to be maintained."'7 And Hand concludes his Holmes Lectures
by "considering [in connection with the first amendment] whether, even
assuming that I am right in thinking that the Constitution does not warrant
the courts in annulling any legislation because they disapprove it on the
13. Id. at 44.
14. See id. at 34-38.
15. See id. at 2,38-39.
x6. Seeid.at xII-15.
17. H. WEcUSL , supra note 8, at 35.
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merits, nevertheless it is desirable that they should exercise such an author-
ity on extreme occasions.
'"18
Wechsler's and Hand's acceptance of a special status for first amend-
ment guarantees does not, however, imply that their decision in any given
case would accord with that arrived at by Shapiro. A great many value
judgments other than that concerning the propriety of judicial review are
involved in any given case. Consequently, even a regularly divergent pat-
tern of results might be accounted for-to choose only the most obvious of
a spectrum of possibilities-by different weights being assigned to one or
more of the other values involved in the decisions. Once the "modest" and
Shapiro reach agreement on the existence of a special status for first amend-
ment guarantees, therefore, the verdict on the superiority of Shapiro's view
of the proper role of the Court must be "not proven."
Phenomena for which the "modest" cannot account, however, are not
difficult to come by. Both Wechsler 9 and Hand"0 made clear their inability
to construct doctrinal substantiation for the Segregation Cases,2 and similar
claims of illegitimacy have recently been made22 concerning the Reap-
portionment Cases.3 These two sets of cases, moreover, represent the most
controversial recent examples of the Court's implementation of policy pref-
erences-of, in the language of the "modest," "political" action. This fact
alone, putting aside problems of demonstrating the superiority of Shapiro's
theory, would seem a sufficient basis for expecting explication of the re-
apportionment and segregation decisions to be central to his thesis.
Here, then, are the conclusions arrived at by Shapiro on the basis of
his analysis of the Reapportionment Cases:
The Court's failure to grapple with the complex philosophical and theoretical
issues that lie behind the notion of constitutional democracy led it away from the
delicate and tentative adjustments that our peculiar form of democracy requires
and into the formulation of appealing slogans. The "one man, one vote" slogan,
in equating the whole of democracy with majority-rule elections represents naive
political philosophy, bad political theory, and no political science. It remains that
the Reapportionment Cases are, in one important sense, imprudent political action.
One of the first rules of politics at any level is that a politician must keep his word.
Great tactical advantage may occasionally be gained from breaking promises, but
a politician who earns a reputation for breaking promises cannot survive very long.
Courts are not immune to this rule. One of the principal tactics of the Supreme
x8. L. HAND, supra note 7, at 56.
2g. See H. WECHsLER, supra note 8, at 36-48.
2o. See L. HAND, supra note 7, at 54-55.
21. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 ('953);
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. (1948); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (i944).
22. See, e.g., Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 1962 S. CT. Rv. 252.
23. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (x964);
Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S.
678 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (2964); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 US.
713 (964).
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Court's opponents has always been to seize upon a narrowly circumscribed opinion,
to inflate it to its logical extreme, and then to attack the extreme rather than the
actual opinion. Defenders of the Court have traditionally replied by pointing to
the limited nature of the opinions and by insisting that the Court really means only
what it says and nothing more. The Court, in its two most important postwar de-
cisions, has obviously meant more than it said, and its subsequent actions have
justified those who attacked the most extreme interpretation of its decisions. The
Court has, in a sense, not kept its word to those of its defenders who have relied
on the initially limited arguments.
The opinion in the school segregation cases was strictly limited to education
and rested upon a rationale narrowly drawn to cover only public education. Yet we
learned from the subsequent per curiam opinions that, at the time the school cases
were decided, the Court had already made up its mind that segregation, not only
in schools but also in all public facilities, was unconstitutional.
In Baker v. Carr, the Court said, as far as the jurisdictional niceties would
allow, that patently unreasonable districting was unconstitutional, but it carefully
avoided the "one man, one vote" rule and hinted strongly in other directions ...
[T]he Reapportionment Cases made it perfectly dear that what the Court had
really meant, although it had not said so, in Baker was that "one man, one vote" is
the universal rule applicable to both upper and lower houses of the state legislatures.
The advantage to the Court of such an approach in both the segregation and
apportionment cases is obvious. The first and greatest battle rages around the rela-
tively narrow and therefore most easily defended opinion. Then, when the shout-
ing has died down somewhat and the position is solidified by widespread public
acceptance, the Court goes on to what it really intended all along, the broadest and
most extreme application of its initial decision. Such tactics are politically clever,
but they may be too clever. It will hardly be possible in the immediate future to
defend any Supreme Court position by pointing to its limited scope. Attackers of
the Court will be perfectly safe in painting the most wildly exaggerated pictures
of the Court's intentions in any field it enters. It remains to be seen whether or not
the tactical advantage gained by its "delayed action" approach will compensate for
the Court's loss of that precious political asset, a reputation for candor.
24
The verdict on the comparative utility of Shapiro's approach to judicial
review must once again be "not proven." Here too Shapiro and the "mod-
est" are in agreement. Of course, convergence of Shapiro's and the "modest"
assessment of these particular results, no less than divergences, might well
be accounted for by policy preferences having nothing to do with judicial
review. In fact, Shapiro seems to share with many of those he denominates
"modest" a policy preference for the result reached in the Segregation Cases
and against that arrived at in the Reapportionment Cases.
The real importance of the quoted passage is the tone and sweep of the
condemnation of the Court's works. Indeed, if neither the segregation nor
the reapportionment decisions can satisfactorily be accounted for in terms
of Shapiro's theory, what have the "modest" to fear from it? True, Shapiro
substitutes the charge of imprudent political action for Wechsler's accusa-
24. M. SEAX'no, supra note i, at 250-52.
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tion of unprincipled-and therefore illegitimate-behavior. But that ex-
change can represent progress only for those who, on aesthetic grounds,
prefer the dull click of value-free social science to the sonorous moralism
of the law. The crucial fact remains that Shapiro characterizes as danger-
ously improper both the reapportionment and segregation decisions. If
this be the music of political jurisprudence, the "modest" ought to urge
Shapiro to play on.
What makes this coalescence of Shapiro and the "modest" startling is,
of course, the wide divergence in their starting points. Shapiro postulates
the Court as a political agency competing with other political agencies.
The "modest" postulate a need for the Court to avoid opposing political
agencies on political matters. Yet Shapiro converges with the "modest"
in disavowing two sets of "political" decisions. Unraveling the paradox
exemplified by that coalescence constitutes the task of the remainder of this
Article.
I.
Our inquiry begins with Justice Black, whose "activist" first amendment
philosophy, approved by Shapiro, -" constitutes the unnamed target of many
of the "modest" strictures. 6 Our goal, the assessment of theories concerning
the proper role of the Court, requires a focus upon cases in which the issue
of the Court's relationship with other governmental agencies is squarely
faced-in short, "lawyer's law."
During the 1962 term Black joined in two decisions that significantly
altered the relationship between federal and state courts in criminal cases:
Townsend v. Sain2 delineated a series of standards substantially expand-
ing the circumstances in which federal review of state convictions could
take place in habeas corpus proceedings; Fay v. Noia8 held inapplicable to
habeas corpus the doctrine that an adequate and independent state ground
of decision would bar federal review.
Two terms later the Court rendered its decision in Henry v. Missis-
sippi,20 in which Mississippi argued that the proceedings under attack were
insulated from Supreme Court review by the existence of an adequate and
independent state ground. Since Henry was seeking direct review of his
conviction in the Supreme Court, rather than attempting a collateral attack
in a federal district court by means of habeas corpus, Mississippi could-and
did-rely directly on Murdock v. Memphis,"0 which had derived the ade-
25. See M. SHnto, supra note ii, at io8-xi.
26. See, e.g., L. HAND, supra note 7, at 77 (penultimate sentence); cf. A. Bicic.L, supra note 5,
at 85-86.
27. 372 U.S. 293 (1963)-
28. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
29. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
30. 87 U.S. (2o Wall.) 590 (1875).
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quate-state-ground doctrine from a construction of the statute governing
direct review of state cases by the Supreme Court,3" and which Fay v. Noia
had carefully confined to cases involving direct review. 2
The Court in Henry noted that, given Noia, the existence of an adequate
state ground would not suffice to bar federal review in collateral proceed-
ings,3 3 and it also indicated some doubts as to the adequacy of the state
ground."' But the Court did not dismiss the case outright, which would
have "remanded" Henry to whatever remedies he could obtain in a subse-
quent federal habeas proceeding. Nor did it find the state ground inade-
quate and proceed to review the state conviction on the merits. What the
Court did was to remand the case to the state courts for a hearing on evi-
dence not included in the record-evidence that the Court regarded as
essential to a determination of the adequacy of the state ground." In sup-
port of this remand procedure, the Court relied on its earlier decision in
Jackson v. DennoY There, after finding New York's procedure for deter-
mining the voluntariness of challenged confessions constitutionally defec-
tive, it had remanded the case to the state courts for a hearing restricted to
the issue of voluntariness.
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the Henry decision (besides the
fact that neither of the two dissenting opinions raised the issue") was its
undercutting of the rationale of Townsend v. Sain. Townsend rested on a
recognition of the overriding importance of providing a federal forum for
determination of the facts underlying a claim of unconstitutional state
detention. And a federal forum was precisely what Henry was deprived
of by the Court's remand to the state, rather than the federal, judicial
system.
The departure, moreover, was far from unintentional. It represented,
rather, a conscious attempt to harmonize relations between state and fed-
eral courts so as to promote the efficient administration of criminal justice:
By permitting the Mississippi courts to make an initial determination of waiver,
we serve the causes of efficient administration of criminal justice, and of harmo-
nious federal-state judicial relations. Such a disposition may make unnecessary the
processing of the case through federal courts already laboring under congested
dockets, or it may make unnecessary the relitigation in a federal forum of certain
issues.... The Court is not blind to the fact that the federal habeas corpus juris-
31. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 2, 34 Stat. 385, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § x257 (1964).
32. See 372 U.S. at 426-35.
33. See 379 U.S. at 452.
34. See id. at 448-49.
35. Id. at 452.
36. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
37. Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Clark and Stewart, dissented, 379 U.S. at 457, in an opinion
stressing the adequacy of the state ground, id. at 458-63, and warning that the decision in Henry
presaged substantial erosion of the adequate-state-ground doctrine even in direct-review proceedings,
id. at 463-65. The other dissenting opinion was by Justice Black. Id. at 453.
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diction has been a source of irritation between the federal and state judiciaries. It
has been suggested that this friction might be ameliorated if the States would look
upon our decisions in [Fay v. Noia and Townsend v. Sain ] . . . as affording them
an opportunity to provide state procedures, direct or collateral, for a full airing of
federal claims. That prospect is better served by a remand than by relegating peti-
tioner to his federal habeas remedy.8"
Although Shapiro does not canvass these decisions, they provide con-
siderable support for his view of the Court as a political agency, whose
decisions reflect the need to accommodate rival govermental agencies-in
this case, the state courts. Henry, on this view, is explained by the fact that
federal judicial resources are too exiguous to implement the comprehensive
supervision of state criminal proceedings portended by Fay v. Noia and
Townsend v. Sain. Having recognized this fact, the Court would thus be led
by considerations of efficiency as well as harmony to attempt to enlist the aid
of state judicial resources."0
Justice Black dissented from the remand procedure in Henry as he had
in Jaclson v. Denno. In both cases, the objection was to "piecemeal prose-
cution," which was characterized as "unjust" and in violation of "the spirit
of the constitutional protection against double jeopardy.""0 As indicated
in Jackson v. Denno, where he bitterly dissented from the Court's invalida-
tion of a procedure in which the jury alone could resolve evidentiary dis-
putes concerning the voluntariness of a confession, Black's reluctance to
sanction remand procedures involving hearings before judges draws heavily
upon his conviction that juries are to be preferred as factfinding bodies:
"[T]he Constitution itself long ago made the decision that juries are to be
trusted."1
Yet Black joined the decision in Townsend v. Sain, which considerably
expanded the number of cases in which federal judges sitting without juries
in habeas corpus proceedings will be obliged to review findings of fact em-
bodied in the verdicts of state juries. And in Jackson v. Denno itself Black
indicated:
It is our duty when a conviction for crime comes to us based in part on a confession
to review the record to decide for ourselves whether that confession was freely and
38. Id. at 452-53 (footnotes omitted).
39. Shapiro's view of the Court's role also contributes to an analysis of the decision in Fay v.
Noiw. The obvious alternative to the decision arrived at in that case would have been a holding that
reliance by the state upon the procedural default there at issue to bar reexamination of a conviction
based on an admittedly coerced confession ran afoul of federal due process standards. Such a holding,
however, would have resulted in a substantial increase in the Court's workload. Any reliance by the
state upon a procedural default would have been open to a due process attack on direct review, and the
Court would have been forced to develop viable standards on a case-by-case basis. In effect, the deci-
sion in Fay v. Noia can be seen as a shifting of this potential workload-as well as the substantive
issues that have to be considered once reliance on the procedural default is held to be unavailing-to
the lower federal courts. The decision in Henry can be viewed as an attempt to shift the burden yet
further-to the state courts. Considerations of workload were explicitly canvassed in Murdock v.
Memphis. See 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 628-29.
40. 378 U.S. at 410; accord, 379 U.S. at 454-55.
41. 378 U.S. at 405.
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voluntarily given. In so doing we must reexamine the facts to be certain that there
has been no constitutional violation, and our inquiry to determine the facts on
which constitutional rights depend cannot be cut off by factfindings at the trial,
whether by judge or by jury.42
Are these positions of Black's reconcilable? By what warrant does the
Court, implementing constitutional guarantees, override the factual deter-
mination arrived at by a jury, if that very Constitution grants to the jury
a preferred status as a factfinder?
The answer, phrased in terms of a contrast between judges rendering
constitutional decisions and those making nonconstitutional law, rather
than between judges and juries, is to be found in Linkletter v. Walker
There the Court refused to make retroactive the holding in Mapp v. Ohio,"
which had held that illegally seized evidence was inadmissible in state crim-
inal proceedings. The reasoning of Linkletter was that (i) retroactivity
would have no deterrent effect on police conduct (since the evidence in
question had already been seized) and (2) a holding of retroactivity (due
to the need for new hearings on the admissibility of evidence long since
forgotten, destroyed, or deteriorated) "would tax the administration of
justice to the utmost."" Dissenting, Black noted:
In making this ruling the Court assumes for itself the virtue of acting in har-
mony with a comment of Justice Holmes that "[t]he life of the law has not been
logic: it has been experience." Justice Holmes was not there talking about the Con-
stitution; he was talking about the evolving judge-made law of England and of
some of our States whose judges are allowed to follow in the common law tradi-
tion.46
This discounting of the factor of experience in constitutional adjudica-
tion accounts for Black's willingness to override jury determinations where
constitutional rights are at stake. It need only be recalled that it is precisely
the factor of experience-of greater familiarity with contemporary com-
munity views and standards-that juries bring to the adjudicatory process.
Black's association of the process of constitutional adjudication with the
rigor of logic rather than the flexibility of experience is, moreover, wholly
consonant with the fact of his dissent from the "political" decision in Henry.
Thus, while the Henry dissent is based, substantively, on the inadequacy
of the state ground there at issue,"7 the Linkletter dissent strongly suggests
that even in the absence of such substantive factors Black would in many
instances find political jurisprudence, with its emphasis on flexible accom-
42. Id. at 408.
43. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
44. 3 67 U.S. 643 (196I).
45. 381 U.S. at 637.
46. Id. at 642. For an analogous attempt by Justice Black to set limits on the discretion of the
Court to give less than full retroactive effect to its decisions, in this instance in the interpretation of
statutes defining criminal conduct, see James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 222 (i96i).
47. See 379 U.S. at 455-57.
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modations among rival agencies, incompatible with the rigorous demands
of constitutional "logic."
We must defer further exploration of the issues raised by Black's con-
trast between common-law development and the processes of constitutional
adjudication until part VI of this Article. What is important for present
purposes is that Black's logic-experience dichotomy can be derived directly
from his insistence on constitutional "absolutes." As demonstrated by Pro-
fessor Reich's concise delineation of the connection between "absolutes"
and Black's opposition to the "balancing" approach long utilized by the
Court in first amendment and due process cases, Black sees an emphasis on
"experience" as underlying the constitutional "balances" he so strongly dis-
approves:
[Tihe Court's ad hoc balances are on a "slippery slope." Each is likely to reflect
present-day needs and views. Each has for a standard its predecessor, and by de-
grees what is thought shocking to the conscience or necessary to the maintenance
of democratic society may become far different from what was first conceived. The
urgencies of the day, like gravity, pull the Court along; there is no counterweight
in its formula to maintain a constant level.
The notion of "absolutes" can best be seen, then, as an answer to a process of
judging which Black believes to be out of keeping with the Constitution. It de-
veloped as a dissenting position. It represents a plea for constitutional adjudication
with definite standards.4"
Black's insistence on "absolutes" served as the focal point for the "mod-
est" attack on his views.4 Yet that insistence eventuates in a call for definite
standards in constitutional adjudication that strangely echoes Wechsler's
demand for neutral principles. Delineation of the differences between the
views of Black and those of the "modest" thus hinges on an analysis of the
neutrality of neutral principles, an issue to which we must now turn."°
III.
The problem to which Wechsler's essay is devoted is posed by him in
the following terms: The Segregation Cases (Wechsler analyzes in detail
those involving white primaries, restrictive covenants, and segregated
schools) "have the best chance of making an enduring contribution to the
quality of our society of any that I know in recent years."5" Yet Wechsler
cannot approve those decisions because they do not "rest on neutral prin-
48. Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HAmv. L. REv. 673, 743-44 (x963).
49. See authorities cited note 26 supra.
50. A bibliography of the considerable literature spawned by the neutral-principles controversy
can be found in M. S-mpmo, supra note I, at 17 n.37.
51. H. WcHSLaR, supra note 8, at 37.
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ciples" and hence are not "entitled to approval in the only terms that I
acknowledge to be relevant to a decision of the courts."52
A.
Wechsler derives the postulate that judicial decisions are legitimate only
when they rest on neutral principles from the duty of constitutional ad-
judication that he finds article III to ifnpose on the courts:
The courts have both the title and the duty when a case is properly before them
to review the actions of the other branches in the light of constitutional provisions,
even though the action involves value choices, as invariably action does. In doing
so, however, they are bound to function otherwise than as a naked power organ;
they participate as courts of law. This calls for facing how determinations of this
kind can be asserted to have any legal quality. The answer, I suggest, inheres pri-
marily in that they are-or are obliged to be-entirely principled. A principled
decision, in the sense I have in mind, is one that rests on reasons with respect to all
the issues in the case, reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend
any immediate result that is involved. When no sufficient reasons of this kind can
be assigned for overturning value choices of the other branches of the Government
or of a state, those choices must, of course, survive. Otherwise, as Holmes said in
his first opinion for the Court, "a constitution, instead of embodying only relatively
fundamental rules of right, as generally understood by all English-speaking com-
munities, would become the partisan of a particular set of ethical or economical
opinions . . . .,,15
The central difficulty with this passage is that its core is assertion rather
than explanation. It tells us that courts are "bound to function otherwise
than as a naked power organ," but it does not tell us why. Wechsler's only
approach to explanation of his assertion begins with a catalog of recent
Court decisions which, in his view, represent ad hoc rather than principled
evaluations: first amendment attacks upon congressional investigations of
suspected Communists, which their authors would not feel obliged to press
home against investigations of labor racketeers; first amendment objec-
tions to the Smith Act, which would not be raised to legislation directed
against agitators preaching racial prejudice; attempts to interpret first
amendment guarantees so as to void convictions based on advocacy of the
abstract doctrine of communism, which would not be forthcoming on be-
half of those advocating resistance to court decrees; and enthusiasm for
jury trial, which seemingly abates before the prospect of making trial by
jury available to white southerners accused of civil rights violations."
The constitutional positions described by Wechsler are, of course, those
espoused by Justice Black. Wechsler may or may not believe that Black
52. Id.
53. Id. at 27-28.
54. See id. at 2o-2i.
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personally would balk at extending first amendment protections to the
fact situations delineated above. What is clear is that Wechsler's conclu-
sion-that the positions taken by Black represent ad hoc responses to par-
ticular situations-rests on his belief that application of such guarantees to
labor racketeers and racial agitators, for example, represent extensions that
are impermissible yet necessarily entailed by Black's positions. Implicit in
Wechsler's catalog, in short, is the nub of the "modest" case against the
"absolutes" of Black's constitutional philosophy.
Wechsler continues:
All I have said, you may reply, is something no one will deny, that principles
are largely instrumental as they are employed in politics, instrumental in relation
to results that a controlling sentiment demands at any given time. Politicians
recognize this fact of life and are obliged to trim and shape their speech and votes
accordingly, unless perchance they are prepared to step aside; and the example
that John Quincy Adams set somehow is rarely followed.
That is, indeed, all I have said but I now add that whether you are tolerant,
perhaps more tolerant than I, of the ad hoc in politics, with principle reduced to
a manipulative tool, are you not also ready to agree that something else is called
for from the courts? I put it to you that the main constituent of the judicial process
is precisely that it must be genuinely principled, resting with respect to every step
that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending
the immediate result that is achieved. To be sure, the courts decide, or should de-
cide, only the case they have before them. But must they not decide on grounds of
adequate neutrality and generality, tested not only by the instant application but
by others that the principles imply? Is it not the very essence of judicial method to
insist upon attending to such other cases, preferably those involving an opposing
interest, in evaluating any principle avowed?5 r5
The need for neutral principles is thus derived by Wechsler from the
contrast between the ad hoc ways of politics and the principled processes
of the courts. This derivation, however, is crucially flawed, at least in part
because of Wechsler's use of rhetorical questions to explicate a concept
central to his scheme. The most striking difficulty involves Wechsler's
assuming the conclusion that he purports to derive. Wechsler begins by
asserting that the branches of government whose actions the Court reviews
act as "naked power organs" in arriving at ad hoc decisions. The question
he puts is why the Court may not legitimately utilize similar processes in
constitutional adjudication. His response is that principled adjudication is
the "main constituent of the judicial process." But this response is relevant
only on the assumption that the process of constitutional adjudication is
in fact a judicial process: only, in other words, if Wechsler assumes that
the Supreme Court-in the exercise of its constitutional functions-is acting
as a court rather than as a "naked power organ."
55. Id. at 21.
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By deriving the judicial need for neutral principles entirely from a con-
trast with the ad hoc decisionmaking processes of the "political" branches,
Wechsler also seriously undercuts his attack on Black's "absolutes." The
extensions of Black's positions drawn by Wechsler are regarded by him as
impermissible wholly on prudential grounds. There is nothing in the
nature of labor racketeers or racial agitators, for example, that leads Wechs-
ler to desire to protect them as such. Quite the contrary, Wechsler must
hold that the situations he sketches are ones in which courts ought to deny
any protection allegedly afforded by constitutional guarantees. Otherwise,
if Wechsler believed that courts ought to protect civil rights violators and
persons who advocate resistance to court decrees-if, in other words, Wechs-
ler held that the first amendment covered such situations-his charge that
Black's positions are ad hoc could not be maintained.
Wechsler's point, then, is that the constitutional protection afforded by
Black to Negroes and Communists, whom we do wish to protect, makes
it impossible to deny those protections to such as labor racketeers and racial
agitators, whom we ought not to protect. Given his contrast between wholly
ad hoc political branches and a wholly principled judiciary, however, that
objection-based, as it is, wholly on prudential grounds-seems one more
properly addressed to a legislature than a court.
There is, of course, the alternative of not enforcing the relevant con-
stitutional guarantee in either situation, and it seems significant that the
only example of an adequately neutral principle given by Wechsler is the
Court's abandonment of any attempt to place limitations upon congres-.
sional exercise of the commerce and taxing powers-a retreat so complete
that Wechsler is led to speculate on the possibility of principles entailing
less comprehensive abdications."8 This speculation, like the opening section
of the essay in which Wechsler derives a justification for judicial review
from a reading of the constitutional text, reassures us that there must indeed
exist constitutional checks that the Court was intended to impose upon
the acts of the political branches.
Once the existence of such limits is admitted, however, the question
arises how they are to be enforced. And it is precisely Wechsler's contrast
with the prudential, ad hoc nature of political decisions that suggests that
judicial enforcement ought to be across the board, to the utmost logical
limits of the principle enunciated, untroubled by those prudential con-
56. See id. at 32-33.
Another possible interpretation of Wechsler's catalog is that it is intended to assert only that the
first amendment principles enunciated by Black are ad hoc without asserting that no neutral principle
could be developed capable of distinguishing between, for example, Negroes and racial agitators. But
the views embodied in Wechsler's catalog are not specifically attributed to Black; what Wechsler im-
plies about the necessity of according to racial agitators the same measure of first amendment protec-
tions granted to Negroes must therefore be read as referring to the entire spectrum of possible first
amendment interpretations, not just those espoused by Black.
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siderations that the contrast relegates to the sphere of politics. Thus if
Wechsler's universe contains constitutional guarantees judicially enforce-
able otherwise than by abdication, the very contrast on the basis of which
neutral principles were found necessary mandates that those guarantees
take the form of Justice Black's "absolutes."
The final difficulty with deriving the need for neutral principles from
a contrast between ad hoc political decisions and principled judicial pro-
cesses goes to the heart of the contrast itself. Far from describing reality,
that contrast, like the use of rhetorical questions, is ultimately no more
than a literary device. Wechsler himself believes that a society governed
by political institutions whose decisions were always and entirely unprin-
cipled could not long survive; his catalog of contemporary ad hoc judicial
decisions is preceded by an historical survey of constitutional positions
taken by a President 7 and in Congress8 -- positons he deems unprincipled.
And the implied judgment is not an approving one.
Unfortunately, this commendable recognition of an obligation to prin-
ciple on the part of the political branches dissolves the very contrast from
which Wechsler derives the judicial need for neutral principles. Once it
is admitted that political decisions are only sometimes or partially ad hoc,
the literary device of a contrast can no longer serve to justify the demand
that constitutional adjudications be always and absolutely principled. Yet
that is precisely the demand that Wechsler makes.
B.
The contrast from which Wechsler derives a need for neutral principles
thus does not aid in answering the very question with which Wechsler
began: Why is it illegitimate for the Court, in the exercise of its constitu-
tional functions, to act (at least partially or sometimes) as a "naked power
organ" ? Wechsler adverts to the contrast between power organs and courts
of law almost immediately after setting out his justification for judicial
review, at a juncture in his argument preceding the introduction of the
concept of neutral principles:"
57. See id. at 18: "Was not Jefferson in the Louisiana Purchase forced to rest on an expansive
reading of the clauses granting national authority of the very kind that he had steadfastly opposed in
his attacks upon the Bank?"
58. See id. at 7-r8: "Did not New England challenge the embargo that the South supported on
the very ground on which the South was to resist New England's demand for a protective tariff?"
59. The problem to which Wechsler is responding at this point is that "[t]hose who perceive in
law only the element of fiat, in whose conception of the legal cosmos reason has no meaning or no
place, will not join gladly in the search for [criteria that can be framed and tested as an exercise of
reason and not merely as an act of willfulness or will] .... " Id. at 16. Once again, Wechsler has
structured an issue encompassing an entire spectrum of possible interactions, this time of reason and
will, so as to create a single antithesis. But we need not explore the similarities between this formu-
lation and the contrast between ad hoc politics and principled adjudication, since Wechsler immedi-
ately disclaims any intention to "try to overcome the philosophic doubt" raised by the possibility of
perceiving law as fiat, since "[tihat battle must be fought on wider fronts than that of constitutional
interpretation." Id. at 17.
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The man who simply lets his judgment turn on the immediate result may not,
however, realize that his position implies that the courts are free to function as a
naked power organ, that it is an empty affirmation to regard them, as ambivalently
he so often does, as courts of law. If he may know he disapproves of a decision
when all he knows is that it has sustained a claim put forward by a labor union
or a taxpayer, a Negro or a segregationist, a corporation or a Communist-he ac-
quiesces in the proposition that a man of different sympathy but equal informa-
tion may no less properly conclude that he approves. 0
The Court may not act as a power organ, then, because to do so entails
the possibility that persons who disagree with its results might on that
basis legitimately object to its decisions. The legitimacy of opposition to
executive and legislative decisions based on disagreement with the results
reached is, for Wechsler, a necessary concomitant of their status as power
organs. If the political branches can survive this state of affairs, however,
why does Wechsler assume that the courts could not?
One possible answer is to be found in the reasoning that underlay
Hand's position on judicial review. If constitutional adjudication is viewed
as an anomaly in a democratic society, as a process in which a politically
irresponsible institution reviews the acts of duly elected legislative and
executive officials, then of course the Court's constitutional decisions re-
quire a species of justification wholly different from that demanded of
elected institutions. That this reasoning both provides the basis for the
contrast between courts of law and power organs and defines the need for
neutral principles emerges from a reading of the passages immediately
following the contrast between ad hoc political institutions and principled
courts.
Wechsler begins by granting, as "commonplace," "that courts in con-
stitutional determinations face issues that are inescapably 'political' ...
in that they involve a choice among competing values or desires, a choice
reflected in the legislative or executive action in question, which the court
must either condemn or condone."61 The argument continues:
But what is crucial, I submit, is not the nature of the question but the nature of the
answer that may validly be given by the courts. No legislature or executive is obli-
gated by the nature of its function to support its choice of values by the type of
reasoned explanation that I have suggested is intrinsic to judicial action-however
much we may admire such a reasoned explanation when we find it in those other
realms.
Does not the special duty of the courts to judge by neutral principles addressed
to all the issues make it inapposite to contend, as Judge Hand does, that no court
can review the legislative choice-by any standard other than a fixed, "historical
meaning" of constitutional provisions-without becoming "a third legislative
chamber"? Is there not, in short, a vital difference between legislative freedom to
6o. Id. at 17.
61. Id. at 22.
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appraise the gains and losses in projected measures and the kind of principled ap-
praisal, in respect of values that can reasonably be asserted to have constitutional
dimension, that alone is in the province of the courts? Does not the difference yield
a middle ground between a judicial House of Lords and the abandonment of any
limitation on the other branches-a middle ground consisting of judicial action
that embodies what are surely the main qualities of law, its generality and its
neutrality? 62
Two factors, in addition to the textual evidence, further suggest that,
in Wechsler's scheme, the function of neutral principles is to meet the
difficulties posed by Hand. First, this interpretation provides the basis for
a meaningful statement concerning constitutional adjudication: Because
the Court, as an undemocratic institution, represents an anomaly in our
democratic society, its decisions require a higher degree of justification than
that demanded of the legislature or executive, a degree of justification em-
bodied in the demand for total neutrality. The alternative, as we have seen,
is to reduce neutral principles to a formulation that assumes the answer
it seeks to demonstrate.
Second, to view neutral principles as a response to Hand's dilemma
concerning the undemocratic nature of judicial review serves to explain
Wechsler's objection to Black's "absolutes." If judicial review represents
an exception to democratic norms that otherwise govern our polity, then,
in Wechsler's words, "the courts ought to be cautious to impose a choice of
values on the other branches or a state, based upon the Constitution, only
when they are persuaded, on an adequate and principled analysis, that the
choice is clear." 8 Given Hand's assumption, it is manifest that the Court
cannot justifiably push a constitutional principle to logical extremes; an
undemocratic Court must be a cautious Court, and a cautious Court eschews
"absolutes."
There is a difficulty, however, with the interpretation of neutral prin-
ciples delineated above. It postulates that the need for neutral principles
is rooted not-as Wechsler has it-in the nature of the judicial process, but
rather in the undemocratic nature of the Court. On this interpretation, the
contrast from which neutral principles are derived is between democratic
political branches and an undemocratic Court, not between ad hoc politics
and principled adjudication. To be sure, it is presumably the democratic
nature of the political branches that, in Wechsler's view, legitimizes their
resort to ad hoc decisions. If, however, the crucial fact in the analysis is not
that the legislature is ad hoc, but rather that it is democratic, the correspond-
ing directive to the Court must prescribe not principle, but caution.
If this interpretation of neutral principles is to be acceptable, therefore,
62. Id. at 22-23.
63. Id. at 34.
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it must account for the fact that Wechsler focused on the ad hoc rather than
the democratic aspect of the political process. Except in his series of rhetor-
ical questions, Wechsler never adverts to Hand's argument. If the concept
of neutral principles was intended to respond to Hand's dilemma, why did
that dilemma go unacknowledged?
The answer is that Wechsler had already established the legitimacy of
judicial review by means of his gloss on article III. Having thus duly exor-
cised the spectre of judicial usurpation, no warrant existed for the invoca-
tion of yet another remedy. Participation in duly prescribed rites for the
warding off of harm does not, however, prevent resort to amulets; it only
makes the wearer reluctant to reveal the identity of the evil against which
the charm offers protection.
C.
Even amulets have their uses, of course, if the danger be sufficiently
serious. Putting aside Wechsler's reading of the constitutional text, we
must, therefore, confront the question of whether the status of judicial
review in our society is so anomalous as to justify a demand for total ad-
herence to neutral principles.
The attempt to derive a need for such adherence from the contrast be-
tween an undemocratic Court and democratic political branches ultimately
suffers from precisely the same defect that marred the earlier contrast be-
tween ad hoc politics and principled adjudication. Even superficial analysis
reveals, as in the earlier instance, that the contrast between a Court wholly
insulated from the desires of the electorate and a legislature and executive
devotedly registering the will of their constituents functions rather as a
literary device than as a description of reality.
To begin with the political branches, is it at all accurate to describe
Senator Fulbright as having represented, over the years, the views of his
constituency on international affairs? It might be argued that he has care-
fully reflected those views on other issues deemed more important by that
constituency, but then what of his control over the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations? Insofar as control over that committee's affairs carries
with it the power to influence governmental decisions, Fulbright has been
exercising irresponsible power. Similarly, Congressman Mills' very con-
siderable power as chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means
is derived not from the importance of his constituency, but rather from
the central role accorded to committees in the legislative process. And power
exercised by administrative agencies is, of course, even further removed
from any direct accountability to the electorate. Shapiro's conclusion, after
a survey of the actual workings of the political system, 4 is as follows:
64. M. Simo, supra note ii, at 17-34.
January 1968]
HeinOnline -- 20 Stan L. Rev. 185 1967-1968
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
[T]he lawmaker, whom the modest so reverently endow with democracy's banner,
is none other than precisely this combination of bureaucracy, President, and Con-
gress, for, quite obviously, all three are major participants in the shaping of our
laws. In short, the lawmaker to whom the nasty old undemocratic Supreme Court
is supposed to yield so reverently because of his greater democratic virtues is the
entire mass of majoritarian-anti-majoritarian, elected-appointed, special interest-
general interest, responsible-irresponsible elements that make up American na-
tional politics. If we are off on a democratic quest, the dragon begins to look better
and better and St. George worse and worse. 5
The other side of the coin-the political irresponsibility of the Court-
is similarly far more complicated than the antithetical nature of the con-
trast might suggest. The ultimate weapons that Congress and the President
can bring to bear on the Court are analogous to those they use to influence
the decisions of the "independent" administrative agencies: control over
appropriations and a refusal to execute decisions. And the Court is cer-
tainly not unique among nonelected governmental agencies in having de-
veloped sufficient resources of its own to make either a cut in appropria-
tions or an executive refusal to enforce its decisions highly unlikely. Simi-
larly, Professor Dahl has demonstrated the considerable power available
to the President to shape the policies of the Court through the appointment
process,"8 a degree of "electoral" control analogous to that which is exercised
over the "independent" administrative agencies. Indeed, given the rela-
tively fast turnover of Justices revealed by Dahl's statistics, and the develop-
ment, in connection with several agencies, of a tradition of reappointment,
the statistical correspondence may be a quite precise one.
There is, moreover, a fundamental contradiction inherent in the posi-
tion that the Court, because it is irresponsible, ought not to make political
decisions, ought not, in the words of Holmes quoted by Wechsler, to "be-
come the partisan of a particular set of ethical or economical opinions."6
This difficulty is apparent in a passage from a recent article describing the
process by which power in the United States has tended to centralize in
federal institutions:
Sharing in the general euphoria of power, the nine justices of the Supreme Court
make major political decisions, unresponsive to the democratic process, in secret
meetings on Friday afternoons. Both the number and the scope of such decisions
steadily mount. Liberal critics have generally approved this development because
they approve the content of the decisions, while the fundamental reshaping of an
important institution seems not to trouble them. But it is a transformation which
almost certainly will come back to plague us as judicial personnel and social atti-
tudes change, and as an institution which has become more and more political
develops an even greater sensitivity to transitory shifts in the political temper.65
65. Id. at 32.
66. See Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker,
6J. Pu. L. 279,284-86 (1957).
67. Text accompanying note 53 supra.
68. Goodwin, The Shape of American Politics, Corn~mrrTAR, June z967, at 26-27.
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The quoted argument, it should be noted, follows Wechsler in intimat-
ing no disapproval of the content of the decisions "approved by liberal
critics." The point is, rather, that the Court should not have made such
decisions at all, and two arguments are offered in support. First, these deci-
sions are political in nature and hence should not be entrusted to an insti-
tution "unresponsive to the democratic process." Second, the making of
such political decisions involves a fundamental transformation of the in-
stitution that "will come back to plague us as ... [the] institution ...
develops an [ever] greater sensitivity to transitory shifts in the political
temper."
If the difficulty with entrusting political decisions to the Court is its
political unresponsiveness, ought we not welcome a "greater sensitivity to
.. . shifts in the political temper ?" If, on the other hand, we distrust de-
cisions based on transitory shifts in the electorate's mood, is not the solu-
tion precisely an institution "unresponsive to the democratic process?"
What we cannot do-once we agree that judicial review involves a duty
to render decisions that necessarily entail political consequences-is to have
it both ways, simultaneously denying legitimacy to decisions of a politically
unresponsive institution and to decisions of one that responds to shifts in
political sentiment.
The above analysis does not deny, of course, that in many areas of gov-
ernmental concern the political branches are more responsive than the
judiciary to the wishes of the electorate. Nor does it deny that, even on
issues as to which the Court might possess a special responsiveness, the
quality of that responsiveness ought to differ from the deference accorded
electoral opinion by the legislature or executive. Nor, finally, does it deny
that Court decisions will typically have far more serious consequences than
those reached by administrative agencies and that this fact ought to have
a considerable bearing on the scope and frequency of the Court's interven-
tions. The point is simply that the antithesis between democratic political
branches and an undemocratic Court is not a complete one, and hence that
a demand for total neutrality cannot be derived from that contrast.
D.
On the level of assertion rather than justification, however, Wechsler's
demand for neutrality and generality rings true. If the arguments he pre-
sents fail to establish the need for total adherence to a concept of neutral
principles, his insistence that reasoned opinions have historically been in-
tegral to the judicial process nevertheless raises the issue of the role and
content of reasoned explanation in constitutional adjudication. Any final
assessment of Wechsler's argument hinges upon the resolution of that issue.
The process of reasoned explanation embodies, according to Wechsler,
two components, neutrality and generality; but he defines neither the con-
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tent of these component parts nor the interrelationship between them.
Much of the criticism directed against Wechsler's argument presupposes
that the concept of neutral principles entails a demand for neutral criteria
on the basis of which a choice among competing values can be made." Such
a demand ultimately involves a contradiction, since the existence of a neu-
tral criterion, precisely because of its neutrality, eliminates the necessity
for choice that Wechsler agrees is "inescapable.""0 On that ground alone
the proposed interpretation seems an unlikely one. Moreover, Wechsler's
contrast between principled adjudication and ad hoc political decision-
making strongly suggests, although the distinction is never explicitly
drawn, that he was focusing on the process of applying rather than deriv-
ing constitutional principles. Presumably on the basis of arguments such
as these, Professor Ernest Brown, in a review of Wechsler's work, suggests
that the formulation "'the neutral application of general principles' ...
would be more explicit of his idea, if less arresting.""
Such a formulation exposes the fallacious assumption underlying much
of the criticism of Wechsler, but its own foundations are none too secure,
since it presupposes the existence of constitutional principles whose gen-
erality remains unaffected by the process of application. Constitutional
adjudication, however, is a process in which the general content of a con-
stitutional principle is only gradually defined by means of its application
in a concrete series of cases. Given this process, the neutrality of application
of a constitutional principle depends precisely on the degree to which its
formulation takes into account those competing principles that, under some
circumstances, require a different result; a principle is neutrally applied, in
other words, where its nonapplication in circumstances to which it is
arguably applicable can be justified by reference to competing principles.72
What this formulation makes clear is that the test of "neutral applica-
tion" is simply another way of stating a test for adequate generality. Thus,
a principle is neutrally applied when it is applied to a sufficiently large
number of diverse fact situations; but its application to those situations is
a function of the degree of generality in its formulation-of the degree to
which competing values were taken into account in the derivation of the
principle. We may, therefore, reformulate the concept of neutral principles
as requiring the general application of general constitutional principles,
and define neutrality as the concept in terms of which Wechsler tests the
adequacy of generality.
69. See, e.g., Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. Cm.
L. REv. 661 (ig6o); cf. Mueller & Schwartz, The Principle of Neutral Prindples, 7 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
57! (i96o).
70. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
71. Brown, Book Review, 62 COLUm. L. REv. 386,387 (1962).
72. A similar analysis is developed at greater length in Golding, Principled Decision-Making and
the Supreme Court, 63 COLum. L. REv. 35 (I963).
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That Professor Brown sees neutrality as no more than a test for the ade-
quacy of the generality with which a constitutional principle is expressed
is clear from the defense he offers for the Court's decision in Smith v. All-
wright.73 In that case, involving primary elections conducted by the Texas
Democratic Party, which was treated by state law as a private voluntary
association, the Court held attempts to exclude persons from the primaries
on the basis of race violative of constitutional guarantees. Wechsler con-
demns the decision as unprincipled because the principle involved seems
to him necessarily to entail the impermissible proposition that political
parties could not be organized exclusively on the basis of religious, eco-
nomic, or social classifications or ideologies.74 Brown responds:
Cause and effect are difficult to establish in political institutions, but it is at least
a tenable thesis that the system of legally significant primary elections is an out-
growth of a party system in which the major parties, to which primaries signifi-
candy relate, have historically been amorphous, heterogeneous, and heterodox. In
dealing with an institution in what is, I should think, its predominant historical
and functional context, it seems questionable that Smith v. Allwright can be con-
sidered unprincipled because it did not anticipate possibilities lying in a hypo-
thetical, and different, futureY
Significantly, Brown denies neither that the extension postulated by
Wechsler is necessarily entailed by the Allwright principle nor that the
extension would be impermissible. His point, rather, is that, given the his-
torical context in which the case arose, it was unnecessary for the Court to
consider Wechsler's extension in formulating the constitutional principle
involved. According to Brown, in short, the Alllwright principle was ade-
quately general because the factual situation stressed by Wechsler, in which
the principle could not neutrally be applied, was one unlikely to arise in
the foreseeable future.
One response to this analysis would deny the legitimacy of relying upon
an historical context to set limits on the degree of generality that can be
accepted as adequate. Generality is adequate, such a response would run,
only when the principle involved can be demonstrated to be applicable
neutrally in any conceivable factual situation. Although the phrasing is
different, such a response represents simply a reformulation of the demand
for totally principled adjudication, a demand that, as we have seen, could not
be justified in terms of Wechsler's argument.
The demand for adequately general principles, moreover, is not ad.
vanced as part of a theoretical model, but rather as a standard for judging
the legitimacy of constitutional decisions. The position that adequacy re-
quires neutral application in any conceivable set of circumstances in fact
73. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
74. H. NVecHSImx, supra note 8, at 39-40.
75- Brown, supra note 71, at 39!.
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demands that judges decide cases on the basis of a constitutional principle
only when that principle forms part of a completely coherent system appli-
cable across the board. Such a total system may in theory be possible,
although everything in our experience of constitutional adjudication coun-
sels the contrary. But the crucial point in this context is an empirical one:
the practical impossibility of constructing a completely coherent system of
constitutional law at any given time. The demand for total generality, like
the demand for totally principled adjudication,76 thus renders superfluous
any defense of judicial review; a Court that could review only after it had
constructed a totally coherent system would in practice not review at all.
We need not, in this connection, assess the validity of the particular
justification offered by Brown for the Al/wright decision. It may be, for
example, that only factors other than historical ones may legitimately be
used to delimit the generality required of constitutional principles. Simi-
larly, the historical context in which Al/wright arose may not be capable
of supporting the interpretation Brown seeks to place upon the case. Neither
of these possibilities, however, detracts from the insight crucial to Brown's
analysis: that adequate generality cannot be synonymous with total gen-
erality.
E.
The care with which Wechsler establishes a constitutional justification
for judicial review-travail that a demand for total generality would render
superfluous-strongly suggests that he would not himself regard the con-
cept of neutral principles as entailing such a demand. Textual arguments
aside, however, the issue is one that can best be analyzed in the setting of
a concrete case. I choose Brown v. Board of Education" because that case
posed most sharply for Wechsler the dilemma that precisely those cases
with "the best chance of making an enduring contribution to the quality
of our society" had to be disapproved because they did not rest on neutral
principles.
The problem that Brown poses for Wechsler is the absence of a neutral
principle upon which a choice in favor of integration can be based, "[g]iven
a situation where the state must practically choose between denying the
association to those individuals who wish it or imposing it on those who
would avoid it." 8 Since Wechsler agrees that legitimate Court decisions
76. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
77. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
78. H. wciistR, supra note 8, at 47. Attempts have been made to deny the propriety of this
formulation of the issue posed by Brown. Dean Pollak, for example, argues that the right not to asso-
ciate is not involved because the forced association results, not from the decision in Brown, but as a
consequence of the existence of compulsory school laws, and that children who wished to exercise the
right not to associate could in any event do so by attending private schools. Pollak, Racial Discrimina-
tion and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, so8 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 29-30 (1959).
The difficulty with this argument is, of course, the financial burden involved in attending private
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"inescapably ... involve a choice among competing values or desires,""
why is not a satisfactory justification for Brown simply that, in the concrete
situation presented, the right to associate weighed more heavily than that
not to associate? There exist, of course, situations more or less analogous
in which, as Wechsler indicates, the conclusion would most likely be the
opposite,0 but that fact does no more than define the problem. Granted the
existence of analogous situations in which the values of association and non-
association would be weighted differently, the question remains why a
weighting in favor of association in Brown does not itself constitute a con-
stitutional principle of adequate generality.
Wechsler's answer is that such a decision does not rest on a neutral
principle because the "judgment turn[s] on the immediate result."' The
examples he cites, described as uses of impermissible bases for assessing,
rather than arriving at, decisions, consist of cases in which claims are ap-
proved because they have been "put forward by a labor union or a taxpayer,
a Negro or a segregationist, a corporation or a Communist."82 Using these
examples, we can more precisely define the question at issue: In what sense
is a constitutional principle inadequately general if it states that all claims
put forward by Negroes or Communists will be approved, or that all
claims advanced by segregationists or corporations will be rejected?
One response is that the principle is inadequate because it is incapable
of being applied to all cases involving, for example, claims advanced by
Negroes. But what does such an assertion mean? If it means simply that
the Court, irrespective of other values embodied in different situations, does
not intend to approve all claims advanced by Negroes, then the assertion
denies, not the adequacy of the principle's generality, but simply the good
faith of the Court in enunciating a principle it has no intention of follow-
schools. The Supreme Court has informed us that first amendment freedoms "are available to all, not
merely to those who can pay their own way." Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (5943).
If a right not to associate exists, therefore, by what warrant are those who wish to exercise it required
to shoulder an additional financial burden? Why does the fact of that burden not suffice as a basis on
which those who wish not to associate can attack a decision that forces them to choose between free
Echooling and the exercise of the right not to associate?
An analogous argument, based on the financial burden involved in attendance at a private
school in which prayers were permitted, was made by Mr. Justice Stewart in dissenting from the
Court's decision in School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 308, 312-13 (1963). In the context of the
prayer decision, Pollak meets this argument by noting that "[i]f as to a particular schoolchild a par-
ticular prayerless public school really operates to restrain his religious faith, this surely suggests not
that such a religious establishment should be tolerated, but that the child would be constitutionally
exempt from compliance with the compulsory school laws." L. Pollak, Foreword: Public Prayers in
Public Schools, 77 H~Av. L. RE%. 62, 77 (1963).
Would a similar exemption be available for children desiring to exercise the right not to associate?
A decision to the contrary would have to rest on the proposition that the free-exercise claim in the
prayer case was more compelling than the claim of a right not to associate in Brown. Such a judg-
ment, however, has nothing to do with the compulsory school laws, and represents precisely the sort
of weighing of constitutional values that Wechsler finds at the core of Brown.
79. H. WECHLmE, supra note 8, at 22.
So. See id. at 4 6.
81. Id.at 17.
82. Id.
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ing. A Court that refused to apply an enunciated principle to a fact situation
involving no values on the basis of which nonapplication could be justified
would be deciding solely on the basis of whim and caprice. Quite possibly,
then, it is the good faith of the Court, rather than the adequate generality
of the principle, that is being challenged.
The assertion that the principle could not be applied to all cases involv-
ing claims raised by Negroes could, however, have a different meaning-
a meaning that has the virtue of going to the question at issue, that of ade-
quate generality. Thus, the assertion could represent a prediction that the
principle will in a concrete case conflict with another principle-for ex-
ample, the principle that all claims put forward by Communists will be
approved in a case in which Negroes and Communists assert conflicting
claims. If this is what the assertion means, however, we have come full
circle, since the short answer to the dilemma presented by conflicting prin-
ciples is that the Court's role involves the making of a "choice among com-
peting values or desires." It was precisely Wechsler's assent to the legitimacy
of performing that task that gave rise to the inquiry into the legitimacy of
the Court's choice of association in Brown.
The circle would be broken, of course, if the assertion meant that the
possibility of conflict sufficed to render a principle inadequate. But this is
simply to restate the demand for total generality, to postulate that no
principle can legitimately be applied unless the Court can demonstrate that
it would not in any conceivable situation conflict with any other principle.
We have already noted the considerable difficulties presented by such a
position,"' further exploration of which must be deferred until part VI of
this Article. The important point for present purposes is that analysis of
the principle that all Negro claims will be approved eventuates only in a
reiteration of the flat assertion that adequate generality is equivalent to
total generality. If this were indeed Wechsler's position, then, it would be
a consistent one, but one based on assertion rather than explanation.
F.
Consistency alone, moreover, is not sufficient to make an argument
validly persuasive. An argument is validly persuasive only when its per-
suasive elements stem from the argument itself, and are not extraneous to
it. Wechsler's example, the principle that all Negro claims are to be up-
held, is persuasive; there exists general agreement that decisions based on
such a principle would be illegitimate. But this illegitimacy has nothing
whatsoever to do with Wechsler's concept of adequate generality.
As we have seen, Wechsler's test for adequacy is general applicability;
his objection to the principle that all Negro claims should be approved
83. See text accompanying notes 56, 76 supra.
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is that it represents "ad hoc evaluation '8 of the case before the Court. This
objection would be met, however, if the Court did in fact approve all Negro
claims coming before it-a course of action that would neither change the
general agreement as to the principle's illegitimacy nor be approved by
Wechsler.
Any principle, moreover, can in theory be applied with complete gen-
erality, provided only that the Court is willing to disregard the claims of all
competing values. The general agreement as to the illegitimacy of the
principle that Negro claims should always be favored does not, however,
rest on the prediction that that principle might often be held inapplicable;
indeed, the more often it was held applicable, the more illegitimate the
Court's course of action would be. That agreement rests, rather, directly
on disapproval of the content of the principle: disapproval based on the
belief that other values are equally or more important than those em-
bodied in Negro claims.
Failure to take these competing claims into account can, of course, be
described as a situation in which the content of the principle is inadequately
general. Used in this sense, however, the accusation of lack of generality
is no longer the "neutral" one of lack of general applicability, but rather
expresses disagreement with the weighting of the values from which the
principle was derived. Morover, given Wechsler's view that the principle
embodied in Brown has "the best chance of making an enduring contribu-
tion to the quality of our society of any that I know in recent years," 5 it is
difficult to perceive the basis on which he would disagree with the weight-
ing of values it embodies.
Nor can a standard of total generality be applied to the content of
principles, any more than to their applicability, since the proposition that
a principle is adequately general only if it does not involve a conflict among
values denies the possibility of the "choice among competing values" that
Wechsler agrees is a legitimate part of the Court's task. The short of this
matter, then, is that the persuasiveness of Wechsler's examples must stem
from factors extraneous to his argument. Analysis of those factors may pro-
vide a definition of "neutrality" on the basis of which decisions such as
Brown-the results of which Wechsler values so highly-can be justified.
What must be investigated is the basis for the general agreement that
the principle that all Negro claims should be approved is illegitimate. One
of the defects in the principle, embodied in the word "all," has already
been noted: the failure to take any competing value into account. Simply
delimiting the principle, however, would not suffice to meet the charge
of illegitimacy. Thus, in a suitably limited case, we might well find legiti-
84. H. WEcmLER, supra note 8, at 17.
85. Id. at 37-
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mate the principle that, all other things being equal, the claims of those
exercising the right of free speech should be favored. Yet it is precisely
Wechsler's point that we would not find legitimate even in a single case
the proposition that, all other things being equal, the Court should favor
the claims of those who are Negroes.
Nor can the difficulty be met by the analysis that the Constitution
protects rights such as free speech but not groups of people such as Negroes;
one need not search long for authority to the effect that the Reconstruction
amendments were intended to protect the newly freed slaves. Perhaps the
best illustration of the inadequacy of such an analysis is provided by Pro-
fessor Brown's justification for the Al/wright result. Wechsler, it will be
recalled, asserts that the interpretation of equal protection embodied in
Al/wright could seriously curtail the exercise of first amendment religious
and ideological freedoms. Brown dismisses the relevance of this assertion
by stressing that the historical context in which Allwright arose rendered
highly unlikely attempts to form ideological and religious political parties.
Brown's view of history, in short, leads him to the proposition that only
racial categories need be considered in assessing the legitimacy of the All-
wright result. But is this different from saying that the Allwright principle
was legitimate, despite the fact that it threatened the exercise of hypotheti-
cal religious and ideological first amendment rights, because it did protect
Negroes from actual discrimination?
The difference, of course, is one of phrasing, and the importance of
that difference is underlined by the decision in United States v. Brown, "
which struck down as violative of the constitutional prohibition against
bills of attainder a statutory provision barring Communist Party members
from the executive boards of labor organizations. The heart of the holding
was that Congress, in passing the statute, had "exceeded the authority
granted it by the Constitution" because
[t]he statute does not set forth a generally applicable rule decreeing that any per-
son who commits certain acts or possesses certain characteristics (acts and charac-
teristics which, in Congress' view, make them likely to initiate political strikes)
shall not hold union office, and leave to courts and juries the job of deciding what
persons have committed the specified acts or possess the specified characteristics.
Instead, it designates in no uncertain terms the persons who possess the feared
characteristics and therefore cannot hold union office without incurring criminal
liability-members of the Communist Party.
87
United States v. Brown rests on our society's deep-seated aversion to
attaching legal consequences to the fact of group membership vel non, an
aversion that is essential in a society as heterogeneous as ours if we are to
86. 381 U.S. 437 (x965).
87. Id. at 450.
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avoid the divisive consequences of distrust of that society on the part of
minorities. The difficulties involved in attempting to distinguish United
States v. Brown8 from the Court's earlier decision in American Communi-
cations Association, CIO v. Douds89 make clear, however, that stressing the
existence of this aversion is a way of stating, rather than resolving, the issue.
The fact is that all lawmaking-judicial as well as statutory--must perforce
proceed in terms of groupings larger than the single individual. Thus, a
legislative act directed against a specific person would clearly constitute a
bill of attainder,"0 and judicial decisions whose principles applied only to
the situation then before the Court would represent the acme of ad hoc
rather than principled evaluation. Even the category of persons exercising
first amendment rights, to return to an earlier example, defines an ascer-
tainable group.
The central difficulty raised by the holding in United States v. Brown that
Congress' grouping for legal purposes constituted a bill of attainder may,
therefore, be generalized. To paraphrase the quotation from Holmes that
for Wechsler sets forth the dangers to be avoided by adherence to neutral
principles,"' one man's "relatively fundamental rules of right" may well
be another man's "particular set of ethical or economical opinions." What
Brown's Alhwright justification contributes to the resolution of that diffi-
culty is the insight that the historical context may well determine the
proper classification of a given principle as either a "fundamental right"
or a "particular opinion. '
Redefining neutrality in terms of that insight, a neutral principle be-
comes one that is perceived as adequately general in terms of the historical
context in which it is applied. The question that such a reformulation
raises, however, is this: perceived as adequately general by whom? The
answer can be derived from the fact that the illegitimacy of the principle
approving all Negro claims was ultimately traced to a deeply held social
aversion to the attaching of legal consequences to membership in groups,
an aversion that is expressed in the demand that constitutional principles
be generally applicable. Adequate generality in a judicial decision-neu-
trality, if you will-is, therefore, that degree of generality perceived as
adequate by the very society that imposes the requirement of adequate
generality to begin with-that same public whose agreement that the prin-
ciple approving all Negro claims is illegitimate serves to make Wechsler's
illustrations persuasive.
88. Cf. Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966).
89. 339 U.S. 382 (950).
go. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
91. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
92. Another illustration is provided by the doubt recently cast upon the historically impeccable
proposition that legal consequences can legitimately be attached to the status of citizenship by natu-
ralization rather than birth. See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
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G.
Shapiro accepts Wechsler's demand for adequately general constitu-
tional principles, which he calls "standards," as a political necessity. He
agrees that "[i]f the Court is to be successful as a political actor, it must
have the authority and public acceptance which the principled, reasoned
opinion brings."" He goes on to note, however, that satisfying popular
expectations about the legal process
is not a political body's end but its means. It seeks to satisfy expectations in order
to build the prestige necessary to pursue policy goals successfully. A court devoted
only to creating the judicial myth and enhancing its own prestige would be simply
strutting like a peacock. A court must use its prestige to further whatever long-
range goals it has chosen....
The question then becomes one of political strategy. The availability of stan-
dards becomes one of the factors in the political equation. In those areas where
standards are most readily available and reasonably defensible, the Court enjoys
the greatest freedom to act .... Where the creation or selection of standards
would bring the Court into open collision with a politically powerful opponent or
force it to do a patent injustice, then standards may not be the order of the day. 4
What Shapiro's formulation makes clear is the danger that adherence
to neutral principles is intended to avoid: loss of the Court's ability to gain
public acceptance for its decisions. But if Shapiro agrees that "[p]olitical
institutions survive and prosper to the extent that they satisfy widely held
expectations about them,"" he is also careful to emphasize that the satis-
faction of those expectations represents no more than one of the complex
of values that the Court must weigh in arriving at a decision. Moreover, if
the concern underlying the demand for neutrality is the satisfaction of pub-
lic expectations, the weight to be accorded to that demand must be de-
termined not only by how strongly some members of the public believe a
given principle to be inadequately general, but also by the number and
influence of those who share that view-and of those who oppose it.
This last proposition affords a basis for explicating the consequences of
Wechsler's disapproval of Brown v. Board of Education. Given the high
regard in which he holds the Brown result, it would be anomalous in the
extreme for Wechsler to deny legitimacy to that decision if he alone per-
ceived the principle it embodies as inadequately general. But Wechsler's
disapproval entails more than the empirical judgment that the Brown prin-
ciple is widely perceived as inadequately general. Whatever the degree of
generality deemed by him to be adequate, and whatever the relationship of
that degree to the desirability of the result in a given case-whether, that is,
93. M. SHi~mo, supra note i, at 29.
94. Id. at 39-31.95. Id. at 29.
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Wechsler believes that a higher or lower standard of adequacy should be
imposed as the desirability of the result increases-his disapproval of Brown
embodies the judgment that the damage done to public expectations about
the Court by Brown's inadequate generality outweighs the desirability of a
result which has "the best chance of making an enduring contribution to
the quality of our society of any that I know in recent years."
It follows, from a definition of neutrality as that degree of generality
that the public perceives as adequate, that the Court ought always to de-
cide on the basis of the most general principle that can fairly be derived
-the principle that will maximize satisfaction of public expectations of
neutrality. Given that proposition, the most troublesome Court decisions
are those per curiam opinions in which no explanation at all is offered,
and hence no generality at all achieved.
It is thus no surprise that Wechsler begins his review of decisions that
cannot be justified in terms of neutrality with per curiam decisions in the
areas of film censorship and segregation.96 Strikingly, however, Shapiro's
objection to the segregation decisions also rests upon the Court's per curiam
opinions, his objection being that resort to such opinions will result in
"the Court's loss of that precious political asset, a reputation for candor."97
Loss of "a reputation for candor," however, is precisely the consequence
entailed by judicial failure to respond to the demand for neutral principles.
Is the demand for "candor," then, simply an insistence upon neutral prin-
ciples under another name? If so, the differences between the prudential
maxims of political jurisprudence and the strictures of the "modest" seem
once again to be those of style rather than substance.
IV.
At the heart of Wechsler's concept of neutral principles, as we have
seen, is the demand for generality of principle. Yet early in his argument
Wechsler warns that courts may ask "what the Constitution may require
or forbid . . . only . . . when it is necessary for decision of the case that
is at hand" 8-- a requirement that severely limits the permissible generality
of constitutional principles. Wechsler never attempts to resolve the contra-
diction between a demand for maximum generality and the requirement
that a court decide only the case at hand, but the tension between them
96. See H. Wrcssrm, supra note 8, at 28-31.
97. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
98. H. WNELER, supra note 8, at 1o; see id. at 21: "To be sure, the courts decide, or should
decide, only the case they have before them."
January 1968 ]
HeinOnline -- 20 Stan L. Rev. 197 1967-1968
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
forms the core of Professor Alexander Bickel's analysis of the work of the
Court in The Least Dangerous Branch.99
A.
Bickel, like Wechsler, treats justification of the Brown decision as the
ultimate test of his approach. He begins with a basic objection to Brown:
that the principle of decision in that case entails the constitutional invalidity
of measures such as benevolent quotas, which, like statutes requiring school
segregation, involve the state's attaching legal consequences to the fact of
race. Like Wechsler,' Bickel believes both that benevolent quotas should
not be invalidated by the Court and that the Brown principle, fairly read,
is inconsistent with a finding of their validity.' What Bickel does not
accept is that these two propositions suffice to render the Brown decision
unjustifiable; he rejects Wechsler's view that the Court may invoke only
those principles that can also justifiably be applied to all relevantly analo-
gous situations.
"Our democratic system of government," argues Bickel,
exists in [the] tension between principle and expediency, and within it judicial
review must play its role. Mr. Wechsler's dilemma is a false one. The constitu-
tional function of the Court is to define values and proclaim principles. But this is
not a function to be exercised with respect to some exceedingly few matters, while
society is left wholly to its devices of expediency in dealing with the great number
of its other concerns. Often, as with the segregation problem and slavery before it,
we require principle and expediency at once. The rule of the neutral principles
would excise the Court's function of dedaring principled goals. More, it would
require the Court to validate with overtones of principle most of what the political
institutions do merely on grounds of expediency....
The essentially important fact, so often missed, is that the Court wields a three-
fold power. It may strike down legislation as inconsistent with principle. It may
validate, or, in Charles L. Black's better word, "legitimate" legislation as consistent
with principle. Or it may do neither. It may do neither, and therein lies the secret
of its ability to maintain itself in the tension between principle and expediency. 02
Bickel's argument as to the importance of the Court's leeway to "do
neither" in any given case rests, therefore, on the insight developed at length
by Professor Charles L. Black, Jr.: In any assessment of the work of the
Court, the function performed by that body in legitimating the actions of
other agencies of government has central importance.' Bickel states:
99. A. BIcREL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SuPpRmn CoURT AT TH BAR OF POITICS
(1962).
I0. The same objection is cited in H. WECSLER, PRINCIPLES, PoLrrics, ANS FunruAENTAL LAw
xiv (ig6i).
ioi. A. BicKEL, supra note 99, at 57-65.
i02. Id. at 68-69 (italics in original).
103. See C. BLACKx, Tim PEOPLE AND THE CoURT-JUDICIAL RE IEW IN A DEMocRAcY 56-86
(i96o).
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[I]t is no small matter, in Professor Black's term, to "legitimate" a legislative
measure. The Court's prestige, the spell it casts as a symbol, enable it to entrench
and solidify measures that may have been tentative in the conception or that are
on the verge of abandonment in the execution. Regardless of what it intends, and
granted that it often intends no such thing, the Court can generate consent and
may impart permanence.10 4
Bickel's differences with Wechsler are thus defined:
The rule that the Court must legitimate whatever it is not justified in striking
down fails to attain its intended purpose of removing the Court from. the political
arena; rather, it works an uncertain and uncontrolled change in the degree of the
Court's intervention, and it shifts the direction. In the course of achieving this
result, it excises a great deal of what the institution is capable of doing without
undue offense to democratic theory and practice. At the root is the question-in the
large-of the role of principle in democratic government. No attempt to lift the
Court out of the [tension between principle and expediency] can be successful.
The rule of the neutral principles merely distorts the tension, by placing the weight
of the Court most often on the side of expediency; for that weight is felt whenever
the Court legitimates legislative choices on the constitutional merits. The Court is
able to play its full role, as it did in [Brown], maintaining itself in the tension on
which our society thrives, because it has available the many techniques and devices
of the mediating way between the ultimates of legitimation and invalidation 105
Thus, Bickel's response to the concrete problem presented by benevolent
quotas is to refer to Naim v. Naim,0. in which "the Court found no insuper-
able difficulty in leaving open the question of the constitutionality of anti-
miscegenation statutes [by dismissing an appeal from a state-court decision
upholding their constitutionality], though it would surely seem to be gov-
erned by the principle of [Brown]," and to suggest "that the Court should
similarly leave open such an issue as is offered by benevolent housing
quotas. m~
The variety of "mediating devices" that Bickel's theory makes available
to the Court, however, includes more than dismissals of appeals and denials
of certiorari. The bulk of The Least Dangerous Branch is devoted to a com-
prehensive survey of the work of the Court ranging from cases arising
under the commerce clause0" to such decisions as Kent v. Dulles; 9 and
Garner v. Louisiana,"' which, although they raised constitutional issues,
were decided on nonconstitutional grounds. Bickel presents Kent v. Dulles
as an instance of the Court's using the "delegation" doctrine to "remand"
to Congress for a "second look" a statute raising serious constitutional
104. A. Bier.EL, supra note 99, at 129.
xo5. Id. at 131-32.
xo6. 350 U.S. 985, dismissing appeal from 197 Va. 734, 90 SYI.2d 849 (1956).
107. A. Bxc=.., supra note 99, at 71.
xoS. Seeid. at 228-32.
109. 357 U.S. i16 (1958).
88o. 368 U.S. 157 (896i).
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doubts.--a type of analysis that Bickel, together with Professor Harry
Wellington, had earlier adumbrated in an article suggesting application of
the "remand" technique to Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act.112
In Garner, the Court reversed the Louisiana convictions of a group of
"sit-ins" who had been prosecuted under a statute that prohibited the
commission of certain acts "in such a manner as would foreseeably disturb
or alarm the public.""' The ultimate constitutional issue raised by the case
was the validity, under the fourteenth amendment, of the use of state power
to enforce the discriminatory policies of lunch-counter owners. The Court,
however, did not reach the constitutional merits: The ground for reversal
was that the state had introduced no evidence at trial to show that the public
was being unreasonably disturbed or alarmed.
Analyzing the case, Bickel first notes that "[i]t is not credible that a
conviction of disturbing the peace would be reversed for lack of evidence
that the public might be alarmed""' in analogous circumstances-a peace-
ful demonstration involving nudity, for example, or a peaceable refusal
either to produce a ticket for, or to leave, a seat at a Carnegie Hall concert.
But "[t]he defendants were Negroes sitting at a white lunch counter; and
as Justice Douglas, who differed from the majority and spoke to the merits,
pointed out, this was Louisiana.""' 5
"[E]verything else being equal," Bickel argues,
the Court would normally have left to the local trier of facts the choice of which
inference [as to whether or not the public was unreasonably disturbed or alarmed]
to draw. Surely the decisive factor in Garner was that everything else was jarred
into being unequal by the looming presence, in the background, of a momentous
constitutional issue. All this is not to say that the holding in the Garner case is in-
tellectually untenable. It is to say only that by its own intrinsic significance such a
holding was not necessarily to be expected or even likely. It is explained and justi-
fied as probably the most suitable and certainly the narrowest method of avoidance
consistent with the equities that favored the defendants, the method with the
fewest surrounding implications. For the upshot is merely that this prosecution
failed for reasons that are easily curable .... 116
Whether the Court's disposition is phrased in terms of lack of ripeness,
excessive delegation, or vagueness, whether what is involved is a denial of
certiorari, dismissal of an appeal, or a decision so narrowly confined as to be
applicable only to the facts then before the Court, whether the "remand"
for a second look is to the legislature, as in Kent v. Dulles, or to the prose-
i i i. See A. BIcKEL, supra note 99, at 164-66.
i 2. See Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills
Case, V' HtAv. L. REv. I, 28-35 (I957).
113. 368 U.S. at 165.
I14. A. BiCKEL, supra note 99, at 178.
115. Id.
zz6. ld. at 179.
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cutor, as in Garner, the distinguishing characteristic of the "mediating
devices and techniques"--the Court's "passive virtues"--is the avoidance of
a decision on the constitutional merits. What makes the passive virtues so
important, in Bickel's view, is:
When the Court... stays its hand, and makes clear that it is staying its hand
and not legitimating, then the political processes are given relatively free play.
Such a decision needs relatively little justification in terms of consistency with
democratic theory .... [I]n withholding constitutional judgment, the Court does
not . . . abandon principle. It seeks merely to elicit the correct answers to certain
prudential questions that ... lie in the path of ultimate issues of principle. To
this end, the Court has, over the years, developed an almost inexhaustible arsenal
of techniques and devices. Most of them are quite properly called techniques for
eliciting answers, since so often they engage the Court in a Socratic colloquy with
the other institutions of government and with society as a whole concerning the
necessity for this or that measure, for this or that compromise. All the while, the
issue of principle remains in abeyance and ripens. "The most important thing we
do," said Brandeis, "is not doing." He had in mind all the techniques, of which he
was a past master, for staying the Court's hand. They are the most important thing,
because they make possible performance of the Court's grand function as pro-
claimer and protector of the goals. These are the techniques that allow leeway to
expediency without abandoning principle. Therefore they make possible a prin-
cipled government.
117
What needs to be noted, finally, is the intimate connection between
Bickel's "mediating devices" and the techniques of adjudication long since
embodied in the common-law tradition as canons of judicial craftsmanship.
Law made by judges-common law-is not law until it is applied by a
court, and it is crucial to Bickel's theory that constitutional law is judge-
made law." 8 At the level of craftsmanship, a common-law judge might
well appraise the passive virtues as no more than applications of the ven-
erable injunction that decisions be based on the narrowest possible ground,
a connection Bickel himself draws at one point. 19 Given Bickel's presup-
positions, however, the techniques for applying constitutional law in con-
157. Id. at 70-7.
uS. See id. at 69-7o: "When it strikes down legislative policy, the Court must act rigorously on
principle, else it undermines the justification for its power. It must enunciate a goal, it must demon-
strate that what the legislature did will not measure up, and it must proclaim its readiness to defend
the goal-absolutely, if it is an absolute one. But it is not obligated to foresee all foreseeable relevant
cases and to foreclose all compromise. Indeed, it cannot. It can only decide the case before it, giving
reasons which rise to the dignity of principle and hence, of course, have a forward momentum and
broad radiations. But the compelling force of the judgment goes only to the actual case before the
Court. If it were otherwise, another part of the justification for the existence of the power [of judicial
review] would be destroyed. For, as we have seen, the Court's peculiar capacity to enunciate basic
principles inheres in large part in its opportunity to derive and test whatever generalization it pro-
claims in the concrete circumstances of a case. This is an opportunity that a legislature, constrained to
generalize prospectively and hence in a sense abstractly, cannot have. I have remarked that the func-
tion of judicial review arises in the limiting context of cases, and yet, while the Court should not sur-
mount the limitation, it must rise above the case. And while the Court should rise above the case, it
must not surmount the limitation."
zsg. Seeid. at 112.
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crete cases have implications far beyond those of judicial craftsmanship.
At the center of Bickel's analysis of the work of the Court is the importance
of "not doing"-the insight that the timing and vehicle of constitutional
decisions are deserving of the same attention as their content. The resolu-
tion of questions of timing and circumstance, moreover, simultaneously
defines the terms of the "colloquy" between the Court and other agencies
of government. Thus, the passive virtues are far more than craft techniques
governing the application of judge-made constitutional principles. They
are also, in Shapiro's terms, maxims of political jurisprudence.
B.
Bickel's entry into the lists as a defender of the Court was met with
cries of outrage from the "modest."1 ' The objections to Bickel's thesis were
basically three: First, use of the mediating devices eventuated in unprin-
cipled, albeit nonconstitutional, grounds of decision in cases raising con-
stitutional issues; second, some of the mediating devices, notably dismissals
of appeals based on considerations of ripeness, constituted an unprincipled
flouting of jurisdictional directives imposed on the Court by Congress; and
third, once the Court accepted Bickel's counsels of expedience as to non-
constitutional decisions, it would inevitably apply the techniques for ac-
commodating political pressures to decisions on the constitutional merits,
which would themselves thus become unprincipled 21
The content of the first two objections can be illustrated briefly in terms
of cases that have already been discussed. The objection to Garner, for ex-
ample, would be that the Court there avoided the constitutional merits
only by deciding that southern prosecutors, in "disturbing the peace" cases,
would have to proffer more evidence than their northern counterparts-
in short, that in the service of avoiding the "momentous constitutional
issue" looming in the background, the Garner convictions were ultimately
voided on the wholly unprincipled ground that "[t]he defendants were
Negroes sitting at a white lunch counter; and ...this was Louisiana."
Similarly, the Naim dismissal, which Bickel explains "in terms of the dis-
cretionary considerations that go to determine the lack of ripeness,"'' was
branded by Wechsler as being "wholly without basis in the law."'"
The basic "modest" objection to Bickel's view that dismissals of appeals
rest largely in the discretion of the Court is that, in contrast to the discre-
tion embodied in the certiorari jurisdiction, the relevant congressional
120. See, e.g., Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"--A Comment on Principle and
Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUm. L. REv. 1 (1964).
121. See id.
122. A. BICxEL, supra note 99, at 126.
123. H. WEiHiLER, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, in PRiNCiPLES, POLITICS,
AN FUNDAMENTAL LAW 3, 46-47 (I96I). See also Gunther, supra note 12o, at i6-2o; Wechsler, Book
Review, 75 YALE L.J. 672, 675-76 (1966).
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statutes appear to make the appellate jurisdiction mandatory. It is pre-
eminently these dispositions, therefore, that provide the basis for the charge
that Bickel would transform a principled institution into a political one.
Bickel himself admits:
It follows that the techniques and allied devices for staying the Court's hand,
as is avowedly true at least of certiorari, cannot themselves be principled in the
sense in which we have a right to expect adjudications on the merits to be prin-
cipled. They mark the point at which the Court gives the electoral institutions
their head and itself stays out of politics, and there is nothing paradoxical in find-
ing that here is where the Court is most a political animal . 2'
But why do the "modest" refuse to accept the justifications offered by
Bickel for the political accommodations that he prescribes? As we have
seen, the "modest" insistence on adhering to the terms of the congressional
mandate is derived from the premise that the Court, because it is an insti-
tution incapable of being held to account by the public, ought not, except
in extraordinary circumstances, to impose its own views where those views
contradict decisions reached by the electorally responsible agencies of gov-
ernment. As his many references to "democratic theory and practice" sug-
gest, however, and as his discussion of "The Counter-Majoritorian Diffi-
culty" makes explicit,' 2' the limitations on the Court's power derived by
the "modest" from the fact of political irresponsibility are central to Bickel's
approach. Indeed, the thrust of his effort is precisely to afford the Court
the maximum possible opportunity to avoid taking stands on constitutional
issues.
The differences between Bickel and, for example, Wechsler thus have
nothing whatsoever to do with the opposition of those who counsel judicial
activism to those who advocate judicial restraint. There is simply nothing
in Bickel's system that would lead a Court following his prescriptions to
be any more active than one embracing Wechslerian edicts. The source
of their differences is, rather, that Bickel's view of the Court's "legitima-
tion" function requires him to postulate that the Court acts politically even
when it validates another agency's actions and that the consequences of
such a decision must therefore be weighed as carefully as the consequences
of an invalidation on constitutional grounds.
In Bickel's view, therefore, the Court's lack of electoral accountability
requires not acts of legitimation that necessarily involve political conse-
quences, but rather the "doing nothing" that "gives the electoral institu-
tions their head." Consequently, what separates the two approaches to dis-
missals of appeals is that it is Bickel, not Wechsler, who is "modestly"
124. A. ]3icxEL, supra note 99, at 132.
125. See id. at 16-23.
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willing to let the Court protect itself and the society from exercise of the
power of decision that the statute governing appeals seeks to thrust upon it.
The structure of the judicial "politics" delineated by Bickel, moreover,
is composed of elements developed in the schools of his most vociferous
critics. Thus, the functional and institutional significance of concepts such
as ripeness, standing, and case and controversy have been elucidated in a
succession of both scholarly works and judicial opinions attributable to
such men as Wechsler, Frankfurter, Louis Jaffe, Henry Hart, Albert Sachs,
Philip Kurland, and Gerald Gunther. These are the men who so ably
delineated for the profession the precise senses in which courts and legis-
latures interact to "make" law. It was, indeed, Hart and Wechsler's monu-
mental The Federal Courts and the Federal System... that expounded the
myriad ways in which doctrines such as ripeness not only define jurisdic-
tion but, by deciding jurisdiction, simultaneously determine the timing
and impact of judicial decisions.
Bickel's analysis of the Court's "legitimation" function is thus thoroughly
grounded in the approach to the work of the Court that informs The
Federal Courts and the Federal System. Similarly, his focus, in analyzing
Garner, on the actual impact of that decision in terms of the interplay
among state and federal trial and appellate courts, prosecutors, state legis-
latures, and Congress is wholly consistent with the perspectives developed
by Hart and Wechsler in that work. The fact is, moreover, that the system
developed in The Federal Courts and the Federal System was proving itself
too rigid to be capable of accounting satisfactorily for much of the recent
work of the Court. Over time, the tone of commentators' analyses had
gradually shifted from one that marks the explications of the critic to one
more characteristic of the strictures of the opponent.' Bickel's modifica-
tion of that system, therefore, as contrasted, for example, to the approach
of Wechsler's article on neutral principles, has at least the compelling
virtue of providing a structure in terms of which much of that work can
satisfactorily be explained.
Against this formidable array of merits, Bickel's critics bring to bear
the insistence that dismissals of appeals on the grounds of ripeness are un-
justified, not only because they involve the flouting of a congressional man-
date, but also because they represent denials of a judicial obligation to de-
cide properly tendered constitutional issues-abdications of that duty to
126. H.M. HART & H. WECHS.ER, THE FEDERAL CouRTs AND THE FEDERAL SYsTaE (1953).
127. See, e.g., the following forewords to the Harvard Law Review annual survey of the work of
the Supreme Court: Jaffe, Foreword, 65 HARv. L. Rav. z07 (2952); Freund, Foreword: The Year of
the Steel Case, 66 HARv. L. R~v. 89 (1952); Sacks, Foreword, 68 HAiv. L. REV. 96 (1954); Brown,
Foreword: Process of Law, 72 HARv. L. REv. 77 (1958); Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the
Justices, 73 H-v. L. REv. 84 (x959); Griswold, Foreword: Of Time and Attitudes-Professor Hart
and Judge Arnold, 74 H~Av. L. REv. 81 (9f6o); Kurland, Foreword: "Equal in Origin and Equal in
Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government," 78 HAv. L. Ray. 143 (1964).
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decide from which Wechsler drew his justification for the institution of
judicial review. 28 As in the instances we have already examined, Bickel's
response to this argument is wholly faithful to the tradition of The Federal
Courts and the Federal System, focusing sensitively on the functional dif-
ferences in the roles our system of government assigns to the lower state
and federal courts and to the Supreme Court:
The pressure for individual justice is, of course, all the stronger when one may
fairly surmise that the tendency of the Court, if pushed to the wall of principled
judgment, would likely be to vindicate the moving party's constitutional claim.
How should a man feel who has lost on what he must regard as a technicality,
having asserted a principle that two years later, in a similar case, carries the field?'" 9
In considering this problem, Bickel notes first that the fact that "the equi-
ties on the side of the moving party will vary in intensity ...is not an
argument relevant to the issue of principle itself. It can only make more
palatable [if those equities are weak] the use of a device of avoidance that
works against the moving party.""2 " His argument continues:
In any event, the policy of avoidance, if otherwise applicable, must prevail, despite
hardship to the litigant and despite what is in other circumstances a strong policy
in favor of authoritative and speedy pronouncement of governing rules. There are
crucial differences-which, of course, the opinions in Marbury v. Madison and
Cohens v. Virginia seek to obscure-between the role of the Supreme Court in
constitutional cases and the function of courts of general jurisdiction. The latter
sit as primary agencies for the peaceful settlement of disputes and, in a more re-
stricted sphere, as primary agencies for the vindication and evolution of the legal
order. They must, indeed, resolve all controversies within their jurisdiction, be-
cause the alternative is chaos. The Supreme Court in constitutional cases sits to
render an additional, principled judgment on what has already been authorita-
tively ordered. Its interventions are by hypothesis exceptional and limited, and
they occur, not to forestall chaos, but to revise a pre-existing order that is otherwise
viable and was itself arrived at by more normal processes. Fixation on an individual
right to judgment by the Supreme Court is, therefore, largely question-begging.' 1'
The vociferousness of the opposition to Bickel's counseling dismissals
of appeals cannot, therefore, be explained simply as an expected reaction
to a radical departure, for it is clear that Bickel built entirely on the foun-
dations previously laid out by his critics. The basis for that opposition can
perhaps best be illuminated by reference to another tradition that, like
the law, attempted the necessary but impossible feat of defining relevance
and thus ordering existence-that of Gothic cathedrals.
Sainte Chapelle, the chapel of the French kings in Paris, consists of one
tall room whose walls, with the exception of one area near the base, are
x28. See H. .VEcHsLER, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, in PRiNcIPLES, Pou-
Tics, AND F .NDA rENTAL L w 3, 4-15 (x961).
129. A. BcImFEL, supra note 99, at 172.
130. Id. at 173.
132. Id.
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composed entirely of glass. Clearly Sainte Chapelle is Gothic; the elements
of design indicate immersion in that tradition, and the search for light,
which marked the transition from Romanesque to Gothic, is consummated
in the luminosity its construction made possible. Sainte Chapelle in this
sense represents the culmination of the Gothic tradition.
Yet, in another way, the chapel must have been a thoroughly disturbing
presence for those habituated to the Gothic pattern. For the illusion created
by the building is that there is nothing but luminosity, that the structural
members, the elements that the chapel was to order, have completely dis-
appeared. The child, then, if child it was, was an offspring difficult to recog-
nize, and therefore to legitimate-not because it was not within the tra-
dition, but because, like The Least Dangerous Branch, it was more than the
culmination of an old style. It was also the beginning of a new perspective.
C.
In one sense, therefore, the objections to The Least Dangerous Branch
are understandable, for the new elements introduced by Bickel must even-
tually prove irresistible. The old tradition is exploded and the new begins.
The instability of the equilibrium between the traditional and the novel
embodied in Bickel's approach is demonstrated by at least three factors
that that approach fails to explain satisfactorily. First, there is the problem
presented by the number and variety of the considerations that Bickel
assumes the Court brings to bear upon its utilization of the mediating
devices. Thus, if Bickel's Justices need be no more activist than those of
Wechsler, it is nevertheless true that they have a great deal more discre-
tionary power with which to be nonactivist. And for Bickel, who shares
Hand's premises as to the limitations imposed upon the Court by the fact
of its political irresponsibility,' the existence of such discretion necessarily
presents a dilemma.
Bickel's response to this dilemma, like that of his predecessors to the
more limited discretion entailed by their more limited conception of the
Court's permissible leeway, is to insist upon rationality, upon "intellec-
tually tenable" dispositions, in those areas of accommodation where wholly
principled decisions are untenable. Wechsler had tried to confine the
Court's discretion within boundaries sufficiently narrow to obviate the
possibility of the Justices becoming the Platonic Guardians feared by Hand;
Bickel's modification of that theory postulates Guardians who are Platonic
not only in their exercise of power, but also in their wisdom: possessed of
a degree of rationality exceeding that vouchsafed to Wechsler's Justices by
precisely the extent to which the discretion Bickel bestows on the Court
exceeds that conceded by Wechsler.
132. See text accompanying note 124 supra.
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We need not be cynics to conclude from what we know of the Justices,
and especially of the processes that lead to their appointment, that a
Court meeting those specifications could be produced only by the sheerest
accident. Yet, under Bickel's theory, only such Justices would be capable
of legitimately exercising the discretion granted the Court. Bickel has not,
then, in fact, satisfactorily accounted for the recent work of the Court we
know. What he has done is to explain how a hypothetical Court might
justifiably have arrived at many of those same decisions.
Secondly, Bickel's analysis of the Court's "legitimation" function-the
fulcrum that enabled him to move the Wechslerian world-itself rests on
the dubious assumption that the society will always perceive the difference
between "doing nothing" and "legitimation." If, however, the Court "does
nothing" long enough, if it leaves undisturbed-because the issue is unripe,
because further experimentation is needed, or because it wants to "give the
electoral institutions their head"--a sufficient number of lower-court dis-
positions at variance with those the Court would reach "if pushed to the
wall of principled judgment," those decisions may well be perceived as
legitimated. Indeed, given a sufficiently notorious case, even denial of
certiorari might have such an impact. Conversely, a sufficiently prolonged
series of invalidations on nonconstitutional grounds might well be per-
ceived as an attempt to implement an unspoken constitutional judgment.
Bickel's counter to this objection is to stress the Court's "resources of
rhetoric," its educational role, in Eugene Rostow's phrase, as "teacher in
a vital national seminar.""' But that rejoinder is convincing only if we
assume that the public responds rather to what the Court says than to
what it does, and that "legitimation" is effective only when the deed is
accompanied by words of approval. The more likely hypothesis is that the
public responds to the results the Court reaches as well as to the rhetoric
it employs.
Given these limits on the usefulness of rhetoric, the objection that Bickel
raises to Wechsler's "rule that the Court must legitimate whatever it is not
justified in striking down" can be applied to his own counsel to "do noth-
ing": It "fails to attain its intended purpose of removing the Court from
the political arena." '1 What it does do is to change, and to some extent
limit, the degree of the Court's intervention in that arena. But this conse-
quence, which is also entailed by Wechsler's rule, must ultimately be as
unsatisfactory for Bickel as Bickel assumed it would be for Wechsler. Both
Bickel and Wechsler, for the same reason-the desire to render exercise of
the Court's power compatible with the fact of its political irresponsibility
133. See, e.g., D. DAxEsm, A SuPRE E CouRT JusTicE Is Appoimrrn (3964).
X34. Rostow, The Democratic haracter of Judicial Review, 66 HA~v. L. REv. 193, 208 (1952);
see A. BICKEL, supra note 99, at 26.
135. See text accompanying note 3o5 supra.
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-attempt to formulate courses of action that will take the Court out of
politics. Both, though for different reasons, fail.
There remains, finally, the problem raised by Bickel's barring of any-
thing analogous to the mediating devices from the formulation of deci-
sions on the merits of constitutionality-what Professor Gunther refers to
as "the novelty and vulnerability of the Bickel thesis: the emphasis on
principle as the highest Court duty, but only in a limited sphere of Court
actions; the ioo% insistence on principle, 20 of the time."'36 Gunther, of
course, is concerned with the other 8o percent of the cases. What he regards
as unjustifiable is, for example, the stress on prudential factors contained
in the following explanation offered by Bickel for the dismissal of the
appeal in Naim:
But would it have been wise, at a time when the Court had just pronounced its
new integration principle, when it was subject to scurrilous attack by men who
predicted that integration of the schools would lead directly to "mongrelization
of the race" and that this was the result the Court had really willed, would it have
been wise, just then, in the first case of its sort, on an issue that the Negro com-
munity as a whole can hardly be said to be pressing hard at the moment, to declare
that the states may not prohibit racial intermarriage? 137
But if, contrary to Gunther, we accept Bickel's view as to the propriety
of the mediating devices, the query implicit in Gunther's characterization
of that view nevertheless remains unanswered. If, that is, Bickel is correct
in asserting that prudential factors properly influence dispositions based
on the unprincipled mediating devices, on what basis does he deny that
such factors ought properly to influence decisions on the constitutional
merits: decisions that, because they attract greater public attention, are
most likely to entail the type of consequences that, for Bickel, justified the
dismissal of Naim?
Similarly, the structure of Bickel's analysis of Garner makes it likely
that he would meet the objection that that analysis involves southern prose-
cutors having to produce more evidence than northern prosecutors in "dis-
turbing the peace" cases by asserting that the relationship between the
dangers involved in "legitimating" a given statute or conviction and the
demand for "intellectual tenability" is an inverse one: that the greater the
dangers involved in "legitimation," the more readily the Court may prop-
erly resort to a mediating device. 8 Thus, Bickel would argue that in Gar-
ner the constitutional issue "looming in the background" was sufficiently
momentous to justify resort to an extremely narrow ground of decision,
one open to the objection canvassed above. Again, if, contrary to Gunther,
136. Gunther, supra note i2o, at 3.
137. A. BICKEL, supra note 99, at 174.
138. See text accompanying note x 16 supra.
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we accept this analysis, the question implicitly posed by Gunther neverthe-
less remains: Why, in Bickel's view, is an analogous equation not applicable
to constitutional decisions? If, in short, the sorts of factors that for Bickel
justify the dismissal of Naim and the disposition in Garner properly enter
into the Court's decision as to when to decide constitutional issues, why
does Bickel deny the propriety of those factors playing any part in the
Court's decision as to how to decide such issues-as to the terms of the
constitutional decision itself ?
The answer, in simplest terms, is that, as we have seen, Bickel is with
Hand and Wechsler in drawing the need for principled constitutional de-
cisions from the fact of the Court's political irresponsibility. Like Wechsler,
moreover, Bickel defines principle in terms of generality; "By 'principle,'"
according to Bickel, "is meant general propositions . . . organizing ideas
of universal validity in the given universe of a culture and a place . . . ,"
Given this agreement, it is perhaps to be expected that two of the three
major constitutional decisions whose lack of neutrality Wechsler analyzed
at length,' Shelley v. Kraemer" and Smith v. Allwright," are not dis-
cussed by Bickel at all. They are mentioned, indeed, only once each, and
then in footnotes.' As for Brown v. Board of Education." the third of
Wechsler's examples, Bickel's proposed dismissal of cases raising the con-
stitutionality of benign quotas obviously presupposes that the Court ought
not strike down such quotas on the merits-that the principle underlying
Brown, the impermissibility of racial classifications, does not, at least in
this place and this culture, possess "universal validity."
Bickel accepts, then, Wechsler's proposition that constitutional deci-
sions are justified only when they are based on neutral principles, and, on
the level of concrete cases, he fails to traverse Wechsler's averment that
certain of the Court's most important recent decisions are to be found
lacking in neutrality. The Least Dangerous Branch can thus truly be char-
acterized as an exercise in the usefulness of mediating devices, for Bickel's
response to Wechsler, in terms of the cases on which the latter relies, is
ultimately explicable only as an instance of confession and avoidance.
D.
That Bickel's analysis of the Court's work eventuates in assessments that
are congruent with those of Wechsler is clearly apparent in his recent ap-
139. A. BrCKEL, supra note 99, at x99; cf. id. at 69: "When it strikes down legislative policy, the
Court must act rigorously on principle, else it undermines the justification for its power. It must
enunciate a goal, it must demonstrate that what the legislature did will not measure up, and it must
proclaim its readiness to defend the goal-absolutely, if it is an absolute one."
140. See H. WECHSLER, supra note 128, at 36-42.
141- 334 U.S. ' (1948).
142. 321 U.S. 649 (1944)-
143. See A. BICKaL, supra note 99, at 191 n.124, 241 n.55.
144. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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praisal of the obscenity decisions.' Bickel there condemns the per curiam
decision in the three cases jointly decided in Redrup v. New York48 as
having "made an utter shambles of the law of obscenity."'47 His objection
is that the publications held in Redrup not to be obscene cannot meaning-
fully be distinguished from the material on the basis of which the convic-
tion of Ralph Ginzburg had been upheld one year earlier:...
All there is of an effort to differentiate Mr. Ginzburg's case in the short order-
it is hardly an opinion-that the Court wrote in the three cases . . . is the remark
that in these cases there was no "evidence of the sort of 'pandering' which the
Court found significant in Ginzburg v. United States." The pandering notion was
based on Ginzburg's advertising, and embodies the bizarre proposition that Ginz-
burg's publications, even if not otherwise obscene, were made so by his sales pitch,
which emphasized that they were sexually interesting. That, as Mr. Justice Doug-
las very sensibly said in dissent in the Ginzburg case, would make the constitu-
tional protection of the Song of Solomon depend on the way it was sold, and might
turn into unlawful obscenity a lot of "lotions, tires, food, liquor, dothing, autos,
and even insurance policies," sold with the aid of displays "of thighs, calves,
bosoms" etc. But be that as it may, and assuming that the pandering test does
have some validity, it is impossible to see how publications .. .held not obscene
[in Redrup] pander any less than Ginzburg's product.
49
The deficiencies Bickel finds in the Redrup opinion are aggravated,
moreover, by the fact that "there was hardly any explanation this time.
Most of that, such as it was, came [in Ginzburg and its accompanying
cases]. Now the Court said virtually nothing; it simply acted."' 0 In de-
ciding Redrup in a per curiam order that briefly adumbrated the bases
on which various justices, by differing routes, reached the conclusion that
the material at issue was not obscene, the Court was seemingly returning
to a "practice that it had previously followed for nine years, from 1957 to
I966.5''1
1957 was the year of Roth v. United States,'52 in which the Court first
attempted to develop guidelines for the obscenity area'5 What followed,
as a recent commentary has put it, is that
[f]or nearly a decade afterwards, the Court could muster a majority only for
cryptic per curiams; in the two cases where the Justices wrote full-dress opinions
... no more than three of them could agree on a common rationalization. Initial
efforts to clarify Roth broke down in a dispute whether the "community" re-
x45. See Bickel, Obscenity Cases, NEw REPuauc, May 27, x967, at 15.
146. 3 86U.S. 767 (1967).
147. Bickel, supra note 145, at 17.
148. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, rehearing denied, 384 U.S. 934 (I966).
149. Bickel, supra note z45, at x6.
150. Id. at 15.
I51 Id.
152. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
153. For a concise and perceptive analysis of the difficulties inherent in those guidelines see
Comment, More Ado About Dirty Books, 75 Y. LJ. 1364, 1365-77 (1966).
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ferred to in the Roth definition was a national or local one; attempts to establish
the relevance of "social importance" were similarly unsuccessful. One Justice sug-
gested that the prurient interest rule be supplemented by elements such as "patent
offensiveness"; another, that Roth be applied in conjunction with a "sufficient evi-
dence" rule in reviewing lower-court decisions; still another, that Roth be limited
to federal cases. Mr. Justice Stewart urged the Court to replace Roth entirely with
a "hard core pornography" rule, promising that although he was unable to define
the hard core, he would know it when he saw it. From the start Mr. Chief Justice
Warren offered a "purveying" test as an alternative, claiming that the conduct of
the distributor rather than the content of his wares should be the central issue.
Few of the proposals won the support of anybody but their authors.15'
That Bickel finds these dispositions objectionable is dear, since it was this
course of decision that he believes led lower courts, and Mr. Ginzburg, to
the conclusion that "just about anything is printable in the US today" '
-a conclusion emphatically, and, according to Bickel, unjustifiably, re-
jected in Ginzburg v. United States.
"The problem [of obscenity]," Bickel concludes,
is exceedingly difficult-quite likely insoluble at the hands of the Supreme Court.
On principle it would seem clear that, while government may take a hand in help-
ing parents and schools to control what juveniles read and see, and while govern-
ment should also have the power to control displays that thrust themselves un-
availingly at people who may feel offended by them-with these two exceptions,
anyone should have the right to print and publish and show anything that anyone
else may wish to read and see. But . . .it seems equally clear that a majority of
our people are not prepared to accept such a broadly permissive rule, and that their
unwillingness to accept it is based in some part on surmises about the possible con-
nection between pornography and crime. That there is no such connection may be
likely. But no one is able to prove it.
In such circumstances, it is neither wise nor is it possible, as a practical matter,
for the Court to impose and enforce a broadly permissive constitutional rule. And
short of a broadly permissive rule, as the Justices have amply demonstrated, there
is no coherent and consistent constitutional principle on which to rest judicial
judgment. There is merely-but that is a great deal-an opportunity, through
procedural, interpretive and other decisions falling short of the attempt to impose
ultimate constitutional prohibitions, to discourage, circumscribe, reduce and con-
tain the application of obscenity statutes. This is the business the Supreme Court
ought to get on with.'15
The principled disposition of the obscenity problem being ruled out,
for prudential reasons analogous to those that for Bickel governed the dis-
position in Naim, we are thus left with the counsel of the passive virtues.
Unlike the areas with which Bickel dealt in The Least Dangerous Branch,
however, his analysis of the obscenity issue in fact involves a wholesale
154. Id. at 1373-77 (footnotes omitted).
155. Bickel, supra note 145, at x5.
156. Id. at 17.
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condemnation of the Court's recent work in the area. The per curiam dis-
positions in Redrup and the post-Roth cases are only explicable as holdings
on the merits of the constitutional issue of obscenity, and such holdings,
on Bickel's analysis, are unjustifiable. In other words, Bickel can avoid
Wechsler's characterization of Naim as "wholly without basis in the law"
by arguing, as he does, that dismissals of appeals, even dismissals "for the
want of a substantial federal question," need not be principled because they
do not in fact represent dispositions on the merits." But this avenue is
closed to Bickel in the obscenity area since, whatever else may be said of
the per curiam dispositions we have been canvassing, it is apparent that
they disposed of the issue presented on its constitutional merits.
Shapiro's fears for the Court's loss of a "reputation for candor," it will
be recalled, are in part based on the per curiam dispositions in the segre-
gation cases."' And Wechsler, while agreeing that those dispositions are
rightly to be condemned, begins his survey of illegitimate recent decisions
with a number of pre-Roth per curiam dispositions in the area of film cen-
sorship." 9 On the basis of Bickel's analysis of the obscenity issue, therefore,
we may conclude that he is with Shapiro and Wechsler in being unable
to offer a satisfactory account of the Court's recent per curiam practice.
Bickel's strictures may be couched in more sophisticated language, but that
fact in no way mitigates the severity of the indictment of the Court's re-
cent work that his analysis of the obscenity cases entails.'
157. "It can be said, and indeed it is commonly assumed, that dismissals 'for the want of a sub-
stantial federal question' are decisions on the merits, though without opinion. But when the Court
decides the merits without opinion, it is in the habit of telling us so by issuing a summary order that
reverses or affirms the judgment below. There is and has been for many years a great deal that is pure
fiction in this explanation. Many are the dismissals for the want of a convenient, or timely, or suitably
presented question." A. BIcKE.L, supra note 99, at 126 (footnote omitted).
A striking confirmation of Bickel's view is to be found in Mr. Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion,
which Mr. Justice Clark joined, in Redrup: "The three cases were argued together at the beginning of
this Term. Today, the Court rules that the materials could not constitutionally be adjudged obscene by
the States, thus rendering adjudication of the other issues unnecessary. In short, the Court disposes
of the cases on the issue that was deliberately excluded from review, and refuses to pass on the ques-
tions that brought the cases here [the issues of scienter, "vagueness," and "prior restraint"].
"In my opinion these dispositions do not reflect well on the processes of the Court, and I think the
issues for which the cases were taken should be decided. Failing that, I prefer to cast my vote to dis-
miss the writs in Redrup and Austin as improvidently granted and, in the circumstances, to dismiss the
appeal in Gent for lack of a substantial federal question. I deem it more appropriate to defer an ex-
pression of my own views on the questions brought here until an occasion when the Court is prepared
to come to grips with such issues." 386 U.S. at 772 (emphasis added).
The description given by Mr. Justice Harlan of the Court's handling of certain summary dismissals
in early reapportionment cases is also instructive: "Each of these recent cases is distinguished on some
ground or other in Baker v. Carr. . . . Their summary dispositions prevent consideration whether
these after-the-fact distinctions are real or imaginary. The fact remains, however, that between 1947
and 1957, four cases raising issues precisely the same as those decided today were presented to the
Court. Three were dismissed because the issues presented were thought insubstantial and in the fourth
the lower court's dismissal was affirmed." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 614 (r964) (dissenting
opinion) (footnote omitted).
158. See text accompanying note 97 supra.
159. See text accompanying note 96 supra.
i6o. Cf. Bickel & Wellington, supra note 112, at 3: "The Court's product has shown an increas-
ing incidence of the sweeping dogmatic statement, of the formulation of results accompanied by little
or no effort to support them in reason, in sum, of opinions that do not opine and of per curiam orders
that quite frankly fail to build the bridge between the authorities they cite and the results they decree."
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V.
The ultimate source of the difficulties in Bickel's analysis is, as we have
seen, the postulate that he shares with Hand and Wechsler: that the Court's
political irresponsibility requires-though, for Bickel, only in a delimited
category of cases-an absolute adherence to principle. That what we know
of the legislative and executive branches renders meaningless a compara-
tive characterization of the Court as politically irresponsible has already
been indicated." 1 Nor can it realistically be asserted that the absolute form
of limitation that Bickel and Wechsler would impose is required to pre-
vent the Court from becoming excessively powerful. Unlike Congress or
the President, the Court has access to neither sword nor purse, and in many
areas, including such crucial contemporary concerns as foreign affairs, its
recognition of its own limitations has amounted to almost total abdica-
tion.1
0 2
The issue central to both Bickel's and Wechsler's analyses is, therefore,
not power but propriety. The charge is not that the Court is in some ab-
stract sense exercising more power than our system of government allo-
cates to it. What Bickel and Wechsler conclude, rather, is that recent dis-
positions, because they are not based on neutral principles, betray an abuse
of the Court's admitted power to render constitutional decisions. The issue,
then, is one of defining criteria for justifiable decisions.
A.
The starting point for any such formulation must be the insight that
underlies Bickel's development of the passive virtues: that the Court, as an
institution, has certain institutional needs-for example, the needs to ensure
survival and to operate efficiently-and that those needs are necessarily
reflected in the form and content of its work. The active role played by
the Court in securing passage of the Judiciary Act of 1925,1"' the "Judges'
Bill" whose introduction of certiorari made possible control of the docket
at a time when the number of cases awaiting decision threatened to cripple
the Court as an effective institution, constitutes a response to the need for
efficient operation. And Bickel's rationale for dispositions such as Naim-
the necessity for maintaining the "tension between principle and expe-
diency"-ultimately rests on the Court's need to ensure its own survival
as a viable institution.
"The Court's authority to employ [mediating devices]," notes Bickel,
"derives from its ultimate function of rendering principled adjudications;
x61. See part In-C supra.
162. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); text accompanying
note 56 supra.
163. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936 (codified in scattered sections of io, 1i, 15, 28,
48 U.S.C.).
January 1968 ]
HeinOnline -- 20 Stan L. Rev. 213 1967-1968
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
for this is a function that can be wisely and fruitfully exercised only if the
Court is empowered also to decide whether and when to exercise it."1 "4
The Court's duty to render constitutional decisions thus entails, for Bickel,
the power to determine the timing and scope of such decisions-entails,
in other words, the Court's power to determine its own institutional capac-
ity. It is precisely this reasoning that forms the basis for Bickel's approval
of dismissals of appeals on grounds of ripeness.
In an earlier article, Bickel and Wellington, quoting Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, advanced the view that the Court's power to determine its own in-
stitutional capacity derives directly from the principles of article III of the
Constitution:
The earliest declaration of unconstitutionality of an act of Congress-by the Jus-
tices on circuit-involved a refusal by the Justices to perform a function imposed
upon them by Congress because of the non-judicial nature of that function....
Since then, the Court has many times declared legislation unconstitutional be-
cause it imposed on the Court powers or functions that were regarded as outside
the scope of the "judicial power" lodged in the Court by the Constitution....
One may fairly generalize from these instances that the Court has deemed
itself peculiarly qualified, with due regard to the contrary judgment of Congress,
to determine what is meet and fit for the exercise of "judicial power" as authorized
by the Constitution.18 5
Whatever the merits of this attempted derivation from the constitu-
tional text, however, there exist a variety of devices for avoiding "contro-
versy" and thereby ensuring survival, many of which have become so in-
tegral a part of adjudicatory techniques that the Court is often criticized
for failure to observe them. One instance is provided by the maxim that
a decision ought always to be based on the narrowest possible ground, as
a means both of preserving flexibility for the future and of avoiding the
conflict of judicial and public opinion that would likely result from more
sweeping dispositions. Bickel commends this course to the Court, " ' and
Gunther takes pains to argue that nothing Wechsler proposes is inconsis-
tent with that maxim. " ' Cognate propositions, such as the importance of
submerging individual doctrinal differences in compromise opinions that
can speak for a majority of the Court and the importance of refraining
from dissent in order to make unanimous decisions possible, " ' rest; like
that mandating the choice of the narrow ground, both on the desirability
164. A. BIcKEL, supra note 99, at 205.
165. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 464-65 (1957) (dissenting opinion),
quoted in Bickel & Wellington, supra note 112, at 28.
z66. See A. BICKEL, supra note 99, at 112.
167. See Gunther, supra note 12o, at 20 (discussing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264
(182 1), on which Wechsler heavily relies).
I68. See A. BIC.EL, Tim UNPUBLISHED OPiNIoNs Op MIR. JUSTIcE BRNEis: THE SU REME
COURT AT WOax I8-I9, 28-32,58, 65, 9 x6I-62, i99-200, 203, 209-10 (1957); Murphy, Marshaling
the Court: Leadership, Bargaining, and the Judicial Process, 29 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 64o, 656-72 (x962).
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of the Court's maintaining a united front and on the importance of obviat-
ing the possibility of conflicting decisions.
It was these considerations that underlay the assertion by Justices Frank-
furter, Clark, Harlan, and Whittaker that the noting of probable jurisdic-
tion in Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price"9 "manifest[ed] disrespect by the Court
for its own process."' 0 Regarding Eaton as "completely controll[ed]" by
a case decided within two weeks of the time the Eaton papers came be-
fore the Court,"' the four Justices objected to the Court's "willingness to
create an opportunity to overrule a case decided only a fortnight ago after
thorough discussion at the bar and in the briefs and after the weightiest
deliberation within the Court.
'1 a
The issue involved in Eaton, however, was admittedly a weighty one-
the propriety of warrantless searches in a noncriminal setting. Might it
not be argued, therefore, that the four Justices who voted to note probable
jurisdiction, far from manifesting disrespect for the Court's processes, were
actually following Wechsler's injunction that they act on principle? Since
they regarded the earlier decision as a serious infringement of constitu-
tional rights, might not their insistence that the Court give plenary con-
sideration to every extension of that case, no matter how small the varia-
tion in the facts presented, be characterized, again borrowing Wechsler's
terms, as a praiseworthy refusal to bow to "controlling sentiment" and "to
trim and shape their speech and votes accordingly" ?' A year later, when
Eaton was affirmed by an equally divided Court, the four Justices who had
voted to note probable jurisdiction took care to point out, referring to the
earlier, controlling decision: "We would not be candid to say that on its
own facts we have become reconciled to that judgment."1 " Does this avowal
of refusal to be bound by decided cases help to provide a basis for that
"reputation for candor" whose loss Shapiro fears?
The proper answer to these questions, a negative one, entails the asser-
tion that a Court that often indulged in controversies like Eaton would
suffer greatly-not only from the inability to utilize its time and resources
efficiently that must result from the insistence that certain issues never be
regarded as even temporarily settled, but also from the loss of public esteem
that must eventually be caused by spectacles as unseemly as that provided
by Eaton. Such an answer indicates much about the extent to which the
institutional values of efficient operation and survival form the necessary
x69. 360 U.S. 246 (1959).
170. id. at 248-49.
X71. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 36o (1959).
172. 36o U.S. at 249.
173. H. WECHSLER, supra note 128, at 21.
174. Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 269 (196o). The four justices who voted to note
probable jurisdiction joined in an opinion urging that Frank be either reversed or distinguished. The
Frank case has since been overruled in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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underpinning for any analysis of the work of the Court. But it indicates
more than that as well, for the emphasis on loss of public esteem as provid-
ing a justifiable basis for criticism of Eaton recalls the earlier analysis of
the degree of generality-of neutrality, in Wechsler's terms-that suffices
to render a decision justifiable. A decision is to be regarded as justifiable,
it was there concluded, when its generality is perceived as adequate by the
public
B.
As the Eaton analysis makes clear, the necessary limitation on judicial
"candor," like the Wechslerian insistence on neutrality as necessary to the
enforceability of the Court's decisions, ultimately represents a requirement
of public acceptance. Nor is this a limitation peculiar to the judicial branch,
for in the last analysis, obedience over the long term even to congressional
statutes can be enforced neither by the sword nor by the purse. The con-
tinued existence of all branches of our government, not just the judiciary,
is at bottom dependent upon public acceptance. That acceptance is not at
issue, however, in the normal course of events. Inertia is a guiding princi-
ple in politics as well as physics, and the very existence of our institutions
-the persuasive testimony of history--itself serves to produce a significant
degree of acceptance.
It is the reservoir of acceptance produced by this inertia that is drawn
upon by the Court whenever it renders a decision less than adequately gen-
eral, and the reservoir is far from inexhaustible. Why, then, render such
decisions at all? Why not follow Wechsler's advice and validate acts of
other governmental agencies or, following Bickel, resort to the "passive
virtues"? The answer is that public acceptance of the Court does not rest
solely on perceptions of adequately general decisions. That acceptance rests
also, to a very considerable degree, on a view of the Court as the guardian
of our constitutional rights. Given this view, each approval of a statute
perceived as involving an infringement of constitutional rights-even, in
some instances, refusals to rule on the merits of such a statute-results in a
loss of credibility, and therefore public acceptance, of the Court.'
The loss of acceptance resulting from a loss of credibility, like that pro-
duced by a decision perceived as inadequately general, depends, of course,
on the seriousness with which the public views a given constitutional in-
fringement or a given instance of inadequate generality. The requirements
of credibility and generality will, moreover, be inconsistent wherever a
statute perceived as constituting an infringement of constitutional rights
175. See part 111-F supra.
176. See Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YAX
L.J. 517, 562-66 (1966).
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can be struck down only on a basis perceived as inadequately general. The
crucial point, however-the point that Bickel refuses to accept-is that
resort to the "passive virtues" does not resolve this dilemma. It simply
ignores one factor in the equation, for the fact is that every decision not
to decide, just like decisions on the constitutional merits, may result either
in adding to the reservoir of public acceptance (if only by remaining un-
noticed, and thus adding to the inertial acceptability produced by the
Court's continued functioning) or in depleting that accumulation. And
depletion may as easily be the consequence of a lack of credibility as a lack
of generality.
Bickel's significant contribution to analysis of the Court's work is the
description of the multitude of factors that may necessitate a compromise
with doctrinal purity-with the adequate generality on which Wechsler
insists. There is the Court's need to ensure itself the flexibility that will be
required in future cases, where the issue presented is manifested in such a
diverse variety of circumstances that no principle is yet at hand, or where
available principles are seen to entail ramifications in other areas that have
not yet fully been explored. There is the Court's need, wherever possible,
to maintain a united front, both to retain public acceptance and to preserve
uniformity and therefore stability within the law. There is the need to
accommodate the pressures and needs of other governmental institutions,
including lower federal and state courts and federal and state administra-
tive agencies, whose attitudes towards a given decision may have a signifi-
cant impact on the way in which it is enforced, as well as federal and state
executive and legislative institutions, which may be considering taking
action in a field with which the Court is presently concerned, or whose
later actions may have drastic implications for any decision reached by
the Court. There is, finally, as in Bickel's analysis of Naim, the limitation
imposed by the public acceptability of the result reached in the given case.
What Bickel failed to see, the flaw upon which Gunther correctly insists,
is that this analysis is workable only if it is applied to decisions on the con-
stitutional merits as well as to the mediating devices. Thus, that same pub-
lic whose refusal to accept the Naim result justified the disposition of that
case may, in another case, regard a given result as so urgently required that
refusal to reach it would entail a loss of credibility far outweighing the
consequences of inadequate generality. The point is that the weighing of
the factors delineated by Bickel is a task that the Court must undertake in
each and every case, whether what is involved is a mediating device or a
decision on the constitutional merits. If these factors represent "political"
considerations, in other words, then the Court is in politics, and the counsel
of passive virtues ultimately avails as little as the injunction of neutral prin-
ciples to extricate the Court from that status.
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It is precisely this failure that makes it impossible for Bickel convinc-
ingly to distinguish dismissals for want of a substantial federal question
from per curiam dispositions without opinion. Thus, as his analysis of the
obscenity issue indicates, Bickel subjects per curiam dispositions involv-
ing constitutional questions to the same rigorous requirements of prin-
ciple applicable to cases decided with full opinion. Appeals dismissed for
want of a substantial federal question, however, often involve, as Naim
did, a constitutional question, and the existence of a congressional statute
making the hearing of appeals mandatory seems to entail the proposition
that such a dismissal involves a decision on the merits about the substan-
tiality of the constitutional question presented. Denial of this proposition,
which Bickel characterizes as "pure fiction,"17 is mandated, as we have
seen, by the necessity for the Court to be able to determine its own insti-
tutional capacityY 8 Yet the only distinction Bickel offers between such
dismissals and decisions on the merits without opinion is the fact that the
latter "habitually" involve "issuing a summary order that reverses or affirms
the judgment below."1 ' The point seems somehow too formal, too con-
cerned with the mechanics of the Clerk's office, to account satisfactorily
for the distinction between dispositions subject to a requirement of rigorous
adherence to principle and dismissals for which that requirement may
justifiably be treated as a "fiction."
The question Bickel never satisfactorily answers, the query insistently
put by Gunther, may thus be reformulated in more precise terms: If the
Court's need to preserve its institutional capacity by avoiding needless pub-
lic controversy justified the dismissal of Naim, notwithstanding the exis-
tence of a mandatory appeals jurisdiction, why would not a similar need
to avoid loss of the Court's credibility in a situation where enunciation of
the principle involved would cause needless public controversy justify a
per curiam disposition, reaching the required result without opinion? One
response given in connection with criticisms of the Court's per curiam
practice" is that reasoned opinions constitute the source of the Court's
power, and that a refusal to make clear the grounds of decision in each
case must ultimately result in the Court's decrees becoming unenforceable.
Such a response ignores the reservoir of public acceptability provided for
the Court by the inertial effects we have already analyzed. But the more
serious difficulty in terms of Bickel's theory is that acceptance of this argu-
ment would go far towards rendering unjustifiable many of the mediat-
ing devices, including, of course, dismissals for want of a substantial fed-
eral question.
177. See A. BIccEL, supra note 99, at x26.
178. See text accompanying note x64 supra.
179. A. BxcyEL., supra note 99, at 126.
x8o. Cf. Brown, supra note 127; Sacks, supra note 127.
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Thus, Bickel agrees that reasoned, principled opinions constitute the
source of the Court's power, but his description of the importance of the
mediating devices rests on the insight that not every case provides the
proper occasion for such an opinion-that often, as in Naim, what is called
for is not the reasoned opinion, but rather the passive virtue. Bickel's more
likely response, therefore, is that a disposition without opinion in the per
curiam situation is unjustifiable because such a disposition represents a
decision on the merits that must be principled; because it, unlike the dis-
missal of an appeal, is not truly a mediating device. Such an argument,
however, serves only to restate the question why dismissals of appeals do
not represent decisions on the merits. Bickel cannot, after all, simply wish
out of existence the congressional statute making appeals mandatory; and
the argument that dismissals can be differentiated from per curiams be-
cause the Court does not in fact treat the former as binding precedents"8
can be met by reference to Bickel's own analysis of Ginzburg, which con-
vincingly demonstrates that the Court there did not regard earlier per
curiams as entitled to precedential weighty 2
The search, therefore, must be for the factor that makes dismissal of
an appeal a justifiable mediating device-the significance, in Bickel's terms,
of the absence of an order affirming or reversing the judgment below.
Viewed in terms of a focus upon public acceptability, the significance of
that absence seems clear, for it results in a decision that in form, in appear-
ance, represents not a decision on the merits, but simply a refusal to decide.
The justifiability of treating dismissals as a mediating device thus lies pre-
cisely in the disparity between the public and the lawyer's view of the sig-
nificance of such a decision. We can therefore say, with Bickel, that it is
a fiction that dismissals of appeals involve decisions on the merits, not
because that proposition is a fiction in the universe of the legal scholar, but
because the scholar's world does not in itself contain all the relevant ma-
terials from which a satisfactory account of the work of the Court can be
drawn.
If, however, we focus with Bickel on the impact of a given decision on
the public that is ultimately the source of the Court's power, it is clear that
decisions without opinion do often serve as mediating devices. The limita-
tions on the use of this device are, of course, considerably more severe than
in the case of dismissals; but what is involved are differences, not antitheses.
Thus, there is a significant probability that certain cases will be sufficiently
notorious that a decision without opinion would be perceived as enunciat-
ing an inadequately general principle, just as there is a lesser probability
that certain dismissals would be perceived as refusals to enforce constitu-
18x. See note 157 supra.
182. See text accompanying notes 154-56 supra.
January x968 ]
HeinOnline -- 20 Stan L. Rev. 219 1967-1968
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
tional rights sufficiently significant to lead to a loss of credibility. Similarly,
it is probable that a whole series of dispositions without opinion in a given
area would lead to a significant loss of public acceptance resulting from a
perception of inadequate generality, and this eventuality is more likely
than a series of dismissals resulting in a loss of credibility. But the question
ultimately is one of a difference in probabilities, not of antitheses. To
further complicate matters, moreover, any complete description would re-
quire modification of Bickel's unlikely assumption that legal scholarship
is so completely isolated from the world on which Court decisions impinge
that scholarly criticism of an opinion's refusal to give precedential weight
to a series of "fictional" dismissals cannot become sufficiently vociferous
and well known as to result in a loss of public acceptance.
The crucial point, once again, is that the same factors that provide jus-
tification for the passive virtues come into play in connection with deci-
sions avowedly on the constitutional merits. If it is the form of dismissals
of appeals-the appearance of not deciding-that accounts for their desig-
nation as mediating devices, then the stringently limited form of disposi-
tions without opinion-the appearance of deciding without any radiating
effects-must also suffice to qualify the per curiam practice as a passive
virtue. The relevant characteristic of the per curiam is thus precisely the
absence of any full-dress opinion, ensuring, in the absence of other circum-
stances leading to public notoriety, that the public impact of the Court's
action, as in the case of dismissals, is held to a minimum.
Such an analysis does not, of course, purport to demonstrate that dis-
positions without opinions invariably represent a mediating device as de-
sirable as dismissals. As indicated above, the limitations on the use of this
device are more severe than is true of dismissals, and the likelihood that
factors outside the Court's control, such as the actions of the press or the
scholarly community, will result in the public's perceiving the disposition
as inadequately general is greater than in the case of dismissals. With those
qualifications, however, the same reasoning that leads to the designation
of dismissals as legitimate passive virtues must also be applicable to the
per curiam practice. We may, therefore, criticize the Court's per curiam
practice, as we might criticize its dismissal actions, for discounting too
drastically the likely reactions of the press and the scholarly community,
for example, or for resorting to dispositions without opinion for too ex-
tended a period in any given area, since any long series of such decisions
tends to increase the likelihood of a public perception of inadequate gen-
erality. What we cannot do, and this is precisely what Bickel attempts, is
simultaneously accept dismissals as legitimate mediating devices and yet
criticize the per curiam practice on the basis that dispositions without
opinion are not entitled to the same status.
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Assimilation of per curiams to the status of passive virtues, moreover,
involves a good deal more than simply expanding the scope of application
of the latter. For, as we have seen, Bickel's justification for drawing the
line between per curiams and dismissals of appeals is that the former truly
embody what the latter only "fictionally" represent-decisions on the
constitutional merits. And decisions on the constitutional merits, unlike
the mediating devices, are subject to the rigorous requirements of prin-
ciple. Recognition of per curiams as one of the passive virtues entails, there-
fore, the proposition that the pressures that compel resort to the mediating
devices, which for Bickel justify the decision in Naim, also have their part
to play in the disposition of cases on the constitutional merits. To some
extent, of course, this view is implicit in Bickel's treatment of Garner,
which, as we have seen, ultimately rests on the proposition that justifiable
demands for "intellectual tenability" are inversely related to the dangers
involved in legitimating the situation before the Court.'83 Garner, however,
although a decision on the merits, was not a decision on the constitutional
merits; and the crucial point about many of the per curiams, once again,
is precisely that they are decisions on the constitutional merits. In this sense,
therefore, classification of per curiams as a mediating device ultimately
does far more than simply shift the line that Bickel draws between dis-
missals of appeals and the per curiam practice. What it entails, rather, is
destruction of the barrier Bickel seeks to erect between principled deci-
sions and the mediating devices.
C.
A satisfactory theory of the work of the Court cannot stop, however,
with the assimilation of the per curiam practice into the world of passive
virtues. It must also account for the phenomenon against which much of
the recent criticism has been directed, for what Bickel and Wellington re-
ferred to as the
increasing incidence of the sweeping dogmatic statement, of the formulation of
results accompanied by little or no effort to support them in reason, in sum, of
opinions that do not opine and of per curiam orders that quite frankly fail to
build the bridge between the authorities they cite and the results they decree. 8
That description has since been echoed in numerous critical appraisals,'
and the phenomenon it reports is presumably also what Shapiro depicts as
the Court's lack of "candor" and Wechsler as a lack of "principle."
Criticism has, of course, always accompanied the work of the Court,
and the accusation of a lack of "candor" or "principle" may to some extent
183. See text accompanying note 138 supra.
184. Bickel & Wellington, supra note i32, at3.
185. See, e.g., L. HAND, TmE Bau. OF R ImGs (1958); Brown, supra note 127; Griswold, supra
note 127; Hart, supra note 127; Kurland, supra note 127.
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rest simply on a refusal to accept the legitimacy of the mediating devices.
As Bickel demonstrates, however, the Court has resorted to such devices
throughout its history. Even f one views them as unprincipled, or as lack-
ing in candor, their use means only that the Court's product has continued
to be as deficient as it always has been. What Bickel reports, however, and
what the recent critics object to, is something more-not the same old level
of imperfection, but an "increasing incidence" of failure.
One could, of course, simply brand these failures as illegitimate decisions
and leave it at that. Imprecation, however, is a poor substitute for under-
standing. And even a work that purports not to describe the ongoing work
of the Court, but only to delineate the role that such an institution may
legitimately fulfill, is more likely to persuade if it is based on an accurate
diagnosis of the institution's ills. Any satisfactory theory, therefore, must
account not only for the necessary level of lack of principle that has always
characterized the work of the Court, a requirement Bickel ably satisfies, but
also for the fact of an "increasing incidence" of failure, a task Bickel wholly
ignores.
Assuming that the quality of personnel staffing an institution remains
reasonably stable and that no significant changes occur in the internal insti-
tutional processes (and there is nothing in the recent history of the Supreme
Court to vitiate either of these assumptions), striking variations in work
product are likely to represent responses to change in the environment in
which the institution operates. The environment in which the Supreme
Court operates has recently been subject to two significant changes-neither
of them unknown in prior eras, neither of them without considerable roots
in history, but both having assumed significant proportions only in the
years following 1945.
The first of these changes has to do with increased public awareness of
the possibilities for social change inherent in constitutional litigation. In
part this is a diffuse, general consciousness resulting simply from more
widespread education and from developments in communications that en-
sure that an increasing proportion of the public learns of Court decisions,
and has access to speculation concerning the consequences of those deci-
sions, almost as soon as they are handed down. More significantly, it is this
awareness that has increasingly guided the behavior of organized groups, a
phenomenon symbolized by the carefully conceived campaign of litigation
that eventuated in the Brown decision. 88 A decisive effect of such group
activity is the extent to which it predetermines the sequence of issues
brought before the Court in any given area. One of the most important of
the passive virtues has historically been the property of randomness in the
186. See generally Vose, Litigation as a Form of Pressure Group Activity, 319 ANNALS 20 (1958).
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flow of litigation, which made it unlikely that the Court, after deciding any
given case, would immediately be faced with the situation that most strin-
gently tested the principle enunciated. It is precisely this saving element of
accident, this opportunity to avoid the testing of the outermost limits of a
principle, that has been eliminated by the activity of groups whose aim it is
to utilize litigation as a means of pursuing social goals.
One response by the Court to this activity has been to utilize an organi-
zation possessing considerable legal resources that, in addition to furthering
its own interests through litigation, has also demonstrated a regard for the
institutional needs of the Court. The Office of the Solicitor General has in-
creasingly been cast in this role, as is demonstrated by its recent participa-
tion in cases in which the interests of the United States were not directly
involved-the Reapportionment Cases and the Brown decision provide two
striking examples. In instances such as the second Brown decision, 8' the
Court's request for participation by the Solicitor General has eventuated in
arguments displaying a sensitive regard for the importance of mediating
devices and the Court's institutional capacity. 88
A second response, rooted in the considerations so thoroughly canvassed
in The Least Dangerous Branch, has been an increasing incidence of resort
to the passive virtues, including the mediating device represented by the
per curiam practice. The series of cases denying retroactive effect to various
decisions in the field of criminal procedure"9 represents one such instance,
analogous to the second Brown decision. To understand a second instance,
the handling of the obscenity issue, requires consideration of the second
significant change in the Court's environment-the breakdown of accepted
limitations on the meaning of constitutional concepts.
Dean Bayless Manning, in an incisive analysis demonstrating the in-
applicability of constitutional limitations to the exercise of power by private
business corporations, stresses the narrowly delimited nature of the free-
doms embodied in our constitutional guarantees. His conclusion that those
guarantees cannot meaningfully be applied to the corporate area is based
on the fact that the freedoms they ensure are freedoms from arbitrary inter-
ference only by governmental agencies and only in a restricted number of
areas, largely political rather than economic. The economic freedoms, in-
cluding freedom from hunger and deprivation; the cultural and intellec-
tual freedoms, including freedom to develop talents to the utmost limits of
capacity and to express those talents; "positive" rather than "negative" free-
doms; and freedoms whose attainment would implicate the actions of non-
187. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (implementation decision).
188. See A. BIcEL, supra note 99, at 252-53.
i89. See, e.g., Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (x966); Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott,
382 U.S. 406 (1966); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
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governmental agencies, all were largely ignored when our Constitution
was written 9
Strict observation of such limitations vastly simplified the task of the
Court in defining the applicability of constitutional guarantees. Thus, the
Court has not historically been in danger of losing its "reputation for
candor" when it failed to consider the applicability of a given constitu-
tional principle to deprivations of economic or cultural freedoms. And a
constitutional principle was perceived as adequately general even when it
was applied only to attempts by governmental agencies to interfere with
political freedoms. As the scope of the freedoms regarded as relevant ex-
pands, however, both candor and adequate generality must become in-
creasingly difficult to achieve.
The limitations that have thus helped to make the Court's work manage-
able are not to be found explicitly set out in the constitutional texts. They
exist, rather, as cultural understandings, as implicit assumptions, and it is
precisely these agreements that have increasingly been breaking down.
A primary example is the traditional understanding of the scope of the
equal protection guarantee. The Court's recent expansion of the applica-
bility of this guarantee has been designated "the egalitarian revolution" by
Professor Kurland, one of the Court's most vociferous scholarly critics, who
considers this expansion the most "novel" of the themes that have charac-
terized the work of the Court over the past decade.'
When he wrote those words, Kurland had in mind the reapportionment
and segregation decisions;.92 but he might with equal justification have
included the recent decisions in the area of criminal law, which he con-
siders primarily as examples of "the effective subordination, if not destruc-
tion, of the federal system."' 1 True, decisions such as Gideon v. Wain-
wright'94 and Escobedo v. Illinois'95 are phrased in terms of sixth amend-
ment guarantees, and Miranda v. Arizona.. is couched in fifth amendment
language. But Gideon emphasizes the fact that "there are few defendants
charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can
get to prepare and present their defenses,"' 7 and Escobedo relies on the
"lesson of history that no system of criminal justice can, or should, survive
if it comes to depend for its continued effectiveness on the citizens' abdica-
tion through unawareness of their constitutional rights."'98 Clearly, then,
19o. See Manning, Corporate Power and Individual Freedom: Some General Analysis and Par-
ticular Reservations, 55 Nw. U.L. Ray. 38, 46-53 (i96o).
191. See Kurland, supra note 127, at 144.
192. See id. at 145-62.
193. Id. at 144; see id. at 163-65.
194. 372 U.S. 335 (963).
195. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
i96. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
197. 372 U.S. at 344.
198. 378 U.S. at 490.
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the theme that underlies these cases is one of equality: in Gideon, the im-
position of a duty on the State to provide the same access to counsel for those
who cannot afford to hire an attorney as for those who can; in Escobedo
and Miranda, the duty to equalize, between those who are aware of their
constitutional rights and those who are not, the opportunity for access to
counsel prior to interrogation that may result in invocation of fifth amend-
ment rights.
The equal protection basis for decision is most nearly explicit in cases
such as Douglas v. California,'99 which invalidated the practice of denying
appointment of counsel for an indigent upon the independent determina-
tion of an appellate court that no purpose would be served by the appoint-
ment. The opinion in Douglas relied on Griffin v. Illinois,"' which had
held that indigents must be given equal access to the procedures established
by the States for reviewing criminal convictions. But as Mr. Justice Harlan
pointed out in dissent, Douglas, unlike Griffin, did not deal with a problem
of access to appellate review, for the procedures struck down in Douglas
required the appellate court to make a complete review of the trial pro-
ceedings in determining that no purpose would be served by the appoint-
ment of counsel."° What Douglas involved, rather, was the imposition of
a duty on the State to equalize the quality of the indigent's participation
in appellate procedures.
Mr. Justice Harlan clearly saw the implications of such a decision for
the other criminal-procedure cases canvassed above:
[I]f the present problem may be viewed as one of equal protection, so may the ques-
tion of the right to appointed counsel at trial, and the Court's analysis of that right
in Gideon v. Wainwright ... is wholly unnecessary. The short way to dispose
of [that case] . . . would be simply to say that the State deprives the indigent of
equal protection whenever it fails to furnish him with legal services, and perhaps
with other services as well, equivalent to those that the affluent defendant can
obtain. 2 2
Justice Harlan's basic objection to the decision was precisely the "novel-
ty" of its interpretation of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection:
[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not impose on the States "an affirmative duty
to lift the handicaps flowing from differences in economic circumstances." To so
construe it would be to read into the Constitution a philosophy of leveling that
would be foreign to many of our basic concepts of the proper relations between
government and society. The State may have a moral obligation to eliminate the
evils of poverty, but it is not required by the Equal Protection Clause to give to
some whatever others can afford.
203
199. 372 U.S. 353 (963).
200. 351 U.S. 12 (x956).
2o. See 372 U.S. at 363-64.
2o2. Id. at 363.
203. Id. at 362 (footnote omitted).
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The extent to which the accepted limitations on the concept of equal
protection have been eroded-whether the Court's "novel" interpretation
will eventually be extended to such areas as payment for expert witnesses,
and beyond-is not yet clear. As Douglas demonstrates, however, the pro-
cess is under way. Ultimately, therefore, Kurland's failure to point to the
criminal cases as exemplifications of "the egalitarian revolution" seems to
stem from a failure to appreciate the real source of the "novel" constitu-
tional doctrine he finds in the segregation decisions: the Court's partial
recognition, reflecting a new awareness on the part of the public, that the
freedom embodied in constitutional guarantees as they have historically
been limited is, for the economically and socially disadvantaged, no free-
dom at all. Once that fact had been recognized in Brown, in connection
with the impact on Negroes of segregated educational facilities, the draw-
ing of its obvious implications for criminal law required only a further
recognition of the empirical connection between poverty and crime.
The "novel" element in recent segregation and criminal decisions can
thus largely be accounted for in terms of the relatively recent public (and
judicial) awareness of the extent to which the world of the poor and of the
Negro differs from that in which the bulk of the public lives, and of the
consequences entailed by that disparity for the content of a meaningful
constitutional guarantee of "equal protection." Moreover, the discovery of
previously unknown universes existing within our boundaries is not the
only example of an area of increased public and judicial consciousness in
the United States in the post-World War II period. Due in part to the
enforced world tours required of so many citizens by that conflict, and
perhaps more to ongoing developments in communication and transporta-
tion, there developed a growing awareness of the divergent sexual stan-
dards characteristic of even closely related Western cultures.
The predictable result was confusion. Both a public that continued to
hold to the accepted truth that society ought not to permit the dissemina-
tion of obscenity, and a Court that had translated that premise into the Roth
formula that obscenity was not speech and was therefore not protected by
first amendment guarantees,""4 found themselves increasingly unable to
agree on just what it was that had-of course-to be banned. Reflecting the
public confusion, the absence of even a potential consensus on the nature
and content of permissible areas of candor in sexual matters, a badly frag-
mented Court increasingly resorted to the passive virtues. Wherever pos-
sible, for nearly a decade after the Roth decision, "cryptic per curiams"
were the order of the day.
204. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482-84 (1957).
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D.
Bickel, of course, is fully aware of this lack of consensus, and it forms
the basis for his counsel that the Court restrict the scope of obscenity statutes
without ever ruling on the constitutional merits.2 " But the circumstances
in which several of the cases arose foreclosed, in the Court's view, avenues
other than that of constitutional adjudication;0. and decisions on the
merits, given the relatively acceptable content of the material that was
usually at issue and the need of the Court to preserve credibility, had, in the
main, to uphold the freedom to print and to read. Bickel correctly suggests
that a "principled" exception to this pattern should be made for cases in-
volving "displays that thrust themselves unavailingly at people who may
feel offended by them."2 '
Would application of this "principled" exception, however, entail the
inconsistency noted by Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Ginzburg, of
making the obscene content of material depend on the advertising that
preceded or accompanied it? That inconsistency could be avoided only if
what the Court in fact condemned was the method and content of the ad-
vertising rather than the material being advertised. But that, of course, is
precisely the purport of the "pandering" test advanced in Ginzburg. The
content of the material involved in Redrup, as Bickel notes," 8 cannot mean-
ingfully be distinguished from that condemned in Ginzburg. But the
Court in Ginzburg did not focus on the content of the material being dis-
seminated; the pivotal inquiry was, rather, into the nature and content of
the advertising campaign that accompanied it. "
The Ginzburg test is, admittedly, not stated in these terms, just as the
per curiams that both preceded and followed that decision are impenetrably
"cryptic" concerning the bases of decision. But that, as Bickel himself ac-
knowledges in terms reminiscent of his justification for Naim, is surely
attributable to the fact that "a majority of our people are not prepared to
accept such a broadly permissive rule, and . . . their unwillingness to ac-
cept it is based in some part on surmises about the possible connection be-
tween pornography and crime. That there is no such connection may be
likely. But no one is able to prove it."21 The obscenity cases, therefore, no
205. See text accompanying note x56 supra.
206. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAsr DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME CouRT AT THE BAR oP
POLITICS 133-43 (1962), outlining an alternative to the Court's having reached the merits in Times
Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (196x), a film-censorship case.
207. See text accompanying note 156 supra.
208. "(The materials involved in Redrup] . . . are no more distinguishable from Mr. Ginz-
burg's publications than were all those items that went before, from 1957 to 1966." Bickel, Obscenity
Cases, NEW REPUBLIC, May 27, 1967, at 15, 16. See also text accompanying note 149 supra.
209. See Comment, More Ado About Dirty Books, 75 YALE hJ. 1364, 1386-88 (1966).
21o. Bickel, supra note 208, at 17.
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less than the other examples surveyed by Bickel of the use of mediating
devices, represent dispositions "seek[ing] merely to elicit the correct an-
swers to certain prudential questions that ... lie in the path of ultimate
issues of principle."2 '' They are attempts by the Court "to maintain itself
in the tension between principle and expediency"" 1 --the tension "on which
our society thrives." '13
Bickel's objection to the obscenity decisions is not, however, an objection
in the large. It focuses, rather, on "the rank injustice of punishing [Ginz-
burg] under a rule applicable to no one else, past or future."2 4 Because the
per curiams preceding Ginzburg had seemed to indicate that "just about
anything is printable in the US today," and because Ginzburg itself refused
to make explicit the "principled" exception on which it was based, Bickel
can only conclude:
The Court, we now know, made of Mr. Ginzburg an example which exemplifies
nothing. Had any other institution been responsible for this performance-say
some hapless administrative agency-the Court would have been well-justified in
holding that it violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.2 15
In another context, as we have seen, Bickel himself exposed the flaw in
this contention. In response to the argument that devices of avoidance could
not legitimately be employed where they resulted in refusals to uphold
individual claims that "the Court, if pushed to the wall of principled judg-
ment, would likely . . . vindicate," ''  Bickel countered:
The Supreme Court in constitutional cases sits to render an additional, principled
judgment on what has already been authoritatively ordered. Its interventions are
by hypothesis exceptional and limited, and they occur, not to forestall chaos, but to
revise a pre-existing order that is otherwise viable and was itself arrived at by more
normal processes. Fixation on an individual right to judgment by the Supreme
Court is, therefore, largely question-begging.
21 7
We are all creatures of the injustices to which we have become accus-
tomed. Ginzburg's conviction had already been upheld by one appellate
court when the Supreme Court granted certiorari in his case. Had the
Court simply denied certiorari at that point, would there then have been
a rank injustice? The conclusion to be drawn from a negative answer, one
that Bickel's prescription of mediating devices strongly suggests, must be
that the Ginzburg decision and the obscenity per curiams, no less than the
other passive virtues described by Bickel, represent the price society must
211. A. BicrEL, supra note 2o6, at 70.
212. Id. at 69.
213. Id. at 132.
214. Bickel, supra note 2o8, at i6.
215. Id.
216. A. BIicEL, supra note 206, at 172.
217. Id. at 173.
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pay for maintaining the Court as a viable institution capable of fulfilling
its assigned constitutional task.21
That price may be expected to increase as the factors of change sketched
above continue to accelerate. It is not only the growth of self-conscious
group litigation-although that is important and likely to become vastly
more so as the legal agencies associated with the War on Poverty come into
full operation-and the gradual breakdown of accepted limitations on
constitutional concepts that dictate an increasing resort to the full panoply
of mediating devices. In the last analysis, this trend toward "expediency"
can be accounted for as a reaction to the continuing increase in both the
tempo and content of constitutional litigation-an intensification and ex-
pansion that at bottom are produced not by a Court imperiously attempt-
ing to impose its will upon the nation, but rather by a nation with a popu-
lation growing both in numbers and in education, a population ever more
aware both of decisions of the Court and of the potentiality for social change
inherent in those decisions.
In terms of any given decision, therefore, the Court may be open to
criticism for espousing a wrong, or an inadequate, principle; for failing to
resort to a passive virtue where such resort is both possible and proper;218
or for resorting to per curiam dispositions where a more limited and less
controversial mediating device is available 2 In general, however, it is
clear that the direction of change is such that the Court's task of constitu-
tional adjudication must necessarily become an increasingly difficult one.
The prognosis, then, is precisely one of an "increasing incidence" of failure.
VI.
Professor Bickel, moreover, is not alone in disapproving of the Court's
handling of cases in the areas of obscenity and film censorship. Almost a
decade ago, Mr. Justice Black made clear his objection to the Cout's pro-
cedure of dealing with such cases at retail:
228. A similar price involving subordination of individual goals is exacted by the process of group
litigation delineated in the text accompanying notes 186-88 supra. In the NAACP campaign that led
to the Brown decision, for example, may there not have been individual plaintiffs who were con-
demned to an experience of exclusively segregated schooling, to a practical denial of the right being
contended for, by the grade-a-year desegregation programs on which agreement was often reached?
Acceptance of the fact that in every viable society individual desires must at some point be sacri-
ficed to institutional needs presumably also represents the solution to the equal protection problems
raised by the practice, described in the text at notes 287-88 supra, of having the Office of the Solicitor
General intervene in cases in which the United States has no direct pecuniary or governmental in-
terest. Assuming that this practice has become an established one, suppose that after a Supreme Court
decision has established a certain constitutional right, the Solicitor General receives a letter from some-
one being denied that right reporting that no lawyer whom the writer can afford to hire is willing to
take the case, and requesting assistance. Must the Solicitor General-an agency of government-re-
spond affirmatively if the facts contained in the letter are true, or can he-and the Supreme Court-
restrict at will the occasions when, and the parties on whose behalf, intervention will take place?
219. See note 2o6 supra and accompanying text.
220. Cf. text accompanying note 156 supra.
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We are told that the only way we can decide whether a State or municipality
can constitutionally bar movies is for this Court to view and appraise each movie
on a case-by-case basis. Under these circumstances, every member of the Court
must exercise his own judgment as to how bad a picture is . . . .The end result
of such decisions seems to me to be a purely personal determination by individual
Justices as to whether a particular picture viewed is too bad to allow it to be seen
by the public. Such an individualized determination cannot be guided by reason-
ably fixed and certain standards. . . [The resulting] uncertainty cannot easily
be reconciled with the rule of law which our Constitution envisages.2 2 '
Black's emphasis on "fixed and certain standards," like his objection to
a case-by-case process of adjudication, recalls the differentiation between
constitutional and common-law adjudication that he expressed in his
Linkletter dissent222 in terms of the logic-experience dichotomy.2 But
what is the danger posed for the development of constitutional law by
resort to common-law methods of adjudication? A persuasive argument
can be made that, far from eschewing such methods, a Court desiring to
achieve that precision of analysis essential to the formulation of enduring
constitutional principles could do no better than to adhere to the process of
case-by-case adjudication:
[T~he framing of concepts and the integration of a conceptual system for the pur-
pose of finding out where we are at, as a preliminary to seeing where we are to go
next-that will remain eternally necessary to scientific advance. And at this point,
the process of argument in court, or the judicial process, affords in the rival claims
of the opposing lawyers a clarity of appreciation, forced upon few other men, as to
the weasel ways of verbal symbols, as to the need for rigorous definition, the need
for hunting postulates to their foul holes and yanking them out into brutal, healthy
sun, the need for step-by-step reasoning which stays at every step within the prem-
ises as defined, whenever one sets about any such integration.
2 2 4
What Black fears sufficiently to justify his sacrifice of the intellectual
precision made possible by common-law processes is the exercise by the
Court of that measure of discretion that a system of case-by-case adjudi-
2z. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 69o-9I (959) (concurring opinion).
222. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
223. Mr. Justice Black has recently reiterated this distinction in support of his dissenting position
in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965): "Observing that 'the right to privacy ...
presses for recognition here,' today this Court, which I did not understand to have power to sit as a
court of common law, now appears to be exalting a phrase which Warren and Brandeis used in dis-
cussing grounds for tort relief, to the level of a constitutional rule which prevents state legislatures
from passing any law deemed by this Court to interfere with 'privacy.'" Id. at 51o n.I (emphasis
added).
224. Llewellyn, Legal Tradition and Social Science Method-A Realist's Crtique, in BRoOINsGS
INSTITUTION, ESSAYS ON RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 89, II (i93i); cf. Corbin, Hard Cases
Make Good Law, 33 YALE L.J. 78 (1923).
Bickel shares this appreciation of the virtues of common-law methods of adjudication: "Another
advantage that courts have is that questions of principle never carry the same aspect for them as they
did for the legislature or the executive. Statutes, after all, deal typically with abstract or dimly foreseen
problems. The courts are concerned with the flesh and blood of an actual case. This tends to modify,
perhaps to lengthen, everyone's view. It also provides an extremely salutary proving ground for all
abstractions; it is conducive, in a phrase of Holmes, to thinking things, not words, and thus to the
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cation inevitably entails. The connection between discretion and common-
law adjudication is explicitly drawn by the prevailing opinion in Link-
letter, which begins by establishing the Court's agreement with Austin,
who "maintained that judges do in fact do something more than discover
law; they make it interstitially by filling in with judicial interpretation the
vague, indefinite, or generic statutory or common-law terms that alone are
but the empty crevices of the law."
Black's Linkletter opinion also makes explicit the basis for his opposi-
tion to the exercise of such discretion by the Court. The sentence immedi-
ately following the passage that objects to the reading of Holmes as identi-
fying constitutional law with "experience" is as follows: "It should be re-
membered in this connection that no member of this Court has ever more
seriously criticized it than did Justice Holmes for reading its own predi-
lections into the 'vague contours' of the Due Process Clause."22 In other
words, the Court may not in constitutional cases rely on "experience," may
not exercise the discretion that case-by-case adjudication would entrust to
it, because to do so would run the risk of repeating the occurrences of the
i93o's. That period, as the then Senator Black was well aware, was one in
which the Court's attempts to block economic measures deemed necessary
by the legislature and executive came near to destroying it as a viable in-
stitution.
It might be argued that, if the function of the Court is truly to afford
our society an opportunity for "sober second thought" concerning mea-
sures that challenge, in some significant way, either cherished ideals or
deep-rooted social beliefs, then the actions of the thirties were thoroughly
in accord with that function. The fact is that the impropriety of govern-
ment intervention in the economy did represent such a belief; and the
effect of the Court's decisions was precisely to impress upon the society the
magnitude of the departure from received tradition entailed by acceptance
of the view that there exist no principled checks on governmental eco-
nomic actions. The full implications of that acceptance are only now be-
coming apparent, as property rights once again begin to be perceived as
necessary bulwarks of individual freedom.2 Even on a less long-range
view, it is apparent that the Court's i93o's decisions performed the task of
legitimation that the cumbersomeness of the machinery for amending the
Constitution has historically imposed upon the Court. Thus, the public
evolution of principle by a process that tests as it creates." A. BicrsEL, supra note 206, at 26. Indeed, as
we have previously seen, it is essential to Bickel's theory that constitutional cases are decided by means
of common-law processes. See note zx8 supra and accompanying text.
225. 381 U.S. at 623-24. See also K. IaxwELLN, ThE CommoN LAw TRADrrioN 62-i2o (196o).
226. 381 U.S. at 642.
227. See, e.g., McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and
Reburial, x962 S. CT. REv. 34; Reich, The New Property, 73 YAL L.. 733 (2964); cf. Struve, The
Less.Restrictive-Alternative Principle and Economic Due Process, 8o Hnv. L. REv. 1463 (1967).
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consensus on the propriety of the economic legislation of the 193o's was
ultimately strengthened, not weakened, as a result of the Court's inter-
vention.
Whether or not that intervention was proper, the Linkletter dissent
makes clear that Black's objection to case-by-case adjudication is rooted in
his fear that the Court will abuse the discretion such a process necessarily
involves. That fear is confirmed by what Black sees as the record of the
Court's use of common-law "experience" as a guide to constitutional deci-
sions. In Black's view, reliance on "experience" led, in the 195o's, to a sup-
planting of the excesses of the I93O's by the constitutional "balances" he so
bitterly opposed. Black's solution to this dilemma is an insistence on "logic"
-the logic of textual "absolutes" and of historical meanings.
The efficacy of relying on these two sources of logic for satisfactory
guidelines in constitutional adjudication has been searchingly questioned
by Bickel.2 What is crucial for present purposes, however, is that Black's
system of constitutional "logic" can successfully eliminate the element of
discretion in constitutional adjudication only if it provides a totally co-
herent and comprehensive system, whose principles never conflict with
each other in any conceivable set of circumstances. Such a system, of course,
satisfies Wechsler's criterion of neutrality interpreted as total generality.
Under such a system, moreover, there would be no need for mediating
devices and the avoidance of constitutional issues. Consequently, the Court,
in each and every case, would be able to fulfill completely the requirement
of "candor" with regard to the basis for decision that Shapiro seeks to
impose upon it.
But to return momentarily to the Gothic mode, the fact is that the struc-
ture of the law embodies the diversity and incongruity of Chartres, not the
rational order of Amiens or even of Notre Dame. It is no less true for con-
stitutional law than for tort law that precedents serve, not as logical axioms
from which conclusions can mechanically be derived, but as an accumu-
lated store of wisdom against which the validity of new conclusions can be
assessed. Nor are constitutional cases exempt from the transformations of
meaning produced by history. Is the proposition for which Marbury V.
Madison.. stands today the holding of that case? Is not Pierce v. Society
of Sisters.. cited as establishing a first amendment right of which no trace
can be found in the opinion? Is not Buchanan v. Warley... cited as estab-
lishing an equal protection rather than a due process right?
As then Dean Rostow put it :
228. See A. BICKEL, supra note 206, at 84-2o.
229. 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137 (1803).
230. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
231. 24.5 U.S. 60 (917).
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Any lawyer who has worked through a line of cases about easements or trusts
or bills and notes or any other legal subject, knows that no court has ever achieved
perfection in its reasoning in its first, or indeed in its twentieth opinion on the same
subject .... [Even our greatest and most insightful judges] grapple with a new
problem, deal with it over and over again, as its dimensions change. They settle
one case, and find themselves tormented by its unanticipated progeny. They back
and fill, zig and zag, groping through the mist for a line of thought which will in
the end satisfy their standards of craft and their vision of the policy of the com-
munity they must try to interpret. The opinions written at the end of such a cycle
rarely resemble those composed at the beginning. Exceptions emerge, and new
formulations of what once looked like clear principle. If we take advantage of
hindsight, we can see in any line of cases and statutes a pattern of growth, and of
response to changing conditions and changing ideas. There are cases that lead
nowhere, stunted branches and healthy ones. Often the judges who participated
in the process could not have described the tree that was growing. Yet the felt
necessities of society have their impact, and the law emerges, gnarled, asymmetri-
cal, but very much alive-the product of a forest, not of a nursery garden, nor of
the gardener's art.
2a2
To substitute "logic" for "experience" in constitutional adjudication, there-
fore, would be to dispense altogether with the judicial process, at least the
judicial process as known in the United States and in England.
The connection between the judicial process and the discretion that
Black fears is perhaps best illustrated by the following example: Assume a
logical chain of propositions (a) through (e), with the Court already
having decided (a) and (b) in such a way as to indicate a particular result
in (c), which result has not, however, yet been promulgated. Assume fur-
ther, that case (e) then arises and that some combination of factors-with
the Supreme Court, perhaps a need to maintain credibility that outweighs
any loss of public acceptance foreseeable from a perception of inadequate
generality-presses strongly for a resolution that conflicts with the indi-
cated outcome, the "logical" decision, in (c). It is precisely here that the
process of case-by-case adjudication maximizes the attention given to the
"flesh and blood" of the case before the court, "to things," in the phrase of
Holmes quoted by Bickel, "not words." Outweighing the need to main-
tain doctrinal consistency, in short, is the fearsome pressure of decision, the
knowledge that even a refusal to decide involves not only a continuation,
but also in part a legitimation, of the (by hypothesis) undesirable status quo
contained in the case presently at issue. In such a situation the measure of
discretion inevitably entailed by common-law methods of adjudication is
embodied in the pressure toward simply deciding the single case, toward
reaching a decision in (e) that conflicts with the result indicated in (c),
232. Rostow, American Legal Realism and the Sense of the Profession, 34 RocKy MT. L. REv. 123,
141-42 (1962).
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and leaving to a later case, or to a later bench, the possibility of formulating
an acceptable distinction in (d).
The description given above is not, of course, intended to suggest either
that sloppiness in opinion writing ought to be condoned in common-law
adjudication or that the dilemma being delineated will often be encoun-
tered. Nor can decisions such as that suggested in (e) long survive in the
law if the issue on which they bear continues to be actively litigated. Unless
within a reasonable period of time they become incorporated into an ar-
ticulated, rationalizable exception to the general rule, they must inevitably
become, in Rostow's phrase, "stunted branches," "cases that lead nowhere."
There is, however, another possibility, one canvassed by Bickel in con-
nection with his justification for the Court's avoidance of the "momentous
constitutional issue" lurking in the background of the Garner case:233 "But
then, nothing may have to be faced, or what must be faced may arise in a
different social and political context. As many a southern and border city
has demonstrated, the sit-in problem is soluble-and beyond a doubt best
solved-by processes other than judicial."23 Case (d), in other words, may
never arise or, if it does, the factors that represented the potentiality for
conflict with (c) and (e) may have been transformed beyond recognition
by the passage of time. Is it too early to suggest that the Communist cases of
the 195o's are rapidly being assimilated to that status, that the recent trans-
formations in the monolithic quality of the world Communist movement
are rapidly rendering irrelevant the justification offered in those cases for
the inapplicability of first amendment guarantees?
Whatever the applicability of this analysis to those particular decisions,
it is clear that the alternative suggested by Bickel, the possibility that any
particular formulation of a social or political problem may be only transi-
tory, is what ultimately makes possible the art of government. That today's
problems, even if not completely or rationally or logically soluble, will
eventually be replaced by tomorrow's, is an insight that lies at the core of
all political wisdom. It is also, of course, what Brandeis had in mind when
he said of the Court: "The most important thing we do is not doing."'
And it is, finally, the ultimate justification for the common law's reliance
on "experience," for the case-by-case methods of adjudication in terms of
which common-law judges make the law.
In the last analysis, the wisdom of "experience" is a humbling one.
"Often," Rostow tells us, "the judges who participated in the process could
not have described the tree that was growing." Thus when a judge decides
simply the case before him, when he focuses on things rather than words,
233. See text accompanying notes 1X5-17 supra.
234. A. BICKEL, supra note 2o6, at 177.
235. Id. at 71.
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the ultimate justification for his actions is not the certainty that he will
reach the correct result in the particular instance. The certainty, rather, is
that the words are inadequate, that even if a totally coherent and compre-
hensive system of law is theoretically possible, there is no warrant for be-
lieving that our judges are capable of finding and administering it.
Reliance upon common-law methods of adjudication, however, has con-
sequences for society as well as for the judge. Thus, as we have seen, the
rising incidence both of awareness concerning the Court and of group liti-
gation tends to create a situation in which case (d) will rapidly be brought
before the courts. Similarly, the breakdown of accepted limitations on the
meaning of legal concepts, most evident in constitutional law but by no
means confined to that area, makes it increasingly difficult to formulate
even partially complete and coherent systems. This problem, the reverse
side of the coin of "candor," arises because a widening of the meaning of
fundamental legal concepts increases the number of situations to which a
given principle is arguably applicable, and in which it may arguably con-
flict with some other principle.23
The heart of the difficulty is that stability represents one of the para-
mount demands that we make on the law. And stability is the child of
"logic," of "clear and definite standards," and of the absence of conflict.
The common law can meet this demand, it can achieve the status of "logic,"
but it can do so only over time, as the slow accretion of individual decisions
works itself into a recognizable pattern. The key to the stability of the com-
mon law is, therefore, time: time in which to develop a pattern of decision
whose meaning will be accessible to hindsight, and time in which to accom-
modate, in terms of shifting doctrine, the changes required of the law by
changing social conditions. As the pace of social change accelerates, how-
ever, it is precisely the element of time that is increasingly denied to the
common law. As a result, the prognosis for the continuing acceptability of
case-by-case adjudication as the method by which constitutional litigation
is conducted must eventually be the same as that for the Court's efforts to
maintain satisfactory levels of principle and candor in the resolution of con-
stitutional issues-one of an increasing incidence of failure.
VII.
Even apart from the effects of accelerating social change, it has always
been true that the common law has existed in an uneasy tension between
the "logic" of doctrine and the "experience," the "flesh and blood," of the
individual case. As is true of all common-law courts, much of the Supreme
Court's prestige stems from the public's identification of the law with
236. Cf. Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YATaE L.J. 1037 (ig6i).
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"logic," with the pattern of decision rather than with the individual case.
And, as is again true of all common-law courts, it is this identification that
ultimately accounts for the reservoir of public acceptance upon which courts
draw, not only when adherence to doctrine results in an unpopular deci-
sion, but also when the need to preserve institutional capacity leads to a
decision inexplicable in terms of received doctrine or when an error is com-
mitted in the exercise of discretion.
It is thus only partially correct to assert, as Bickel does in demonstrating
the "question-begging" nature of a demand for "an individual right to
judgment by the Supreme Court," that "[t]here are crucial differences-
which, of course, the opinions in Marbury v. Madison and Cohens V. Vir-
ginia seek to obscure-between the role of the Supreme Court in constitu-
tional cases and the function of courts of general jurisdiction." 3' It would
be more accurate to say that what the opinions in Marbury and Cohens are
seeking to obscure is the fact that "logic" is not the whole of the law. The
pressures requiring resort to "experience" are, of course, greater for the
Supreme Court than for lower federal courts and the state judiciary. But
the fact is that the Supreme Court is not alone, that it shares with all com-
mon-law courts the status of existing in the tension between the principled
universe of "logic" and the expedient requirements of "experience."
A.
As Bickel stresses, however, this tension assumes a significantly greater
dimension with the Supreme Court. In large part, the source of this addi-
tional dimension is to be found in what Bickel refers to as "The Mystic
Function" of the Court;238 the sense in which the Court, because it "is seen
as a continuum," because "[ilt is never, like other institutions, renewed at
a single stroke," serves "to concretize the symbol of the Constitution,"
which, for our society, serves as "the symbol of nationhood, of continuity,
of unity and common purpose."23 One of the consequences of being cast in
a symbolic role-the need to assume a stance that can be apprehended by
the public in terms of moral norms-has been evocatively portrayed by
Dean Manning:
To the extent that our politics partake of the nature of a Morality Play, they
have inevitably required, and generated, a set of theatrical conventions as arbitrary,
and as acceptable, as those of any dramatic form. The vocabulary of our politics
conforms to its role as a national Morality drama. That vocabulary is formal, dog-
matic, simplified, symbolic, repetitive, and goal-setting; it is not descriptive and
must not be thought of as being descriptive. And the actors in the political drama
must, as in epic drama, appear as more than life-size, establishing, declaring, and
237. A. BICKEL, supra note 2o6, at x73.
238. Id. at 29-33.
239. Id. at 31.
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appearing to live in accordance with, standards that are not of this world. We
therefore demand ultimate moral pronouncements from our parties and our offi-
cials. We beatify or apotheosize our former Presidents, feeling the need for unify-
ing national moral norms and having no national established church to do the job
or to produce national saints.
2 40
Manning, in the passage quoted, was considering the rhetoric of United
States political campaigns and offering an explanation for the imposition
upon our government officials of requirements for the divestment of hold-
ings in commercial enterprises that go far beyond the purported necessity
to avoid conflicts of interest, and that serve in fact to deprive government of
so large a proportion of the society's administrative and technological
talent that the effective formulation and implementation of national policy
may seriously be threatened. Insofar as the Court also has a symbolic role
to play in our society, however, it too is subject to the mandate of "estab-
lishing, declaring, and appearing to live in accordance with, standards that
are not of this world." In the case of the Court, those standards require the
maintenance of an appearance not only of incorruptibility-which the so-
ciety largely, and correctly, takes for granted-but also of adherence to
principle, to "logic," and to neutrality.
The impact of such requirements is most dearly apparent in the rhetoric
of decision, in what was referred to in part III-F as matters of "phrasing."
When a dissent characterizes the majority's disposition as an impermissible
ccamending of the Constitution," for example, the rhetoric serves precisely
the same function as an accusation by the minority in the House that the
majority are "employing steamroller tactics" or "playing partisan politics."
The dissenting judge is fully aware, of course, that any judicial interpreta-
tion of a constitutional principle involves a pro tanto "amendment" of the
Constitution, just as the House minority knows full well that "partisan
politics" are an integral part of the legislative process and that the majority's
electoral mandate involves, in part, a commitment to enact certain policies
and, if necessary, to use "steamroller tactics."
Neither the dissenting judge nor the House minority, then, is suffering
from any illusions concerning the nature of the judicial or legislative pro-
cess. What they are doing is adverting to the existence of certain overriding
goals that those processes are expected to fulfill: stability and continuity,
in the case of judicial interpretation of the Constitution, and the need for
compromising competing interests and for giving some recognition to the
legitimate demands of the minority party, in the case of the legislative
process. In both instances, therefore, the appeal is to the symbols in terms
of which those overriding goals are expressed: an unchanging Constitution,
240. Manning, The Purity Potlatch: An Essay on Conflicts of Interest, American Government,
and Aforal Escalation, 24 FED. B.J. 239,243 (1964).
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whose meaning is clear and accessible to all, and which is simply applied
by the judiciary to the cases that are brought before it; and a legislative
process that represents the work, not of members of political parties or
agents of interest groups, but of statesmen whose sole concern is the attain-
ment of the national good.
Another example of the impact of the requirement that symbolic ap-
pearances be maintained is to be found in the Court's refusal to assign sig-
nificance to changes in the policymaking personnel of an administrative
agency, the refusal to treat such changes as a reason for either more or less
stringent scrutiny of that agency's decisions. The suggestion offered is not;
of course, that the Court ought to scrutinize an agency's decisions more
closely because individual justices personally dislike or distrust the policy-
making members of the agency. No court could long survive public aware-
ness of such flouting of the ideal of dispassionate inquiry to which our judi-
ciary is held. But assume that the legislative history of a given statute in-
dicates that it was to be interpreted in a certain fashion, and that both the
administrative agency charged with its implementation and the Court had
agreed on the propriety of that mode of interpretation over a period of
years. And assume further a change in agency personnel resulting from the
entry into office of an administration out of sympathy with the aims of the
statute (does the NLRB under Eisenhower's administration at least par-
tially fit this description?). Why, under such circumstances, does not the
change in personnel provide a proper occasion for a judicial announcement
that that agency's decisions will henceforth be subject to more stringent
scrutiny?
The answer, it is suggested, is not that the Court is under any illusion
as to the unimportance of the political persuasion of agency personnel in
determining the spirit in which congressional statutes are implemented;
a Court that suffered from such an illusion would have to regard as mean-
ingless the many statutory provisions that specify the political composition
of the policymaking arms of administrative agencies. The crucial point is,
rather, that the Court is charged with the function of upholding the symbol
of n evenhanded Government, characterized by continuity of policy and
devoted to the interests of the nation as a whole rather than to the attain-
ment of parochial, partisan goals. And that ideal, symbolized by the belief
that we are ruled by a "government of laws, not men," would be seriously
compromised by overt recognition of the fact that a change in party, even
without an accompanying change in legislative mandates, can nevertheless
result in a change in law.
Recognition of this consequence of the Court's symbolic role severely
limits the applicability of any requirement of "candor" in measuring that
institution's achievements. Shapiro's fears concerning the possibility of "the
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Court's loss of that precious political asset, a reputation for candor," are
based on the premises that the public looks at opinions, not results, and that
it demands of those opinions the utmost candor concerning the bases of
decision. The short answer is that matters are far more complex than that.
To begin with, it is a far more likely hypothesis, as we have seen, that the
public responds as much to results, to the outcome of a given decision, as to
the rhetoric contained in the opinion." 1 Even more important, however,
are the complicating factors introduced by the Court's symbolic function.
It is true, of course, that there exist severe limits on the extent to which
the content of symbols such as those considered above are taken literally
by the public. The public is aware, and to some extent accepts as inevitable,
that, for example, the staffing of many governmental offices is dictated by
narrowly political considerations; that our government is, in a sense-as the
statutory provisions specifying the political composition of administrative
agencies attest-a government of men as much as of laws. But that fact
alone does not entail the proposition that an increase in public sophistica-
tion will, or ought to, lead to a public willingness to accept a rhetoric that
substitutes greater candor concerning the processes by which the polity is
governed for continued adherence to the symbols cherished by the society.
In some cases, where the conflict between symbol and reality is particu-
larly acute, and where continued adherence to symbolic rhetoric would
seriously interfere with the efficient performance of the workaday govern-
mental task, such a result may well follow. But the point remains that con-
tinued adherence to the symbolic content of government is not just a matter
of "keeping up appearances," that the overriding social goals embodied in
those symbols have both meaning and importance. It is thus of the highest
importance that our legislators be reminded constantly of their obligation
to be more than members of a political party or agents of an interest group,
and that our judges display a proper regard for the traditional wisdom
contained in precedents and the social utility of continuing adherence to
established patterns of social organization.
But these requirements are only half of the story of government, for the
work of this world, the world in which the symbols are only partially and
sometimes operative, also urgently requires doing. If society is to continue
to function efficiently, in other words, parochial interests must continue to
be represented effectively in the legislative process; and political parties,
despite the fact that they are unsanctioned by any mention in the constitu-
tional text, represent the means developed by our polity for fulfilling this
task. Similarly, a Court concerned exclusively with adherence to the "logic"
of precedent could not long succeed in the task of keeping relevant to
241. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 134-35 supra.
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present-day social needs a constitutional text phrased in the language of
i8th-century concerns and concepts.
That task, it might be argued, is properly performed, not by the Court,
but by the people of the society through the democratic process of amend-
ing the Constitution. Two factors, however, militate against such a conclu-
sion. First, the cumbersome and complicated machinery provided for
amendment casts serious doubt on both the efficacy and the democratic
nature of reliance on this process, if by democratic we mean responsive to
the majority will. More importantly, a Constitution that had been amended,
rather than judicially interpreted, in the majority of instances in which
such interpretation was required to maintain it as a continuingly relevant
document, would by that very fact cease effectively to serve as the symbol
of continuity that represents its greatest contribution to the continuing
stability of our society.242 The short of the matter, then, is that the Court's
symbolic function is best fulfilled in terms of what Dean Manning desig-
nates a "dramatic form" and that our society requires, from that dramatic
form, a far more complicated mixture of appearance and reality than
Shapiro's insistence on candor would allow for.
It is precisely because we entrust them with so important and complex
a function that being a Supreme Court Justice, rather than a law professor,
regularly appears in public opinion polls as the most desirable occupation
in our society. Law professors tend to be more skilled than many Justices
in the "logic" of the law and would no doubt be more capable, in many in-
stances, of meeting Shapiro's criterion of candor in opinion writing. But
the task that we entrust to our Justices requires the political sensitivity of
the statesman as well as the doctrinal skills of the lawyer. It is for this reason
that Justices are selected by means of a political appointment process rather
than by a nationwide system of examinations, and that the high degree of
rationality required of Justices by Bickel,24" ' even if it were possible of at-
tainment, would in the end prove to be an insufficient criterion.
The objection might be taken that the description given above repre-
sents an apotheosis of the role of a Supreme Court Justice that no actual
incumbent could hope to achieve. But such an objection confuses a job de-
scription with an assessment of the degree of skill required to perform a
given task satisfactorily. No marriage is perfect, and precious few are great,
but the fact that any marriage would disintegrate under the stress of an
insistent demand for complete candor is nevertheless sufficient to convince
us that intellectual honesty is inadequate as the sole criterion for selection
of a marital partner.
242. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, POLITICS AND THE WARREN COURT 155 (1965).
243. See text following note 132 supra.
[VOL. 20: Page 169
HeinOnline -- 20 Stan L. Rev. 240 1967-1968
THE SUPREME COURT
Similarly, in the case of the Court, we cannot legitimately withhold our
consent from its activities until we become convinced that the nine men
who staff it are capable of performing perfectly. We need only agree that
there exists a role that must be performed, and that our selection process
for filling that role is as satisfactory as possible. After that, as in all human
endeavors, we can only ask that the nine men we have chosen do the very
best they can. In government as in marriage, there comes a point where
consent is based on trust. It is precisely at such a point that the possibility of
abuse of power is greatest. But that, of course, is the meaning of trust, the
meaning that ultimately gives content to the "Morality Play."
B.
Even if one accepts these consequences of the Court's symbolic func-
tion, however, the question remains how the Court's power is to be con-
fined within its legitimate boundaries. As we have seen, it was this concern,
based on his view that the Court during the I93O's was making decisions
properly entrusted to Congress, that underlay Mr. Justice Black's insistence
that the Court rely on the "logic" of constitutional principles rather than
the "experience" of the common law.
To a considerable extent, Shapiro simply ignores the question thus
posed by Black. "[I]n the free speech area," for example, Shapiro argues
that "the Supreme Court represents some interest groups while other
government agencies represent others." ' Consequently, "[t]he Supreme
Court can actually contribute to greater democracy by vigorously further-
ing the interests of its groups, which are not being protected by other parts
of the government, so that all interests in our society may have a voice in
making policy decisions. ' Such an analysis assumes, however, that the
impact of a decision by the Court and one by Congress are the same;
whereas the problems posed by judicial review, not only for Black but also
for Hand and Wechsler, inhere precisely in the finality embodied in a find-
ing of unconstitutionality, in the fact that such a holding, unlike legislative
action, largely forecloses further action by other agencies of government
representing other interest groups.
Both Congress in passing a statute and the Court in upholding its valid-
ity are, after all, passing judgment on the same statute. If all that is involved
is the same type of policy decision made by bodies whose difference is
simply that they represent different interest groups, on what basis is Con-
gress compelled to respect the decisions of the Court? Shapiro himself be-
trays awareness of this point when he argues that Congress cannot itself
make final determinations of the constitutionality of measures that argu-
244- M. SHAPiRo, FREEDO. OF SPEECH: THE SUPREmE COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 2 (1966).
245. Id. See also text accompanying notes 14-16 supra.
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ably infringe first amendment rights because its deliberations focus too
much on the "marginal adjustments and compromises" of the legislative
process. 4 Yet his analysis of the work of the Court would make it simply
one more participant in that process.
If the Court's decisions are entitled to a special sort of deference denied
to acts of Congress, there must be some set of differences between the two
institutions that can account for this phenomenon-a set of differences
ignored in Shapiro's analysis. The best starting point for delineation of
those differences is Shapiro's description of Congress as a social system in
which participants can efficiently attain their legislative goals only by mini-
mizing conflict within the system, by helping to preserve that system
through cooperation with the floor leadership and heads of committees!"
Contrast with this the degree of independence from such institutional pres-
sures enjoyed by Supreme Court Justices: the absence of any committee
system; the freedom from party discipline; and the very considerable free-
dom, afforded by life tenure, even from any analogue to constituent pres-
sure, all of which ensure that decisions of the Court represent neither at-
tempts to preserve a given social system nor the result of "marginal adjust-
ments and compromises" among competing power centers, but rather the
expression of what the individual Justices collectively interpret the consti-
tutional mandate to be.
Equally important in defining the institutional differences between
Congress and the Court is the greater importance of craft pressures in con-
nection with the latter's work-the need to present an adequate justifica-
tion for the result reached. This factor is based in considerable part on the
tradition of scholarly criticism of the Court's work, which enforces de-
mands of intellectual coherence on the rationale offered for decision 4 But
it rests also on the procedures that the Court has adopted from the common
law: the setting forth of the rationale for decision in an opinion open to
public scrutiny, and the acceptance of the limitation that, with the narrowly
confined exception of judicial notice, a decision is to be arrived at, and sup-
port for its rationale obtained, exclusively from the evidence in the record
before the Court. It is ultimately these differences that justify the conclusion
that the majority of constitutional issues are better resolved through the
processes of the Court than through the processes of Congress, and that the
Court's resolution of those issues is properly entitled to a degree of defer-
ence and finality not normally accorded to acts of Congress.
It is therefore not sufficient to determine, when deciding whether or not
the Court has acted properly in taking cognizance of a given issue, that the
246. Id. at 29-30.
247. See id. at 20-21.
248. Cf. A. BICKEL, supra note 206, at 51-55.
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other branches of the government have long disregarded, and are likely to
continue to disregard, the problems involved. It is necessary further to de-
termine whether the issue is one with which the Court can deal while con-
tinuing to satisfy both craft pressures and the needs of its symbolic role-the
complex and often conflicting demands for adherence to logic, to neutral-
ity, and to experience that our society makes upon it. It is this second step
that Shapiro, in his analysis of the Reapportionment Cases,24 fails to take.
Shapiro approves of the decision in Baker v. Car?" precisely on the
basis that a serious problem existed that no other agency of government was
capable of dealing with.1 What Shapiro disapproves are the decisions fol-
lowing Baker, the Reapportionment Cases, which established the "one
man, one vote" principle. Shapiro's objection is not, of course, that the
"one man, one vote" principle lacks neutrality. Quite the contrary, Shapiro
sees that principle as embodying all of the worst faults that result from an
insistence on a relentlessly generalizable rule of decision,"' and his pene-
trating survey of the complex and unresolved issues in political philosophy
raised by a democratic form of government5 makes clear his conviction
that "one man, one vote" constitutes an oversimplified political slogan
rather than a desirable solution to the problems of malapportionment:
Majoritarian elections and representative government are not ends or values in
themselves but are at best instrumental values, "good" only to the extent that they
contribute to the goals of liberal democracy. Democratic theorists cannot simply
say-and American democratic theory has never consistently held-that "one man,
one vote" majority rule is "good." They can say only that "one man, one vote"
majority rule is good so far and only so far as it contributes to maximum individual
political equality and freedom. No democratic theorist can state flatly and finally
just how much of the "one man, one vote" principle should be introduced into
American politics. He can only make rough adjustments based on estimates of the
political consequences.
It is exactly this approach that the Court took in Baker when it, in effect, said
that Americans have reached a consensus that a proportion of eighteen to one is a
hindrance to democracy. Neither they nor we, however, can say that a one-to-one
proportion always maximizes democracy. In Baker, the Court stated the American
balance between "Madisonan" and "populistic" democracy and avoided binding
itself to precise standards of representation, any one of which would be theoreti-
cally incorrect because democratic theory does not contain any such precise
standards.
It is at this point that the Court as political theorist might have become Court
249. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (2964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (x964);
Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (2964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S.
678 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S.
713 (x964).
250. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
251. M. SHAPIRO, LAw AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREMLE COURT: NEw APROACH-ES TO POLITICAL
JURISPRUDENCE 233-34, 236 (964).
252. Seeid. at 232-33,236.
253. See id. at 216-32.
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as political scientist, analyzing the actual operation of the political forces around it.
For once the democratic theorist recognizes that electoral equality is not equiva-
lent to political equality or freedom but is simply a means that sometimes con-
tributes to and sometimes conflicts with these ends, he must decide when, where,
and how much electoral equality should be added to or subtracted from the po-
litical system in which he operates, in order to make it more democratic. Given
the complexity of contemporary American politics, such assessments are always
difficult, but one thing is fairly certain. Whatever the assessments, they are likely
to suggest delicate adjustments rather than sledge-hammer blows. It seems highly
unlikely that either a continuation of the present crazy quilt of malapportionment
or introduction of total and immediate equalization of votes will yield a demo-
cratically ideal result. The Baker decision allowed the Supreme Court to make its
own case-by-case assessment of the political balance in any given state and to fit its
remedies to the situations it found. When it is recalled that the processes of group
politics may give to members of certain groups far greater political influence than
to others and that the relative strength of various groups is markedly affected by
the geographic distributions of population, resources, industries, and so forth-
distributions that vary markedly from state to state-whoever attempts to achieve
greater equality must be prepared to make differing adjustments in differing
areas.
25 4
Shapiro then shifts his focus to those decisions following Baker-Gray
v. Sanders," Wesberry v. Sanders,"' and the Reapportionment Cases-the
decisions that resulted in the "one man, one vote" formulation:
The new decisions fundamentally ignore all that we have learned about the
group nature of politics. By adopting the most simplistic view of the political
process, and particularly of the process of representation, the Court equates the
electoral and the political processes and thinks to assure each citizen "equal pro-
tection of the laws" in the political sphere by giving each citizen a vote equal to
every other's. I have tried to show earlier that such a position glosses over or ig-
nores the basic paradox hidden behind the notion of government by the people
and mistakes an imperfect expedient, majority voting, for the essence of democ-
racy. . . . A vision of the political process as no more than the electoral process
and of each citizen as exercising his whole political power in the individual act of
voting cannot properly serve even the most populistic philosophy. For in the com-
plex politics of group bargaining and shifting temporary majorities that we acm-
ally have in the United States, inequalities in voting strength may contribute in
the over-all equality of all participants in the political process as a whole. Blanket
and blind enforcement of electoral equality will only decrease the political in-
equalities in some states at the cost of increasing them in others. The result of the
Court's new rulings in terms of real political equality will be largely random. In
the end they may achieve somewhat greater over-all equality but only because the
sum of new equalities will exceed the sum of new inequalities. Viewed as an at-
tempt actually to contribute to greater political equality in the United States,
rather than simply as a philosophical editorial, the Court's new position is little
more than a random stab.
257
254. Id. at 244-45.
255- 372 U.S. 368 (x963).
256. 376 U.S. x (x964).
257. M. SiPpmo, supra note 251, at 249.
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Shapiro's view of the proper role of the Court in the Reapportionment
Cases is echoed in Mr. Justice Stewart's dissent from those decisions:..8
Representative government is a process of accommodating group interests
through democratic institutional arrangements. Its function is to channel the
numerous opinions, interests, and abilities of the people of a State into the making
of the State's public policy. Appropriate legislative apportionment, therefore,
should ideally be designed to insure effective representation in the State's legisla-
ture, in cooperation with other organs of political power, of the various groups and
interests making up the electorate. In practice, of course, this ideal is approximated
in the particular apportionment system of any State by a realistic accommodation
of the diverse and often conflicting political forces operating within the State.
I do not pretend to any specialized knowledge of the myriad of individual
characteristics of the several States, beyond the records in the cases before us today.
But I do know enough to be aware that a system of legislative apportionment
which might be best for South Dakota, might be unwise for Hawaii with its many
islands, or Michigan with its Northern Peninsula. I do know enough to realize
that Montana with its vast distances is not Rhode Island with its heavy concen-
trations of people. I do know enough to be aware of the great variations among
the several States in their historic manner of distributing legislative power-of the
Governors' Councils in New England, of the broad powers of initiative and refer-
endum retained in some States by the people, of the legislative power which some
States give to their Governors, by the right of veto or otherwise, of the widely
autonomous home rule which many States give to their cities. The Court today
declines to give any recognition to these considerations and countless others, tan-
gible and intangible, in holding unconstitutional the particular systems of legis-
lative apportionment which these States have chosen. Instead, the Court says that
the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause can be met in any State only
by the uncritical, simplistic, and heavy-handed application of sixth-grade arith-
metic.
The fact is, of course, that population factors must often to some degree be
subordinated in devising a legislative apportionment plan which is to achieve the
important goal of ensuring a fair, effective, and balanced representation of the re-
gional, social, and economic interests within a State. And the further fact is that
throughout our history the apportionments of State Legislatures have reflected the
strongly felt American tradition that the public interest is composed of many
diverse interests, and that in the long run it can better be expressed by a medley
of component voices than by the majority's monolithic command. What constitutes
a rational plan reasonably designed to achieve this objective will vary from State
to State, since each State is unique, in terms of topography, geography, demog-
raphy, history, heterogeneity and concentration of population, variety of social and
economic interests, and in the operation and interrelation of its political institu-
tions. But so long as a State's apportionment plan reasonably achieves, in the light
258. Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion in the Reapportionment Cases appears in 377 U.S. at
744. The dissent applied to Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964), and WMCA,
Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964). In the other cases he did not dissent, but issued separate
opinions stating either that the legislative apportionment in issue was irrational or (in Maryland
Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes) that the case should be remanded for a determination of
whether the "Maryland apportionment 'could be shown systematically to prevent ultimate effective
majority rule.' "377 U.S. at 677.
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of the State's own characteristics, effective and balanced representation of all sub-
stantial interests, without sacrificing the principle of effective majority rule, that
plan cannot be considered irrational.
259
As the above quotations indicate, Stewart's interpretation of the re-
quirements of the equal protection clause in apportionment cases is that
the clause bars arbitrariness and systematic frustration of the will of the
majority,2 ° not that it mandates absolute equality. Such an interpretation
is supportable by reference to both what the Court had said in Baker" 1 and
the equal protection doctrine contained in decisions applicable to other
than apportionment situations.2 2 If, in addition to these virtues, Stewart's
position also embodies a superior grasp of the principles of political science
and political philosophy, why did the Court refuse to adopt it?
The answer to that question is surely not that the factors involved are
inherently too complex for judicial analysis. That apportionment cases in-
volve a formidable degree of complexity is undeniable, but the Court has
long dealt with the complexities inherent in fields such as antitrust, and
there is no reason to believe that the Court would be less successful at an-
alyzing a given reapportionment problem than will the Governors' com-
missions and legislative committees presently undertaking this task. The
answer is to be found, rather, in Shapiro's insistence that the Court examine
"more than the electoral process," in Stewart's view that what must be
considered is whether "a realistic accommodation of the diverse and often
confficting political forces operating within the State" has been achieved.
What both Stewart and Shapiro would require the Court to do in ap-
portionment cases is to examine the realities of the distribution of political
power within the State-the existence of voting blocs, the degree of party
control over voters and officials, the position of the mass media, and the
extent of financial backing available to the various factions, to mention
only a few of the crucial inquiries. In dissenting from the invalidation of
New York's apportionment,"' for example, Stewart quotes Elihu Root's
remarks to the New York constitutional convention of 1894, justifying the
giving of fewer seats to New York City than a "one man, one vote" rule
would require:
The question is whether thirty separate centers of 38,6o6 each scattered over the
country are to be compared upon the basis of absolute numerical equality with one
center of thirty times 38,6o6 in one city, with all the multiplications of power that
comes [sic] from representing a single interest, standing together on all measures
259. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 749-51 (1964) (dissenting opinion)
(footnote omitted).
260. See id. at 753-54.
261. See M. SApmo, supra note 251, at 242-43.
262. See Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 751-53 (1964) (dissenting
opinion).
263. WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964); -ee note 258 supra.
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against a scattered and disunited representation from the thirty widely separated
single centers of 38,606. Thirty men from one place owing their allegiance to one
political organization, representing the interest of one community, voting together,
acting together solidly; why, they are worth double the scattered elements of power
coming from hundreds of miles apart.21"
Whether or not it is correct to assume that the representatives of a large
city are under pressure to represent only a single, homogenous interest, the
quotation makes crystal dear that the formula espoused by Stewart and
Shapiro would indeed require the Court to canvass the actual workings of
the floor leadership in the legislative branches, the mechanisms of party
control not only over voters and the city government but also over elected
representatives-in short, the details of the petty corruption and networks
of personal influence that all too often constitute crucial sources of power
in municipal politics. Given the Court's institutional arrangements, how-
ever, it could investigate these matters only by requiring lower courts to
build records on these issues. Is this a demand we can reasonably make of
our courts? Even assuming that the evidence was available and would be
forthcoming, is it likely that our society could accept, as a steady diet, the
spectacle of the judiciary solemnly ruling on the accuracy of a political
boss's testimony concerning the sources of his power over voters and the
degree of control that he exercised over elected officials ?
If the analysis, adumbrated earlier, of the function performed by polit-
ical rhetoric has any validity whatsoever, the answer must be in the nega-
tive. The issue is not that the almost imperceptible gradations such inves-
tigations would reveal might go far toward undermining the neutrality
of the principle being applied. The decisive point is, rather, that the con-
tent of the records that would necessarily have to be made, the image of
our politics that the Court would be projecting, would be so totally incom-
patible with the content of the "Morality Play" as seriously to compromise
the symbolic role not only of the judiciary " ' but primarily of the political
system that was being surveyed.
264. 3 REvxsED Rzcopm o THE Co.sTrITTioNAL CONVENTION orF TnE STATE oF NEw Yoax 1215
(190o), quoted in 377 U.S. at 764.
265. Cf. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, in Baker v. Carr: "Manifestly, the Equal Protection
Clause supplies no clearer guide for judicial examination of apportionment methods than would the
Guarantee Clause itself. Apportionment, by its character, is a subject of extraordinary complexity, in-
volving-even after the fundamental theoretical issues concerning what is to be represented in a
representative legislature have been fought out or compromised-considerations of geography, de-
mography, electoral convenience, economic and social cohesions or divergencies among particular local
groups, communications, the practical effects of political institutions like the lobby and the city
machine, ancient traditions and ties of settled usage, respect for proven incumbents of long experience
and senior status, mathematical mechanics, censuses compiling relevant data, and a host of others.
Legislative responses throughout the country to the reapportionment demands of the 196o Census
have glaringly confirmed that these are not factors that lend themselves to evaluations of a nature that
are the staple of judicial determinations or for which judges are equipped to adjudicate by legal train-
ing or experience or native wit. And this is the more so true because in every strand of this complicated,
intricate web of values meet the contending forces of partisan politics. The practical significance of
apportionment is that the next election results may differ because of it. Apportionment battles are
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The Court cannot, in Bickel's terms, legitimate the politics of, for ex-
ample, one-party rule by basing a constitutional decision on firsthand testi-
mony concerning its operations. Nor could evidence consisting solely of
charts, graphs, electoral statistics, and the testimony of expert witnesses meet
the requirements of the Stewart and Shapiro formulas, which insist that
apportionment involves "more than the electoral process" and that the
proper inquiry must consist of a comprehensive analysis of the distribution
of political power throughout the state. Given that quest, resort to the testi-
mony of political-power holders concerning the existence of informal chan-
nels of power seems well-nigh unavoidable.
It will not do, therefore, to approve the decision in Baker v. Carr and
then to disavow the principle arrived at in the Reapportionment Cases,
for the institutional needs of the Court and the interplay between the de-
mands made upon it by its symbolic function and the requirement that
decisions be based on evidence contained in the record inevitably resulted
in the adoption of a standard that does not require involvement of the
judiciary in the spectacle portrayed above-in short, "one man, one vote."
The significant question in the apportionment controversy is the one that
both Stewart and Shapiro ignore, the analogue to the question Wechsler
must be taken to have answered in the negative in assessing the Brown
decision:26 Whether, given the fact that a "one man, one vote" standard
overwhelmingly party or intra-party contests. It will add a virulent source of friction and tension in
federal-state relations to embroil the federal judiciary in them." 369 U.S. at 323-24 (footnotes
omitted).
266. See text accompanying note 96 supra.
The question as posed here is, however, subject to several qualifications. First, adoption of a "one
man, one vote" standard by no means answers the question of the number of situations to which the
Court will apply such a standard. Thus, as both Bickel and Wechsler implicitly predicted, the "color-
blind" standard that underlay Brown has not been applied to "benign quota" situations. And similar
limitations have already been imposed by the Court on the applicability of the "one man, one vote"
standard. See, e.g., Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967) ("one man, one vote" standard
irrelevant to local nonlegislative school officials chosen by essentially appointive process); Fortson v.
Morris, 385 U.S. 231 (1966) (state legislature not disqualified, by reason of malapportionment, from
voting in runoff election for governor where previously held that legislature had until 1968 to re-
apportion). Nor does adoption of such a standard, even apart from the possibility of permissible
degrees of variation from an ideal apportionment, bar the utilization of devices such as gerrymanders
for accommodating many of the same political pressures that had previously resulted in malapportion-
ment. See In re Apportionment of Mich. Legislature, 376 Mich. 410, 137 N.W.2d 495 (1965), 376
Mich. 410, 138 N.W.2d i6 (1965), 377 Mich. 396, 24o N.W.2d 436, appeal dismissed sub nom.
Badgley v. Hare, 385 U.S. 1X4 (1966) (per curiam) (want of substantial federal question); Neal,
Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, x962 S. Cr. REV. 252, 277-78.
There is, finally, the question whether, given the inevitability of a "one man, one vote" standard,
the Baker opinion should have "candidly" canvassed the jurisdictional issue in these terms. To do so
would have required the Court to discount several possibilities that appeared at least feasible, if not
likely, at the time the decision was rendered: the possibility that the analysis given in the text above
was erroneous, and that some standard short of "one man, one vote" could have been developed; the
possibility that litigation would proceed in such a fashion as to make it unnecessary for the Court at
any early date to reach the issue of the ultimate standard to be applied, either because cases could be
disposed of upon the basis of more limited issues, or because the state and lower federal courts would
apply standards approximating "one man, one vote" without further guidance; and finally, the possi-
bility that an aroused electorate would force state legislatures to undertake their own reapportion-
ments, the possibility, in short, that further judicial intervention would not be required at all. History,
of course, has seen none of these possibilities realized, and in this limited sense Shapiro's call for
greater "candor" in Baker v. Carr seems on balance to be justified. The issue, however, was a good
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would have to be applied, the consequences of malapportionments were
sufficiently serious that greater injury would have been done to the Court's
prestige by a refusal to deal with them than by the public controversy that
application of that standard aroused.
Shapiro's condemnation of the reapportionment and segregation deci-
sions, like the insistence on candor that results in the coalescence of his as-
sessments of the Court's work with those of the "modest," thus arises from
his disregard of the institutional needs of the Court, a failure that seems all
the more startling in the context of his insistence that the Court be viewed
as a political institution. Our final inquiry must be, therefore, a search for
the sources of that failure.
VIII.
The considerable interest demonstrated by legal scholars in the insti-
tutional structure of courts has been part of the search for limitations on
judicial discretion. Much of the significant literature in this area is prem-
ised on the hypothesis that analysis of the institutional role and capacity
of the judiciary will make possible the formulation of guidelines in terms
of which courts can be confined within their legitimate sphere of author-
ity."" It is this quest, as we have seen, that underlies Justice Black's pre-
scription of logic rather than experience in constitutional adjudication and
that makes so important the question insistently raised by Black and ig-
nored by Shapiro of the existence of standards by which the decisions
that are properly Congress' can be distinguished from those properly the
Court's." 8 Bickel's mediating devices represent one response to this di-
lemma, and their derivation from the doctrines of "lawyer's law" on which
Shapiro also focuses.. underlines the extent to which the lawyer, in this
instance, has displayed a far more sensitive regard for institutional con-
siderations than has the political scientist.
The most important clue to the origins of this anomaly is provided
by the fact that Shapiro's focus, unlike Bickel's, is not on the activity of
the Court as such, but rather exclusively on the interaction of the Court
with other agencies of government. This difference is clearly apparent, for
example, in the argument offered by Shapiro to justify his central postu-
late, the propriety of treating courts as political institutions:
That courts are political agencies is self-evident. They are part of government, they
make public policy, and they are an integral part of the law-making and enforce-
deal more complicated than Shapiro suggests, precisely because of the existence of those institutional
demands that an insistence on "candor" necessarily overlooks.
267. See, e.g., H.M. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PRocEss (tent. ed. 1958); H.M. HART & H.
IVECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTs AND THE FEDERAL SysTmm (953); K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 225,
at i9-5i; H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AN TfE LEGAL SYSrEm (tent typescript ed. 1967).
268. See text accompanying note 244 supra.
269. See text accompanying notes 4-5 supra.
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ment process which is the central focus of political activity. If legislatures are po-
litical and executives are political, then courts must be political since all three are
inextricably bound together in the process of making law, and each sometimes per-
forms the functions that each of the others performs at other times 2 0
Such a view, as we have seen, offers many valuable insights, but it utterly
fails to provide a framework in terms of which boundaries among the
various political institutions can be delineated; and precisely that, as the
opinions of Black and the scholarly work of Wechsler and Bickel testify, is
the important task.
Shapiro's focus on the process rather than the actor, on interactions
within a given system rather than on the component parts of that system,
is not, however, peculiar to his analysis of the work of the Court. It is evi-
dent in many recent studies by political scientists, including, for example,
Professor Robert Dahl's pathbreaking exploration of the distribution of
political power in the New Haven municipal setting, Who Governs?2"
As is stressed in the companion volume, Professor Nelson Polsby's Com-
munity Power and Political Theory,272 the New Haven study had a theo-
retical as well as a descriptive function: that of demonstrating the extent
to which power in our cities is decentralized and, consequently, of cor-
recting the conclusions of those Polsby refers to as "social stratification"
theorists to the effect that communities are ruled by a single "power
elite.
273
The method used in Who Governs? is to identify a number of impor-
tant political decisions and the participants in them, to study the behavior
of those participants in the course of decisionmaking, and to analyze the
benefits and disadvantages accruing to various participants as a result of
the outcomes that ensued. What Dahl found was that no single social or
economic group either controlled the decisionmaking process or regularly
benefited from the results reached. Further, there was remarkably little
overlap among the participants in the various New Haven decisions studied
by Dahl!"' In connection with the urban renewal program, for example,
although the mayor created a citizens' action commission composed of rep-
resentatives of the economic elite, Dabl's study revealed that the commis-
sion almost never initiated any proposal, nor vetoed or altered one put be-
fore it by the mayor 5 Dahl concluded, therefore, that power in New
Haven is held by constantly shifting, issue-oriented coalitions, with consid-
270. M. Shapiro, Stability and Change in Judicial Decision-Making: lncrementalism or Stare De-
Ciss?, 2 LAw IN TRANSITION Q. 134 (1965). For a similar view see Dahl, Decision-Maling in a De-
mocracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. Pum. L. 279 (957).
271. R. Dam., WHo GovEmus? DarocRAcY AND PowvR m AN AamucA Crr (96i).
272. N. POLSEY, ComiuNrry PowR AND PouincAL. THEORY (x963).
273. See id. at 69-97.
274. R. DAuL, supra note 271, at 175.
275. Id. at 131.
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erable scope being given to a vigorous mayor determined to exploit his
political resources to the utmost.
The primary difficulty with Who Governs? as an analysis of the exist-
ing distribution of power is its assumption that the decisions canvassed
represented conflicts sufficiently serious to force all potentially affected pow-
erholders to mobilize their resources in the hopes of obtaining a favorable
outcome. As Dahl himself recognizes, however, in connection with two
of the three areas he studied-public schools and political nominations-
it can convincingly be argued that the economic and social elite, which
lives primarily in the suburbs, is largely indifferent to possible outcomes."'
Moreover, in connection with the third area studied, that of urban renewal,
it is far from clear that New Haven's economic elite saw its interests as
being significantly threatened rather than advanced. And even if mem-
bers of the elite were aware that the urban renewal program had certain
implications that ran counter to their interests, it nevertheless remains pos-
sible that those implications were perceived as being outweighed by the
advantages accruing to them.
The important question, then, the question that Dahl never asks in
connection with, for example, the power of the citizens' action commis-
sion, is whether that commission failed to assert itself because it was pow-
erless or because, given the program as proposed by the mayor, it was in-
different to further modifications. The inquiry is whether the commission's
failure to oppose the mayor's proposals represents an index of powerless-
ness or can be explained, rather, by the hypothesis that the mayor never
proposed to the commission anything that he thought that body might
reject. If the latter hypothesis is true, and the mayor would in fact have
formulated different proposals had he thought the commission would ac-
cept them, who then holds power in New Haven?
Such a question ultimately raises the issue of the possible priorities of
an elite. Dahl's method of investigation could reveal the true distribution
of power in New Haven only if every possible elite assigned the highest
priority to never suffering any disadvantage whatsoever from the outcome
of any decision reached in any area of New Haven life. Given that postu-
late, the fact that Dahl's studies reveal the absence of elite participation in
certain decisions and the existence of outcomes that to some extent disad-
vantage the elite would indeed indicate a lack of power on their part. The
more likely hypothesis, however, one that Dahl himself apparently ac-
cepts, 2 ' is that members of the elite will not feel compelled even to enter
the arena studied by Dahl unless they perceive what they regard as impor-
tant interests to be threatened. The difficulty is that Dali resolutely refuses
276. See id. at 70-71.
277. See id. at 224-25, 237-38, 270-301.
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to address the difference between those conflicts that an elite would per-
ceive as both significant and threatening and those to which it would re-
main relatively indifferent." 8
None of the above, of course, purports to deny the significant contri-
bution made by Who Governs? to the study of the functioning of politi-
cal power in local communities. As Dahl convincingly demonstrates, the
ways in which such power is exercised are far more complicated than the
social-stratification theorists would have us believe. But that demonstra-
tion, as we have seen, falls far short of embodying a convincing delinea-
tion of the actual distribution of power. The absence of a covert and all-en-
compassing network of influence that ensures elite participation in, and
dictation of the outcome of, all New Haven decisions is not, after all, very
startling news. Only the most ruthless and heavyhanded elite, or an elite
fearing imminent loss of its power, would feel compelled to act in so as-
sertive and undiscriminating a manner. In the end, therefore, rather than
offering an analysis of the distribution of political power, what Who Gov-
erns? largely accomplishes is to supply a correct answer to an often irrele-
vant question.
In part, the objections advanced above to Dahl's methods can be epito-
mized as exemplifications of his failure to take into account what Professor
Carl Friedrich first described as the rule of anticipated reactions: the hy-
pothesis that much political behavior is governed by the actor's perceptions
of, and adjustments for, the reactions he expects to be provoked by pos-
sible actions on his part."' Thus, if the citizens' action commission did ex-
ercise any power in New Haven's urban renewal program, it did so ex-
clusively by forcing the mayor to propose only those measures that would
not conflict with the reactions he anticipated from the commission. The
total absence of overt conflict between the mayor and the commission, how-
ever, means that such a hypothesis would be viable only on the assumption
that the mayor's assessment of the commission's probable reaction was
unfailingly accurate.
Given the mayor's political skill, such an assumption is not untenable,28
but the necessity for invoking it points up the major methodological prob-
lem inherent in the anticipated-reaction hypothesis: the extreme difficulty
involved in obtaining data on the basis of which it can be either confirmed
or disproved in any given situation. Dahl himself noted this difficulty in
connection with a study of influence ranking in the United States Senate;
there he encountered a problem he called
278. For a similar and more detailed discussion of these objections to Dahl's method see Bachrach
& Baratz, Two Faces of Power, 56 Am. PoL. Sc. REV. 947,950-52 (1962).
279. See C. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GoVERNAENT AND PoLrrICs: NATURE AND D-vn.op-
wmNT 16-18 (1937); Simon, Notes on the Observation and Measurement of Political Power, X5 J. POL.
5oo, 505-o6 (953).
280. See Bachrach & Baratz, supra note 278, at 952 n.29.
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the problem of the chameleon. Suppose a Senator takes no prior position on any
bill and always decides how to vote by guessing how the Senate majority will vote;
then, if he is a perfect guesser, according to the ranking method used he will be
placed in the highest rank. Our common sense tells us, however, that in this case
it is the Senate that has power over the Senator, whereas the Senator has no influ-
ence on the votes of other Senators.
...In order to identify chameleon behavior and separate it from actual at-
tempts at influence, one cannot rely on roll-calls. One needs observations of the
behavior of Senators prior to the roll-calls. But if it is true, as I have been arguing,
that observations of this kind are available only with great difficulty, rarely for
past sessions, and probably never in large numbers, then in fact the data needed
are not likely to exist. But if they do not exist for the Senate, for what institutions
are they likely to exist?
281
We need not examine here the extent to which the absence of such data
makes it impossible to reach judgments about who wields power in a
given situation, although the existence of historians, whose trade consists
of making such judgments, is persuasive evidence that the task is a pos-
sible one. Our primary concern is with a phenomenon that, although anal-
ogous to anticipated reactions, operates both more widely and less con-
sciously-the phenomenon of the shared community expectation.
In connection with New Haven, Polsby makes explicit the impact of
this phenomenon on the distribution of political power within the com-
munity:
Some, perhaps most, possible courses of action are never considered in community
decision-making simply because they are inconceivable to the actors involved. No
one seems ever to have seriously considered turning the privately owned New
Haven Water Company over to the city, for example, although there seems to be
no reason why this could not be done. The array of alternatives presented for com-
munity decision-making seems likely, then, to be determined by consideration
[sic] very different from a rational canvassing of all technically feasible possibili-
ties. What determines the agenda of alternatives within which community deci-
sion-making takes place?
There are several plausible answers to this question, but the current state of
affairs seems to be centrally important in determining the future course of ac-
tion ....
Dahli has suggested as a general principle that: "If A's goal requires a slight
change or weak response from B, and C's goals require a great change or a strong
response, then with equal resources, rate [sic] and efficiencies [of resource em-
ployment], A is more likely to succeed than C. Or, to put it another way, A can
attain his political goals with less influence than C can. Thus, if A's goals fall well
within 'political consensus' he may have to do little beyond maintaining the con-
sensus; whereas if C's goals fall well outside the 'political consensus,' then for him
to achieve his goals may require access to enormous resources.
...It is not enough ...for an alternative to be technically feasible. It also
28z. DaM, The Concept of Power, 2 Bsxuv. Se. 201, 212-14 (,957).
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must be politically palatable and relatively easy to accomplish; otherwise great
amounts of influence have to be brought to bear with great skill and efficiency in
order to secure its adoption. Conclusions that might be drawn from this are that
the community agenda of alternatives is relatively insensitive to any but very great
differences in the power of actors and that only influence differences of the greatest
magnitude as between actors are likely to be reflected in changes in the alternatives
presented to decision-makers.282
As exemplified by the quotation just given, investigators such as Dal
and Polsby typically devote little attention to ascertaining the origins of
the "current state of affairs" or the content of the "community agenda of
alternatives." This lack of attention is in part due precisely to the fact that
the community agenda represents a shared set of expectations. In other
words, because the agenda is the community's, because its content is not a
source of conflict among groups within the community, the methods uti-
lized by Dahl in Who Governs? are wholly inappropriate to the task of
analyzing those origins or that content.
The contents of the agenda may of course-indeed, probably will-sig-
nificantly favor one set of groups within the community. But as long as
the disadvantaged groups do not disassociate themselves from that agenda,
analysis of the conflict of interests thus created would require the postu-
late that the disadvantaged groups have a "real" interest that they are pre-
vented from perceiving by their acceptance of the agenda. Such a postu-
late, however, because it involves making value judgments that cannot be
correlated with the actual behavior of participants in the decisionmaking
process, is extremely difficult to integrate into the conceptual structure
underlying Who Governs?
Dahl's failure to explore the consequences of the existence of a com-
munity agenda is also at least partially due to a methodological problem
analogous to that posed by the "chameleon." Thus, rejecting the sugges-
tion that the power of a ruling elite might inhere precisely in the control
that it exercises over the community consensus embodied in an agenda of
alternatives and therefore that such control is inaccessible to an analysis
of conflicts between the ruling elite and other groups, Dahl has argued
that
either the consensus is perpetual and unbreakable, in which case there is no con-
ceivable way of determining who is ruler and who is ruled. Or it is not. But if it is
not, then there is some point in the process of forming opinions at which the one
group will be seen to initiate and veto, while the rest merely respond. And we can
only discover these points by an examination of a series of concrete cases where
key decisions are made: decisions on taxation and expenditures, subsidies, welfare
programs, military policy, and so on.283
282. N. POLSBY, supra note 272, at 133-35 (italics in original) (footnotes omitted).
283. Dahl, A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model, 52 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 463, 469 (1958) (italics
in original).
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Two points need to be made concerning this theoretically unassailable
proposition. First, the fact that the existence of the consensus benefits the
elite does not provide a sufficient basis for assuming that the elite in some
conscious sense controls or manipulates that consensus. The elite would
presumably mobilize its resources in opposition to any attempt to change
the consensus to its disadvantage, but as long as no such attempt occurs,
as long as the consensus truly represents a shared set of community values,
there is no reason to suppose that the elite's acceptance of those values is
more self-conscious than their acceptance by any other group. Dahl's in-
sistence on attacking only a model of an elite that actively manipulates the
community consensus, rather than considering the possibility of an elite
that is the passive beneficiary of the consensus, once again runs the risk of
supplying a correct answer to an irrelevant question.
Second, and more important, there is the problem of the time scale.
Dahl's assertion that unless there is a conflict concerning the community
agenda there is no way to distinguish the rulers from the ruled is true. But
such a conflict is most likely to arise over failures of the community con-
sensus to shift in accordance with changes in economic and social condi-
tions. Given a comfortably affluent society, such changes become apparent
only over fairly long periods of time, and the resulting conflicts may there-
fore occur only near the end of such periods, when the disparity between
the old consensus and the new social and economic reality is particularly
great. The absence of conflict concerning the community agenda during
any reasonably limited period of time does not, therefore, imply that such
a conflict is not likely in the future. The question, to repeat, is always
whether the time scale chosen was a sufficiently long one. In the case of
Who Governs? no attempt is made to demonstrate that it was.2""
Moreover, as Polsby explicitly notes, the existence of a community
agenda of alternatives imposes stringent limitations upon the changes that
can be introduced through the processes of community decisionmaking.
As long as that agenda continues to benefit the elite, therefore-and if an
elite exists at all it is presumably because the agenda does favor it-it seems
reasonable to expect that the elite will remain largely indifferent to the
outcomes of community decisions. The changes to which we would not
expect it to remain indifferent, changes in the community agenda itself,
are precisely those that Polsby and Dahl convincingly demonstrate to be
the most difficult to bring about.
Polsby also accounts for the mechanism by means of which the com-
munity agenda limits the possible outcomes of community decisions-the
fact that "some, perhaps most" outcomes "are inconceivable to the actors
284. For an analysis of the cognate problem that arises in connection with the anticipated-reaction
hypothesis see Simon, supra note 279, at 505-o6.
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involved." This internalization of the community agenda by the actors
involved in community decisionmaking is not, of course, a phenomenon
limited to municipalities. Dahl, for example, makes this argument:
If the military leaders of this country and their subordinates agreed that it was
desirable, they could most assuredly establish a military dictatorship of the most
overt sort; nor would they need the aid of leaders of business corporations or the
executive branch of our government. But they have not set up such a dictatorship.
For what is lacking are the premises I mentioned earlier, namely agreement on a
key political alternative and some set of specific implementing actions. That is to
say, a group may have a high potential for control and a low potential for unity.
The actual political effectiveness of a group is a function of its potential for control
and its potential for unity. Thus a group with a relatively low potential for control
but a high potential for unity may be more politically effective than a group with
a high potential for control but a low potential for unity.
2 5
We have been spared a military dictatorship, then, because the military,
in Dahl's terms, have "a low potential for unity," which is to say that they
have not agreed "on a key political alternative and some set of specific im-
plementing actions." The "key political alternative," however, must surely
be the decision to set up a military dictatorship, and if this decision were
made, our military organization would presumably be capable of produc-
ing plans outlining a "set of specific implementing actions." In the end,
therefore, to say that we have not had a military dictatorship because the
military have "a low potential for unity" seems to amount to saying that
we have not had a military dictatorship because the military have not (yet)
agreed among themselves that one ought to be imposed.
The important question must surely be why the military do not so
agree, and the phenomenon of the internalized community agenda goes
far toward answering that question. Under most circumstances, our na-
tional agenda of alternatives does not include the possibility of a military
dictatorship; it embodies, rather, the shared value-the symbol, if you will
-of civilian rule. And the military, who have historically perceived them-
selves as part of our society, also share in the consensus on that agenda.
They do not agree, in other words, on courses of action that are "incon-
ceivable" to them because not within the agenda they have internalized.
On the basis of the above analysis we may conclude that any study of
the distribution of political power that does not include a detailed analy-
sis of the origins and content of the community agenda must be adjudged
incomplete. 8 ' What is crucial, as one incisive analysis of Dahl's study of
New Haven has put it, is an exploration of the ways in which "the domi-
nant values and the political myths, rituals and institutions ... tend to
285. Dahl, supra note 283, at 465 (italics in original).
286. Cf. Simon, supra note 279, at 510-12.
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favor the vested interests of one or more groups, relative to others." ' It
is precisely such an analysis that is lacking in Who Governs?
The ultimate source of the failure of Who Governs? fully to describe
the distribution of power in New Haven is thus to be found in the focus,
which Shapiro shares with Dahl, on the process rather than the actor, on
interactions within a given system rather than on the component parts of
that system. Such a focus permits a highly accurate description of the sys-
tem as it actually operates at any given time. But it does not permit an as-
sessment of whether the system is operating within proper limits, whether
the community agenda is an equitable one, for any such assessment, as we
have seen, would require the postulation of "real' as opposed to perceived
interests.
Nor does such a focus, as our examination of Dahl's military-dictator-
ship example indicates, even permit satisfactory analysis of the question
how the existing limits of the system are maintained. The continuing oper-
ation of the system, the internal checks and balances, of course limit the
changes that can be introduced by any given component part. But if we
inquire into the source of the particular set of existing checks and balan-
ces or ask why the actors accept the constraints represented by those checks
and balances, we are led directly to the community agenda of alternatives:
the consensus that defines the existing set of checks and balances and
whose internalization by the actors results in the acceptance of the con-
straints that it imposes. 8
287. Bachrach & Baratz, supra note 278, at 950.
288. Cf. D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 348-49 (951).
In one of the footnotes omitted from the quotation in the text accompanying note 282 supra,
Polsby notes that the "current state of affairs" is not the only possible determinant of the "community
agenda of alternatives": "Other plausible answers might be that the agenda of alternatives is deter-
mined by the ideologies of choosers; by the 'real' interests of choosers; by accident; by certain under-
lying 'structural' characteristics of the community (e.g., company town vs. dormitory suburb vs.
metropolis). In presenting my own candidate for the best answer, I do not mean to exclude these pos-
sibilities. A theory that claimed some measure of comprehensiveness would probably have to consider
the extent to which each of these factors determined the course of community decision-making."
N. POLsBY, supra note 272, at 134 n.34.
But Polsby has previously found unacceptable at least one of these "plausible answers"-the "real"
interests of choosers. Polsby's comment on an attempt by C. Wright Mills to delineate the possibility of
a "false consciousness" on the part of a given social stratum is as follows: "Note the presumption that
'objective interests' exist; that there is a set of allegiances and actions which is appropriate for all
members of a class. This presupposes a homogeneous set of 'accepted values' for all class members.
Secondly, Mills presumes that these particular allegiances and actions 'have to be followed.' This means
in effect that a 'best' strategy also exists. But are not these 'objective' circumstances actually constructs
of the analyst?" Id. at 23 n.55 (italics in original).
The salient issue raised by Polsby's comment on Mills is the possibility that Polsby's agenda of
alternatives is itself a "construct of the analysL" The short answer is that it clearly is. Certainly there
exist no empirical data in direct support of the proposition that all members of any existing community
share a single, coherent, and comprehensive body of values. Indeed, one of the most fascinating aspects
of Who Governs?-Dahl's speculations in book VI on the sources of stability in pluralistic democracies
-takes as its point of departure recent empirical findings indicating that "although Americans almost
unanimously agree on a number of general propositions about democracy, they disagree about specific
applications to crucial cases" and that "a majority of voters frequently hold views contrary to the rules
of the game actually followed in the political system." R. DAHL, supra note 271, at 312.
Dahl's hypothesis concerning the stability of those rules suggests that, although the majority of
voters prefer different rules, their preference is not a strong one, in the sense that they are unwilling
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An analogous set of problems arises in connection with the "group"
theory of politics, which explicitly underlies Shapiro's analysis of the
Court's role in first amendment cases. 89 The group theory simply assumes,
on the part of groups within the society, the existence of a consensus about
the legitimacy of the system that defines the conditions of their interac-
tion 9 It assumes, in other words, that groups accept the constraints the
system imposes on their possible goals and the methods to be followed in
achieving those goals.
The difficulties involved in this assumption are most clearly apparent
when group theorists attempt to account for a change in the consensus-
for society's acceptance of, for example, a set of social, economic, or politi-
cal demands that had formerly been unacceptable. Because group theory
to expend many resources to realize it; that no agreement exists regarding the desirability of any single
set of alternatives; and that the politically active stratum of society, marked by a high degree of con-
sensus concerning the desirability of the existing rules, is often capable of blocking changes because of
its superior political skills and resources. Such a hypothesis, suggesting that "public" acceptance of
democratic norms is really a matter of their acceptance by a strategically placed subpublic, could ob-
viously be applied to Polsby's "community agenda of alternatives." But this is only to suggest that the
agenda of alternatives is indeed an analytical construct, one that may or may not be verified by em-
pirical data. It does not answer the question whether this particular construct is a valuable one.
The "community agenda of alternatives" does account for an empirically observable phenomenon,
the fact that "[s] ome, perhaps most, possible courses of action are never considered in community de-
cision-making. ... N. Poi.sBy, supra note 272, at 133 (italics in original). Dahl's hypothesis sug-
gests that Polsby's explanation (that most possible courses of action are inconceivable to the actors
involved because those actors share a community agenda) represents a considerable simplification of a
complex reality involving the agendas held by various subpublics, the intensity of the preference of
each subpublic for its own agenda (in terms of willingness to expend resources to realize it), and the
ability of each subpublic (in terms of access to sufficient resources) to enforce that preference. The
methodological difficulties involved in giving empirical content to any of these categories are, to say
the least, considerable. Given the absence of data-and the comprehensiveness of Dahl's categories
suggests that the vacuum will not soon be filled-a first approximation, a simplification such as that
represented by the "community agenda of alternatives," may therefore be good enough. Dahl's hy-
pothesis, after all, in the absence of empirical data, must remain just that-a hypothesis.
Whether a given construct is good enough depends on what questions that construct is being used
to answer. Thus, the "public" whose acceptance of Court decisions has often been referred to in this
Article is as much an analytic construct as the "public" whose acceptance of democratic norms Dahl
has further analyzed in terms of subpublics. Because this Article is concerned with the empirical
phenomenon of public reaction to Court opinions only insofar as the existence of that phenomenon
requires certain conclusions about the proper role of the Court, detailed analysis of the components of
that "public" seems unnecessary. Conversely, there are inquiries for which Dahl's categories of "po-
litical professionals, the political stratum, and the great bulk of the population," R. DAB,, supra note
271, at 316, will lack adequate precision.
The point, then, is that labeling a category a "construct of the analyse' poses the question rather
than answers it. Any general category that purports to encompass a larger group of events than those
actually studied represents, in Polsby's sense, a "construct of the analyst" as to those events that have
not actually been observed. Further, in a sense that may or may not be different, even categories that
refer only to actually observed events represent constructs of the observer. The question in each case
can only be whether the construct adequately accounts for the phenomenon it is being used to describe.
The construct of the "community agenda of alternatives" adequately accounts for the phenomenon
that most possible courses of action are never considered in community decisionmaking, if the focus
of inquiry is on the process of decisionmaking, on "how" those decisions get made. That the analysis
offered by Dahl and Polsby is inadequate to answer the question "why" decisions get made, to account
for the fact that certain decisions are inconceivable, is the argument made in part VIII of this Article.
As an answer to that question, the construct of a "community agenda of alternatives" is of course un-
satisfactory, since the question at issue is precisely what factors determine the content of that agenda.
What is striking is that Polsby should regard as a "plausible answer" to that question the very hy-
pothesis of "real" interests that underlies so much of social-stratification theory.
289. See text accompanying notes 14-16,244 supra.
29o. See Rothman, Systematic Political Theory: Observations on the Group Approach, 54 Am.
POL. SC. REV. 15, 28-29 (ig6o).
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postulates that all social attitudes are the product of group membership, the
shift in attitudes implied by the acceptance of such demands is accounted
for in terms of the crystallization of what had previously been only a
"potential" group. Shapiro, for example, explicitly resorts to the concept
of potential groups in defining the Court's group "clientele."
291
The difficulty with this construct, however, is that it fundamentally
contradicts the postulate that attitudes are derived solely from group mem-
bership, for a potential group is in essence nothing more than a shared
attitude that at some point may lead to membership in, and activity as, a
group. For potential groups, therefore, attitudes precede group formation,
rather than follow from group membership.29 The root of the difficulty,
once again, is the refusal of group theorists to examine the origins and
content of the community agenda that defines the conditions for group
interaction, and the degree to which that agenda has been internalized by
participants in such interaction. Potential groups simply represent poten-
tial changes in the community agenda, and an adequate account of their
crystallization therefore crucially involves a description of the psycho-
logical mechanisms in terms of which changes are introduced into indi-
viduals' perceptions of the norms and goals of the society in which they
live, the roles they are to play within that society, and the constraints so-
ciety has imposed upon those roles.
It is such mechanisms of internalization that provide the ultimate an-
swer to the fears of judicial discretion that underlie Black's insistence on
"logic" rather than experience. Of course both the existence of other agen-
cies pursuing their own interests-the checks Shapiro postulates as limit-
ing judicial overstepping of legitimate boundaries-and the threat of a
massively unfavorable public response do place some constraints on the
abuse of that discretion. But those constraints, as the experience of the
i93o's demonstrated, operate only belatedly and in the most extreme cir-
cumstances. Therefore, if we are concerned about the day-by-day opera-
tion of the Court, about the routine decision rather than the isolated, spec-
tacular exception, the question whether the Court will confine itself to
those decisions the society regards as legitimately within its authority can
ultimately be answered only by examining the extent to which individ-
ual Justices have internalized the community consensus that defines the
Court's sphere of competence.
It is striking, for example, that immediately upon assuming his seat
on the Court, Senator Black was certain that he had assumed a wholly dif-
ferent governmental role. To some extent, awareness of the content and
limits of the judicial role can be ascribed either to prior judicial experience
291. M. SHAs'mo, supra note 244, at 34-36.
292. For a more detailed exposition of this analysis see Rothman, supra note 290, at 23-25.
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or to what might be designated "on-the-job learning." However, in Black's
case at least, it is unlikely that much significance can be ascribed to his
service, in i91o and 1911, as a police-court judge in Birmingham, Alabama.
Similarly, there are serious difficulties involved in attempts to derive
this awareness from the institutional experiences that Justices undergo
during their service on the Court. It is true that much can be learned
from an examination of the pressures exerted on a Justice by the institu-
tion of the Court, and we already possess studies that considerably advance
our knowledge in this area. " ' We could presumably learn even more from
an accurate and detailed study of the changes in life style that result from
appointment to the Court-changes in luncheon partners, dinner guests,
and recipients and initiators of telephone conversations, for example. Ul-
timately, however, the value of such studies must be considerably less
than in the case of a Congressman, for example, or the head of an admin-
istrative agency, primarily because the Court as an institution imposes far
less pressure on a member than does the social system that is Congress or
the interlocking web of bureaucratic and client pressures that constitutes
an administrative agency.
The utility of studies such as those suggested above is severely limited,
then, by facts already noted: The Court, unlike Congress, is not a social
system; the task of a Justice is far more an individual than a group endeav-
or; and the influence of other Justices and of the institution on a new
member of the Court is correspondingly limited' To a far greater ex-
tent than is true in the case of a Congressman, therefore, the search for
factors that effectively impose restraints on the discretion of the individual
Justice must be carried beyond the realm of his work experience to that
of his schooling, both formal and informal. Such an investigation, a branch
of the study of political "socialization," might profitably begin with an
examination of the impact of their professional training on given Justices.
For example, to what extent can a particular Justice's perception of the
range of discretion he can legitimately exercise be ascribed to a professional
training that was primarily "policy-oriented" ?
Given the growing awareness on the part of the profession as a whole
of the discretion that necessarily inheres in common-law methods of adjudi-
cation, it seems unlikely that the study proposed above would produce any
startling results. But such a study would at least represent a start toward ex-
plorations of far earlier and less formal learning experiences from which
more relevant information might be obtained. To propose studies of child-
293. See, e.g., Danelski, The Influence of the Chief justice in the Decisional Process, in CouTms,
JUDGES, AND POLITICS (W. Murphy & C. Pritchett eds. I96I); Murphy, Marshaling the Court: Leader-
ship, Bargaining, and the Judicial Process, 29 U. Cm. L. REv. 640 (1962); Snyder The Supreme Court
as a Small Group, 36 SociAr. FoRcEs 232 (x958).
294. See text accompanying notes 247-48 supra.
[Vol. 2o: Page I69
HeinOnline -- 20 Stan L. Rev. 260 1967-1968
THE SUPREME COURT
hood learning experiences is not, of course, to suggest that there do not
exist formidable methodological problems that would first have to be over-
come. It is to suggest only that such studies will ultimately prove necessary
if we insist on definitive answers to the dilemma posed by the possibility of
judicial discretion.
As the decisions of the Court increasingly lose the appearance of "logic"
that has historically constituted the basis for their public acceptability, stud-
ies of the institutional differences between Congress and the Court2e" and
of the extent to which the Justices have internalized the constraints on their
power implicit in those institutional differences could thus gradually serve
to replace appearance with reality, could in time make possible the discard-
ing of those symbols in terms of which the Court's authority has historical-
ly been accepted by the public. Even if studies both of childhood learning
experiences and of the functioning of the Court as an institution could in
principle provide us with complete and coherent descriptions, however,
would there not remain significant limitations on the efficacy of those
studies?
Thus, as we have seen, the symbols such studies would regard as mean-
ingless abstractions-the need to achieve "logic" in judicial decisions that
they would be explaining away-in fact perform a function that is vitally
necessary: the function of continually reminding participants in govern-
ment of the overriding social values our society seeks to impose upon the
governmental process, of the ideals in terms of which we desire to be
ruled." 6 The Supreme Court's conferences are conducted in secret, and the
Latin in which the Roman Catholic Mass was formerly invariably con-
ducted presumably veiled from many of the participants in that rite the
meaning of the words being spoken. But is the saying of the Mass in the
vernacular now the beginning, or the end, of the relevance of that sacra-
ment to the lives of believers?
That the limits on the utility of such studies continue to be observed,
that the processes of the Court not be completely open to public view, is,
moreover, no less important for the Justices than for the pi~blic they serve.
For the short of the matter is that trust has a meaning for both partners to a
relationship. If a government based on consent is to survive, the "Morality
Play" must have content for the actors as well as for the audience. And that
content, as we have seen,29 is based precisely on the possibility of abuse of
discretion.
295. See, e.g., id.
296. See text accompanying notes 241-43 supra.
297. See the concluding paragraphs of part VII-A, following note 243 supra.
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